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PREFACE
In the last decade, there is no hotter issue discussed by experts of various scientific disciplines than populism issue. This can-
not be separated from empirical reality of emergence of populism, 
which plays role in the social and political dynamics. The emer-
gence of political elites like Donald Trump in AS, Nharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) and Narendra Modi in India, Marine Le Pen, 
Geert Wilders, Norbet Hoffer and Brexit initiator, Nigel Farage, 
in Europe, Rodriogo Duterte in Philippines, most of which suc-
cessfully win votes in Election and even take the seat of State 
ruler, marks the populism era in the world of global politics. 
In Indonesia, the emergence of Prabowo Subianto and Joko 
Widodo who are engaged in the power contestation for two 
consecutive periods (2014 & 2019) also marks the emergence of 
populism. In experts’ opinion, Prabowo represents a right populist 
political elite figure (ultra-nationalism) since the political narra-
tions he offers are oriented to confirmation of anti-foreign na-
tionalism. Meanwhile, Jokowi is deemed to display modern or 
moderate populism, since he emphasizes nationalism without 
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positioning foreign (Western) parties as an enemy to fight with. 
Differently from the right populism in America, Europe and part 
of Asia, the variant of populism in Indonesia that successfully 
makes Jokowi win the power contestation is the moderate popu-
lism.
One interesting thing for the Indonesia case is the emergence 
of Islamic populism initiated by Islamism groups. The mass mo-
bilization movements in the Defending Islam action (411, 412), 
defending ulama action, reunion 212, to people power are the 
most popular populism phenomena which draw much attention, 
including from domestic and foreign experts. The presence of 
social movement that uses religious label or identity politics is not 
limited to enliven power contestation both at local (Head of 
Region Election of DKI Jakarta) and national (Presidential Elec-
tion) levels. In fact, its presence, more or less, plays an important 
role in changing the political and Islamic landscapes in Indonesia. 
Many experts assume that the emergence of the biggest mass 
mobilization act in Indonesian history after the New Order suc-
cessfully places the Islamism groups on the public mainstream 
discussion. 
In addition, the impacts of the Islamic populism actions are 
really serious, such as declining image of Indonesia’s moderate, 
tolerant and pluralistic Islam. This may at least be observed from 
various literatures of Islamic-social contemporary study which 
generally describe Islam in Indonesia after the New Order as 
conservative, intolerant and radical. The literatures state that Is-
lam in Indonesia is, within a relatively long period, known as or 
identical to –to borrow Martin van Bruinessen’s term— smile 
Islam. After the New Order, however, particularly after the 
populism actions, the smile Islam of Indonesia shifts 180 degree 
to be angry Islam. 
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In line with strengthening Islamic populism with its conser-
vative-radical characters or, in global term is known as, right 
populism, the development of the quality of democracy in Indo-
nesia after the New Order is declining. After a progressive devel-
opment from 1999 to 2004, the development of democracy in 
Indonesia is stagnant (2005-2014). In the next period (2015-
2019), the trend of development of democracy in Indonesia –and 
globally in general-- even declines, particularly in terms of civil 
freedom. In this context, the rise of populism (like Islamic popu-
lism at the bottom and like political elite populism at the top) 
greatly contributes to the deconsolidation of democracy in Indo-
nesia.
This research takes the topic which becomes the experts’ at-
tention, discussion and debates. The aspect explored in this re-
search is the discourses of Indonesian Muslim experts and Indo-
nesianists (Western scholars who are concerned about Indonesia) 
in understanding the Islamic populism phenomena in Indonesia. 
Although the experts of the two segments have produced dis-
courses or scientific reviews of relevant topic, however, only few 
of them comprehensively and systematically review the experts’ 
opinions. 
This research finds that Islamic populism in Indonesian con-
text is defined by the experts in the sense of popular mobilizations 
which engage popular political narrations as well as confrontation 
with elites in power who are imaged as authoritarian, corrupt and 
pro-foreign power and aseng (China). Most of the actors and mass 
involved in these are actions are urban mid-class Muslims of 
various religious (Islamic) identities and classes. The interests of 
the proponents of these populism actions are varied and, in some 
cases, confronting each other, from purely demanding Ahok to 
be prosecuted for blasphemy, piety expression, Islamization of 
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public space as well as political space (State power), and practice 
interest (struggle for access to power).
The research result also finds that almost all experts assume 
that the Islamic populism actions promoted by Islamic political 
groups greatly contribute to the declining quality of democracy 
in Indonesia. These actions also trigger counter-actions which are 
not less militant by State agents and moderate Muslims. Instead 
of responding the Islamic populism in democratic ways, in most 
of experts’ opinion, the State agents and democratic civil society 
groups of moderate Muslims are even trapped in a non-demo-
cratic game model just like how the anti-democratic groups act. 
This research is the result of collaboration between-research-
es of PTKI (Islamic Religious Higher Education Institution) in 
Indonesia as well as researchers of the Australian National Uni-
versity (ANU), Canberra, Australia. M. Khusna Amal of the State 
Islamic Study Institute (IAIN) of Jember, Damanhuri of Instika 
(Madura) and Iksan of Islamic Study Institute Al-Fitra (Sura-
baya) are the three researchers of PTKI. The co-researcher as well 
as supervisor of ANU is Associate Professor Greg Fealy. It is to 
be acknowledged that Greg’s involvement in this research also 
contributes a distinguished role and importance to the implemen-
tation to reporting processes of the research results. Although not 
directly involved in data collection, but Greg gives many inputs 
and corrections in the research proposal, serves as a discussion 
partner in enriching the data and literature, communicates with 
colleagues at ANU (such as Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, 
Paul D. Kenny, Thomas Power), facilitates work space during 
visit at ANU, and also reviews the research results.
With completion of the research reporting, we would like to 
express our appreciation and gratitude to all parties for their in-
volvement in and contribution to this research, from the initial 
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process to final phase (reporting). I would like to thank Greg who 
is the co-researcher as well as the supervisor of this collaborative 
research. Without his help, including making of LoA (Letter of 
Acceptance), we will not freely travel to Canberra to meet and 
discuss with the sources. 
We would like to show our appreciation and gratitude to the 
Director of Islamic Studies Higher Education and staffs (Head 
of Sub-Directorate of Research, Service and Scientific Publica-
tion/Suwendi and Head of Research Division and HAKI/ Mah-
rus El-Mawa) who have given their trust and opportunity as well 
as funding assistance for the implementation of this interna-
tional collaborative research. Without the Directorate of Islamic 
Studies Higher Education’s assistance, through its competitive 
research program of international collaborative category, we 
would have never imaged to conduct a cross-countries research.
We would also like to express our gratitude to the leaders of 
our respective higher education institution, rector of IAIN Jem-
ber, rector of Instika, and rector of Al-Fitra, who have given us 
permission to conduct this research. As a note, this research is 
held from July to December 2019. Within the period, we had to 
request for permission to our leaders for discount to leave our 
campuses and routine activities at the campuses (both as educator 
and institution management at campus) for the purpose of this 
research. Without the leaders’ permission and support, this re-
search would have not run well and might have failed.
At last, we would also like to thank the informants who have 
given us opportunity to discuss about the research topic. It is the 
result of discussion with them that we have systematized into the 
report of this research. Similarly, we also thank all parties, of 
which names cannot be written one by one in this preface. May 
their time and ideas contribution is useful, not only for the re-
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search reporting, but also to improve the quality of science and 
public literacy in understanding issues related to the research’s 
subject matter.
Finally, we expect that the results of this research will greatly 
contribute to the development of discourses, thinking and science 
in Islamic populism and democracy studies. Therefore, the results 
of this research will be published and disseminated through 
books, journals, book reviews, seminars and various means of 
publication.
Jember,  December 15, 2019
Research Team
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Since the presidential election (Pilpres) 2014, the political 
turbulence in Indonesia is quickly reinforced. The fight between 
the two president candidates, Joko Widodo ( Jokowi) and Prabo-
wo Subianto, involves new political narration popularly known 
as populism. Prabowo, the son-in-law of Suharto (authoritarian 
regime), carries poverty, social gap and injustice issues occurring 
to the Indonesians resulted from the corrupt government system 
and foreign intervention. In his many statements, Prabowo con-
demns the existing government, claiming it to be bobrok (corrupt) 
and must be fixed, attacks foreign companies for extracting In-
donesia’s natural wealth without appropriate compensation, de-
scribes domestic elites as foreign parasitic cronies, and, of course, 
asks the poor, uneducated and rural people for their support1.
On the contrary, Jokowi, governor of DKI Jakarta, employs 
more moderate populism narration which is also oriented to 
people’s welfare improvement in various sectors of social life, 
1  In Marcus’s opinion, the populism used by Prabowo is classical, text book, and ultra-nationalist 
populism. Prabowo tends to use classical, text book, and ultra-nationalist populism. Marcus 
Mietzner, Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy and Political Contestation in 
Indonesia, Honolulu-Hawai’i: East-West Center, 2015, pp. xi.
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economy, education and health, without having to behave restric-
tively towards the rich or foreigners. In this case, first, Jokowi does 
not promise to change the political system revolutionarily —he 
offers a change in a democratic status quo framework. Second, he 
does not target certain actor or group as his enemy, but displays 
himself as a very inclusive person instead. And third, he refrains 
from anti-foreign rhetoric to gain support2. 
However, the fight between the two populist president candi-
dates involves their various supporting elements, not limited to 
political parties which notabene have given political ticket for their 
candidacy, but also social groups of the civil society. Some ele-
ments of the civil society which are actively engaged and play role 
in the dynamics of power contestation, both at local and na-
tional levels, are Islamism or Islamic political groups. The Front 
Pembela Islami (FPI), Tarbiyah activists affiliated to the Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Forum Umat Islam (FUI), etc. are a 
number of Islamic groups relatively successfully consolidate and 
at the same time mobilize the mass to contribute to influencing 
the course of power contestation. Differently from the Islamism-
jihadist that uses physical violence instrument like suicide bomb-
ing or other terrorism actions3, these groups choose populism 
approach in struggle for their political agenda.
In line with populism revival in various parts of the world 
(Europe, America, and Asia), the one getting strong in Indonesia 
2  Differently from the approach carried by his competitor (Prabowo), Jokowi prefers a more 
moderate populism approach newly known as the technocratic populism. This type of populism 
is different from the classical populism concept developing in the world: it is more inclusive than 
focusing on exclusion of identified opponent, nationalist, not using anti-foreign rhetoric relied 
on by many people in Asia or Latin America; and it is also more oriented to improvement of 
government than calling for his substitute revolutionarily. Marcus Mietzner, Reinventing Asia 
populism, 3.
3  Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi dan Pencarian identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde 
Baru, Jakarta: LP3ES and KITLV, 2008.
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is none other than the “right populism” with not only its conser-
vative, but also extremely racist and sectarian characters4. Differ-
ently, the emergence of right populism in Indonesia is sponsored 
by the Islamism power. Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Hizbut Tahir 
Indonesia (HTI), Majlis Intelektual dan Ulama Muda Indonesia 
(MIUMI), Forum Umat Islam (FUI), dan Wahdah Islamiyah are 
the actors of the Islamic populism movement. They are known as 
the Islamic fundamental, conservative and radical groups, which 
always utilize religion for their objectives and political interests. 
Therefore, the Islamic populism variant emerging in Indonesia, 
as shown with the popular movement of Defending Islam Action, 
is more appropriately categorized as the Islamic populism or 
political Islam5.
The influence and action of Islam populism movement in 
Indonesia gets stronger, particularly during the 2016-2017 Re-
gional Head Election of DKI Jakarta, which involves incumbent 
governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok. The Islamists’ re-
sistance finds their strategic momentum when the incumbent 
governor conducts a campaign in front of the people of the 
Thousand Islands on September 27, 2016. In the campaign, Ahok 
4  Donald Trump’s victory in US Presiential Election, the success of Brexit supporters in UK, the 
glory of Nharatiya Janata Party/BJP and Narendra Modi in India represents the rise of right 
populism in various parts of the world. Before Trump and Brexit cases stand out, politicians like 
Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Norbet Hoffer and initiator of Brexit, Nigel Farage, have entered 
into populism political flow. Ronald Inlehart and Pippa Norris (2016), as quoted by Ari A. 
Perdana, state that the votes of parties that carry populist issues in Europe increase from 5 
percent in 1960 to 13 percent in this decade. At the same time, their seats increase from 4 
percent to 13 percent. Not limited to votes, populist parties and politicians have strong influence 
at higher level of discourses. In UK, for example, the United Kingdom Independent Party 
(UKIP) is capable of influencing public opinion for Brexit victory. Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya 
Populisme: Trump, Brexit hingga FPI, January 23, 2017.
5  The term political Islam and Islamism are frequently exchanged or used in an overlapping way 
by scholar. In this case, political Islam is more an activism committed to realize certain political 
agenda using Islamic symbols, doctrines, Language, Ideas and ideology. The proponents and 
followers of political Islam are called Islamists, which means Moslems committed to political 
actions to apply what they call Islamic agenda. Noorhaidi Hasan, Islam Politik di Dunia 
Kontemporer: Konsep, Geneologi, dan Teori, Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press, 2012, 10-11.
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suggests the people not to get easily provoked by those who dis-
credit him as a governor candidate on the proposition of al-
Qur’an surah al-Maidah. In Ahok’s view, many people dislike him 
and use verses of al-Qur’an not to elect him in the Regional Head 
Election. Ahok’s statement in his speech in the Thousand Islands 
is more or less as follows.
“In your inner hearts, ladies and gentlemen, you may feel you cannot 
vote for me, because you have been lied to by the use of Surah al-
Maidah, Verse 51. So, if you cannot vote for me because you are afraid 
of being condemned to hell, you do not need to feel uneasy, because you 
are being fooled. It is alright.”
Ahok’s speech in the Thousand Islands later becomes viral 
upon uploaded (and has been edited beforehand) by Buni Yani 
in his Facebook page on October 6, 2016. Buni Yani’s video in-
stantly triggers reaction of Moslems who feel insulted by Ahok’s 
statement. At the same time, the Islamist elites who are resistant 
to Ahok utilize this situation for their political interest. They 
later manage the people’s anger, mobilize and engage them in an 
action popularly known as the Defending Islam Action. The 
blasphemy issue is effectively utilized to mobilize a considerable 
number of Moslems from various parts of Indonesia. Most of the 
Moslems involved in the mass action are from urban low-class 
and mid-class6 who are more interested in their emotional expres-
sion than in theological debate7.
Moreover, the proponents of the Defending Islam Action 
demand Ahok, who is justified as committing “desecration of 
6  Vedi R. Hadiz explains that Islamic populist groups involved in the Defending Islam Action 
consist of loose coalition between urban poor groups incorporated in vigilant groups, religious 
mid-class and some elites of religious figures, political and business figures. Read Vedi R. Hadiz, 
Populisme Islam di Indonesia dan Timur Tengah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 2018.
7  Timo Duile, “Reactionary Islamism in Indonesia”, New Mandala, April 17, 2017.
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al-Qur’an”, “blasphemy”, “insult to ulama”, and even “insult to all 
Moslems throughout the world”, to be sentenced or imprisoned. 
The first Defending Islam Action takes place on October 14, 2016 
and is followed by around 50,000 people. The second Defending 
Islam Action is held on November 4, 2016 and followed by more 
than 200,000 people. At peak, the third Defending Islam Action 
on December 2, 2016 popularly known as the 212 action serves 
to be the brand of the Islamist populism action and is attended 
by over 500,000 people8. The proponents of the 212 action claim 
that the mass is up to 7 million people. The number of people 
based on Google Map’s mathematic calculation is estimated to 
be 2.3 million people. Regardless of different calculation of the 
number of action participants, one thing is certain that this mass 
action is the biggest Moslem mobilization in Indonesia’s contem-
porary history9.
In their action, the proponents of the Defending Islam Action 
or the 212 movement use the Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa-
Majlis Ulama Indonesia (GNPF-MUI) as their political medium. 
Actually, MUI does not acknowledge GNPF-MUI as part of 
and/or an organization formed by MUI. In Ahok’s case, MUI 
only issues “opinion and religious attitude” (instead of fatwa) that 
the governor of DKI Jakarta is categorized as (1) insulting al-
Qur’an and/or (2) insulting ulama with legal consequence. More-
over, this statement is issued by MUI after it is pressured by the 
Islamist groups. As commonly known, a number of Islamist 
figures like Bachtiar Nasir (head of MIUMI), K.H. Fakhrurrozi 
8  Marcus Mietzner & Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in 
Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation”, Asian 
Studies Review, 2018, 1-19.
9  Moch Nur Ichwan, MUI, Gerakan Islamis dan Umat Mengambang, Ma’arif, Vol. 11 (2)  December 
2016, 87-104; Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Growing Islamist Populism”, Asia Dialogues, 
December 19, 2016.
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Ishaq (head of Gerakan Masyarakat Jakarta/GMJ and simultane-
ously FPI version’s governor of DKI), K.H. Ahmad Shabri Lubis 
(general chairman of FPI), Tgk Abdullah Ibrahim (Aceh People’s 
Representative in Jakarta), K.H. Unun Tarunajaya (head of Ma-
jlis Dzikir SBY), etc. come to MUI and ask it to issue a fatwa or 
statement of attitude in response to Ahok’s case10.
In some experts’ opinion, the 212 movement pioneered by the 
Islamist groups does not only desire to overthrow Ahok, but also 
farther than that. Greg Fealy, for example, assumes that behind 
the action, there is an ideological agenda (besides political 
agenda) intending to delegitimize the status quo and at the same 
time apply Islamic agenda of state level11. In this context, the 212 
action does not only target Ahok, but also Jokowi in his capacity 
as the president and head of the State. This opinion is logical 
considering that most of actors involved in the 212 action come 
from the Islamism elements who always carry religious agenda in 
their political struggle12 in their alliance with economic-political 
regime with position vis a vis the regime in power13.
The emergence of the masses’ actions that frequently utilize 
religious symbols, attributes and sentiments and at the same time 
position the people vis a vis/confront them with the ruler marks 
what is called the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia. Vedi R. 
Hadiz, for example, expressly positions the 212 action as, not only 
10  Moch Nur Ichwan, MUI, Gerakan Islamis dan Umat Mengambang, Ma’arif Vol. 11 (2) December 
2016, 87-104.
11  Hidden agenda behind lawsuit against Ahok are, among other, desire to change constitution to 
apply Islamic law, prohibition for non-Moslem leaders in a majority of Moslem community, 
more implementation of sharia principles, and candidacy of political leaders for executive who 
sympathize more Islamic objectives. In short, Ahok dismissal is only part of wider Islamization 
effort. Read Greg Fealy, “Bukan Sekedar Ahok: Menjelaskan Aksi Massa pada 2 Desember, in 
Indonesia At Melbourne, Melbourne University, December 12, 2016.
12  Bassam Tibi, Islam dan Islamisme, Bandung: Mizan, 2016, 1-5; Salwa Ismail, “Being Muslim: 
Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics”, Government and Opposition 39, No. 4, 2004, 66.
13  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme: Trump, Brexit hingga FPI, Harian Indoprogress, January 
23, 2017.
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an identity politics based social movement, but Indonesia’s typi-
cal variant of Islamic populism. Islamic populism is not only a 
marginal low-class movement, but also led by professionals and 
educated individuals who demand reorganization of power to 
favor the community more14. As a representation of Islamic 
populism, the 212 action positions itself as a bloc on behalf of 
ordinary people and regime in power which is labeled as corrupt 
in antagonistic position. In addition, the 212 action also carries 
populist narrations (peoplehood, democracy, poverty, and the 
likes) to be confronted with the ruler or status quo. The propo-
nents of the 212 action generally view the mass mobilization they 
initiate not only as a political strategy to gain power, but also the 
expression of the community and people’s general desire15. 
The experts’ prediction, that the motive behind the 212 action 
is not only directed to Ahok, but farther than that, has a point. 
This is proven after Ahok is defeated in the Regional Head Elec-
tion of DKI Jakarta and imprisoned for blasphemy, populism 
actions driven by the Islamist groups still continue. Carrying the 
212 spirit, the Islamic populism groups continuously attempt to 
play a role in the contestation of power in the Presidential Elec-
tion 2019 momentum. The target shifts from anti-Ahok to anti-
Jokowi sentiment. They keep using racist populism narrations by 
framing the regime in power ( Jokowi) as part of foreign power 
and aseng (China), communist, pro-blasphemer, ulama criminal-
ization, corrupt and authoritarian. During the Presidential Elec-
tion 2019, the Islamic populism actions are realized in various 
forms from reunion 212, 2019 ganti presiden, ijma’ ulama, and 
14  Vedi R. Hadiz, Populisme Islam di Indonesia dan Timur Tengah (Islamic Populism in Indonesia and 
Middle East), Jakarta: LP3ES, 2018.
15  Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory Capitalism - Fascism – Populism, London: 
NLB, 1977.
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even the people power issue. All of these are made by them as a 
measure to prevent Jokowi from winning in the electoral politics 
201916.
However, the increasingly stronger Islamic populism actions, 
as represented by the 212 action and its various derivatives, both 
in the context of Regional Head Election of DKI Jakarta 2017 
and Presidential Election 2019, are interesting phenomena in the 
development of Islam and politics in Indonesia after the New 
Order. Their success in building populist narrations, mobilizing a 
considerable number of people, and launching pressure to the 
regime in power, evidently successfully change the map of po-
litical constellation in contemporary Indonesia. It must be ac-
knowledged that the popular actions have caused extensive so-
ciological and political impacts. Many assume that the Islamic 
populism actions successfully raise radical Islamism’s influence, 
force the government to act by reducing law enforcement’s inde-
pendence, and marginalize mainstream Islamism’s position such 
as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. As the result of 
such actions, the image of Indonesian Islam or Indonesia as a 
nation with most of citizens are tolerant, moderate and pluralist 
Moslems who are committed to legal sovereignty to degenerate17.
Not only Indonesian Islam’s image, the development of de-
mocracy is also affected. The development of democracy in Indo-
nesia after the New Order, which once progresses from 2000 to 
2004, gets stagnant in Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s (SBY) period, 
and even declines in Jokowi’s period (2014-2019). It is also im-
portant to note that the variables which contribute to the decline 
16  IPAC (Institute for Polity Analysis on Conflict), After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia, 
IPAC Report No. 44, 6 April 2018; IPAC, Anti-Ahok To Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on 
Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign, IPAC Report No. 55, March 15, 2019
17  Read Greg Fealy, “Bukan Sekedar Ahok” 2016; Bambang Muryanto, “NU, Muhammadiyah 
Suffer Setbacks over their Roles in Society”, The Jakarta Post, January 19, 2017.
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of quality of democracy are not only originated from the populism 
actions launched by the Islamist groups. The counter-populism 
launched by the Islamic pluralist groups that also use exclusionary 
logic, particularly against Islamist group like HTI, also contrib-
utes to perpetuating religious identity politicization that is not 
entirely compatible to the pluralism, human rights, and general 
democracy values. The technocratic populism policy of Jokowi 
governance is also deemed by the experts to contribute to the 
reduction of democracy quality in Indonesia. However, the Is-
lamic populism actions are considerably responsible for the reduc-
tion of quality of democracy values, particularly related to the 
guarantee of civil rights of minority groups18.
In addition, the phenomenon of emergence of Islamic popu-
lism in relation to the development of democracy in Indonesia 
has also triggered intensive debates among both from domestic 
and foreign academics, particularly the Indonesianists; Western 
scholars who are concerned about Indonesian study. Generally, 
they assume that increasingly stronger populism (including Is-
lamic populism) contributes negatively to the declining quality 
of democracy in Indonesia, particularly from the perspective of 
liberal democracy’s point of view. In their view, Islamic populism 
is not liberal power and its presence certainly contributes to 
strengthening illiberal democracy19. 
The decline of quality of democracy in Indonesia after emer-
gence of popular mobilization may be observed from the findings 
of a number of survey institutions. For example, the Central Sta-
18  Thomas P. Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline”, Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Bussiness, Vol. 54 (3), 2018, 307-338; Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, Diatyka 
Widya Permata Asih and Luqmanul Hakim, “Populisme Islam dan Tantangan Demokrasi di 
Indonesia”, Prisma, Vol. 36 (3), 2017, 48-59.
19  Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Face of Democracy”, Political 
Studies, 1999, XLVII, 2-16; Cas Mudde, Populist Raight Radical Parties in Europe, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009, 156.
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tistics Body (BPS) notes that the Indonesia’s Democracy Index 
(IDI) slightly increases of 0.28 from 72.11 in 2017 to 72.39 in 
2018. The IDI movement is influenced by the development of three 
aspects, namely civil freedom, political rights and democracy insti-
tution. Of the three aspects, only the democracy institution sig-
nificantly develops of 2.76 points from 72.49 to 75.25. The civil 
freedom aspect declines of 0.29 point (from 78.75 to 78.46) and 
the political rights declines of 0.84 point (from 66.63 to 65.79)20.
Qualitatively, the experts’ assumption is based on a number of 
variables, particularly related to expression freedom, association 
freedom and other freedoms. Based on various criteria, religious 
freedom, freedom to express opinion, association freedom, and 
the fate of minority groups such as LGBT, Ahmadiyah, Syi’ah, 
Chinese, Christians, and other minority groups do not get better. 
Instead of Indonesian democracy getting well consolidated, the 
one strengthened is what they call illiberal democracy. Intolerant 
actions and religious sectarianism, as shown by the 212 action, 
addressed to minority groups like Chinese and Christians (as 
represented in Ahok) considerably contributes to reducing toler-
ance, pluralism and human rights (HAM) values. Similarly, 
Jokowi regime’s policy in repressing anti-democratic groups like 
HTI and proponents of Islamic populism 212 actions and no 
legal protection for sexually vulnerable group like LGBT, is 
deemed to contribute to declining quality of democracy in Indo-
nesia21. 
Although most of the experts deem that the emergence of 




21  Thomas P. Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn”, 307-338.
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ity of democracy, but a small number have different opinion. In 
the latter opinion, the populism actions launched by the Islamist 
groups do not change much the declining quality of democracy 
in Indonesia. For example, the electoral processes of president and 
people’s representatives (DPR), from central to regional level, are 
still conducted directly. Democracy institutions such as the Gen-
eral Elections Commission (KPU), the General Election Super-
visory Agency (Bawaslu), political parties, and other democracy 
institutions still exist (not dissolved) until now. Besides, the 
populism actions do not successfully struggle for their political 
agenda, particularly in controlling the State or changing its po-
litical system to be Khilafah. 
Specifically, this research aims at understanding the discourse 
of experts among the Moslem intellectuals and foreign scholars 
who are concerned about Indonesia (red: Indonesianists) regard-
ing the rise of Islamic populism and democracy in Indonesia 
after the New Order. This research does not intend to compare 
the two opinions of experts who generally have relatively equal 
intellectual background. Coincidentally, the intellectuals chosen 
as the research’s subjects are scholars who are familiar with and 
even most of them are graduates of Western education. How-
ever, the experts do not entirely have uniform opinion in all re-
spects related to the research’s topic. For example, the govern-
ment’s policy of prohibiting the organization HTI is responded 
differently by domestic and foreign experts. Some experts deem 
that such government’s policy is a form of authoritarianism or 
non-democratic action, while the remainder deems otherwise. In 
this context, the study of experts’ thinking discourse in the discus-
sion of the rise of Islamic populism and democracy finds its rel-
evance and significance. 
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B. Research Problem
This research studies the rise of Islamic populism and its im-
pacts on the development of democracy in Indonesia after the 
New Order from the perspective of Indonesian Moslem intel-
lectuals and Indonesianists. The main problem to be developed 
through this study is how is the discourse of Islamic populism 
and democracy in Indonesia after the New Order? More spe-
cifically, how Indonesian Moslem intellectuals and Indonesianists 
explain the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia after the New 
Order? Is, according to them, the rise of Islamic populism para-
doxical for the democratization process in Indonesia after the 
New Order? These questions will be developed into some more 
detailed research problems as follows:
1. How is the discourse of scholars from Indonesian Moslem 
intellectuals and Indonesianists in explaining the emer-
gence of Islamic populism in Indonesia after the New 
Order?
2. How is the discourse of scholars from Indonesian Moslem 
intellectuals and Indonesianists in explaining factors 
which encourage the rise of Islamic populism in Indone-
sia after the New Order? 
3. How is the discourse of scholars from Indonesian Moslem 
intellectuals and Indonesianists in explaining the rise of 
Islamic populism in relation to the democratization pro-
cess in Indonesia after the New Order?
C. Objective
This research aims at understanding the view of Indonesian 
Islamic experts and domestic and foreign political experts of the 
dynamics of the rise of Islamic populism in relation to the de-
I S L A M I C  P O P U L I S M  A N D  D E M O C R A C Y. . .
1 3
mocratization process in Indonesia after the New Order. More 
specifically, this research intends to provide a comprehensive 
overview of these experts’ discourse in explaining some important 
matters as follows:
1. The discourse of scholars from Indonesian Moslem intel-
lectuals and Indonesianists of Islamic populism move-
ment and agenda in Indonesia after the New Order
2. The discourse of scholars from Indonesian Moslem intel-
lectuals and Indonesianists in explaining factors which 
encourage the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia after 
the New Order
3. The discourse of scholars from Indonesian Moslem intel-
lectuals and Indonesianists in explaining the rise of Is-
lamic populism in relation to the democratization process 
in Indonesia after the New Order?
D. Significance
This research is believed to make a scientific contribution in 
enriching the discourse on Islamic populism and democracy in 
contemporary Indonesia. All the time, thinking and knowledge 
discourses on Islamism are more dominated by the ideas of reli-
gious radicalism. Radicalism actors with their terrorism actions 
actually impress those who study Islam in Indonesia more in 
explaining the social, political and religious movements of the 
Islamists. At the same time, Islamist extremist groups through 
physical violence are deemed more dangerous and deadly than 
non-physical radicalism actions by Islamic populism agents, while 
the reality is not necessarily the case.
Meanwhile, studies of Islamist groups who take popular ap-
proach indeed once enliven discourses on Islam in Indonesia re-
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cently. However, the developing discourses are more dominated by 
economic-political and identity political perspectives in which the 
rise of popular Islam, as expressed by the Islamists, is understood 
more as a form of commodification and seeking for new identity. 
This type of popular Islam displays itself with devout Islamic iden-
tity which is accommodative to modern culture. The new tendency 
of popular Islamism even results in new terminologies, which is 
labeled by the experts as post-Islamism22. The dynamics of post-
Islamism which moves in cultural and public space with its accom-
modative attitude towards modernity products is deemed not to 
have negative impact on democracy. Moreover, some of these 
popular Islamists move in the corridor of democracy, such as their 
political activism which is realized through political parties or com-
ing to voting booth to express their aspiration during general elec-
tion.
However, the post-Islamists who tend to be accommodative to 
democracy are actually not apolitical. However, the Islamists’ ide-
ological-political DNA does not disappear at all. When there is a 
gap, the post-Islamist agents who so far move in public and cul-
tural spaces get into the political struggle arena. They who are on 
the path of post-Islamism, when come into contact with political 
practice, have their ideological-political temperament changing to 
be radical, sectarian and racist, as expressed by the proponents of 
Islamic populism movement in the defending Islam actions. In 
various literatures of populism, such variant of Islamic populism is 
categorized as the black populism or uncivilized populism.
22  As stated by Bayat, post-Islamism is not anti-Islam or secular or non-Islam. More than that, it 
represents the effort to merge religion and rights, faith and liberation, Islam and freedom. It is 
an effort to reverse the basic principles of Islamism by emphasizing rights instead of duties and 
obligations, upholding plurality instead of single authoritative voice. It struggles to synergize 
Islam with individual choice and freedom to achieve what is called by scholars by an alternative 
modernity. Asef Bayat, Pos-Islamisme, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011, 20.
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E. Literature Review
The significance of reemergence of Islamism has actually be-
come one subject of experts’ study since the September 11, 2001 
incident (WTC bombing) and in Suharto’s last few years for 
Indonesian context. Most of discussions on Islamism still focus 
on its radical social agents. This may be understood considering 
that the radical Islamism movements still strive in many areas, 
regionally and globally. Instead of declining, terrorism issues even 
increase. Even in the West, like Europe and America, the inten-
sity of bombing cases related to terrorism actions increases. 
Therefore, it is not surprising if Western countries’ governments 
and their scholars are highly concerned about deradicalization or 
counter-terrorism movement. Australian Government, for ex-
ample, through ASPI (Australian Strategic Policy Institute) with 
its wing Counter-Terrorism Polity Centre develops an intensive 
study program labeled Counter-Terrorism Years Book. Among 
the scholars’ writings focusing on the study of radical Islamism 
are Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam, issued by Yale University 
Press (2012); Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, issued by 
Harvard University Press (1996); Peter C. Sederberg, “Global 
Terrorism: Problem of Challenge and Response”, in Charles 
Kegley (ed.) The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, 
Controls, issued by Prentice Hall (2003), and many more.
On the other hand, some studies of Islamism start to focus on 
the moderate Islamism phenomena described as non-anti-de-
mocracy social groups. In some experts’ opinion, the moderate 
Islamists’ struggle for their political agenda is realized through 
electoral means like forming party and participating in general 
election. In Indonesia, the Tarbiyah movement with its political 
wing, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), is positioned as the rep-
resentation of moderate Islamists. Studies of Islamic political 
M .  K H U S N A  A M A L  |  DA M A N H U R I  |  I K S A N  K A M I L  S A H R I
1 6
party and Islamic social movement through civil society as the 
instrument also get experts’ attention. Generally, these experts 
reveal positive developments of moderate Islamism movement. 
Among the reputable studies are those written by Burhanuddin 
Muhtadi, Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah, issued by Gramedia 
(2012); Julie Chernov Hwang, Umat Bergerak Mobilisasi Damai 
Kaum Islamis di Indonesia, Malaysia, dan Turki, Jakarta: Freedom 
Institute (2009), and others.
Meanwhile, the moderate Islamism actions involved in 
democratic-political movement in various Moslem countries such 
as Egypt, Iran and Turkey also become scholars’ main attention. 
Generally, scholars view existing changes to the Islamists’ orien-
tation, approach or means of political struggle appreciatively. They 
also label such new non-anti-democracy moderate Islamism 
groups as post-Islamism. Asef Bayat is one of the scholars who 
popularize the term post-Islamism for the Islamists who display 
new Islamic activism which is, on one hand, accommodative to 
modernity and, on the other hand, keeps maintaining their Is-
lamic identity or piety. Bayat’s notion may be found in his 
monumental work Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements 
and the Post-Islamist Turn, issued by Stanford University Press 
(2007). Bayat’s Post-Islamism is adopted by Ariel Heryanto to 
explain similar development not only in political practice, but in 
media and pop culture. Identitas dan Kenikmatan Politik Budaya 
Layar Kaca is the result of Ariel’s research which reviews the rise 
of religious themed movies, soap operas and novels in Indonesia 
from the perspective of identity politics. Ariel Heryanto’s study 
also enlivens the hot issue at the time, popular religion.   
Discourses on popular religion in Indonesia are frequently 
correlated with the rise of popular Islam in many media. The 
emergence of celebrity-da’i (like AA Gym), religious movies 
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(Ayat-ayat Cinta, Ketika Cinta Bertasbih), sharia entrepreneur-
ship (fashion, hijab, and various Muslim/Muslimah garments) 
marks what is called popular Islam. This populism path is com-
monly utilized by moderate Islamic groups not to be tempted by 
violence approaches. Through such popular way of dakwah, they 
may develop their religious mission which is also oriented to 
Islamization of public and political spaces. However, the econom-
ic-political point of view is relatively dominantly used by the 
experts in understanding the development of popular Islam. 
Commercialization or commodification is the theory and argu-
ment used by the experts to explain the rise of popular Islam. 
Among the writings are Noorhaidi Hasan’s work, The Making of 
Public Islam: Piety, Agency, and Commodification on the Landscape 
of the Indonesian Public Sphere, issued by Springer (2009); Greg 
Fealy and Sally White, Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics 
in Indonesia, issued by ISEAS, Singapore (2008).
In the last decade, serious discussions and studies of Islamic 
populism start to emerge. Even writings in the form of popular 
articles, scientific articles, and various products of scientific study 
on this topic start to dominate academic and political discourses 
in Indonesia. The increasingly stronger discourses intersect with 
the global populism phenomena in many countries in Europe, 
America and Asia. Likewise, Indonesia, --a country with major-
ity of population are Moslems known to be tolerant, moderate and 
democratic--, is not free from the exposure of populism politics. 
Fights between political elites both in Presidential Election and 
Regional Head Election contexts, particularly since 2014, have 
been enlivened by populism politics. In the fight between Jokowi 
versus Prabowo, both of them mutually use populism approach. 
Similarly, the governmental practice of ruling elite and opposing 
group’s resistance also frequently use populism approach. The most 
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sensational event which draw public attention is the religious 
identity based Islamic mobilization action, the 212 action, which 
is identified by some analysts as a form of Islamic populism.
Many studies on populism and Islamic populism, particularly 
in Indonesia, have been conducted by the experts. Marcus Mi-
etzner, “Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy 
and Political Contestation in Indonesia”, Polity Studies 72, Ho-
nolulu-Hawai’i: East-West Center, 2015; Thomas P. Power, 
“Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic De-
cline”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Business, Vol. 54, No. 3, 
2018; Burhanuddin Muhatdi, Populisme Politik Identitas & Din-
amika Elektoral: Mengurai Jalan Panjang Demokrasi Prosedural, 
Intrans Publishing; Vedi R. Hadiz, Populisme Islam di Indonesia 
dan Timur Tengah, Jakarta: LP3ES; Rangga Kusumo & Hurriyah, 
“Populisme Islam di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Aksi Bela Islam oleh 
GNPF-MUI Tahun 2016-2017”, Jurnal Politik, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
August 2018; Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, Diatyka Widya Per-
mata Asih dan Luqmanul Hakim, “Populisme Islam dan Tantan-
gan Demokrasi di Indonesia” dalam Prisma, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2017.
The studies above review populism, including that in Indonesia, 
from various perspective from ideational or ideology, social mobi-
lization, political style and strategy, cultural opposition and ap-
proach oriented to security. With regard to democracy, the studies 
have different opinions, some view the correlation of both nega-
tively (populism is toxic to democracy) and the remainder views 
otherwise (populism is challenge to democracy). The experts’ stud-
ies do not provide further explanation of the thinking construction 
of experts from Indonesian Moslem intellectuals and Indonesian-
ists in explaining the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia and 
counter-populism launched by moderate Moslem groups, as well 
as its implications for democracy in Indonesia after the New Order.
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F. Research Method
This research does not intend to understand the Islamic 
populism phenomena in Indonesia as represented by the Defend-
ing Islam Action and the likes from the perspective of those who 
are directly involved in the popular mobilization actions. This 
research is going to reveal the same phenomena from the scholars’ 
perspective (Indonesian Moslem intellectuals and Indonesian-
ists), who are concerned about, observe and study the Islamic 
populism phenomena. To have the understanding of the inter-
pretants or theorists from the academics, the research chooses the 
qualitative-phenomenological method and approach. This ap-
proach is deemed relevant considering that a phenomenological 
research indeed aims at obtaining general understanding or 
definition of the subjects23 who have the same concern in response 
to the Islamic populism phenomena in Indonesia.
Theoretically, the perspective which is included in the con-
structivism paradigm explains that what they say is the result of 
how they interpret (understand) the social world. Revealing these 
individuals’ interpretation requires (borrowing Weber’s term) 
verstehen, an emphatic understanding or the ability to absorb and 
re-reveal feelings, motives, and thinking behind what the subjects 
say. In order to catch the meanings of human behaviors, the phe-
nomenologists attempt to view anything from the person’s per-
spective24. In hermeneutic phenomenological works, phenome-
23  Joseph A. Maxweel, Qualitative Research Design an Interactive Approach, California: Sage Publi-
cation, 1996; Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra. 2007. Paradigma, Epistemologi dan Metode Ilmu Sosial-
Budaya, Sebuah Pemetaan, Yogyakarta: Fakultas Ilmu Budaya, Universitas Gajahmada.
24  Alfred Schutz, is known as a figure deemed to have a big role in developing the phenomeno-
logical approach that correlates sociology with philosophical phenomenology of Edmund Hus-
serl (1970). The main idea of Husserl’s thinking is that science always stands on ‘experiential’. 
The correlation between perception and its objects is not passive. Human awareness actively 
contains experiential objects. This principle then becomes the base for every qualitative research 
on practice and behavior which form reality. Schutz’s phenomenological perspective above is the 
continuation of Husserl’s effort to study the ways the community members arrange and re-form 
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nology is not only a description, but also a process of 
interpretation, in which the researcher makes an interpretation 
(researcher mediates different meanings) of the meaning of such 
life experiences25.
Who are the research’s subjects? Experts from Indonesian 
Moslem intellectuals and Indonesianists chosen as the research’s 
resources derived from various scientific backgrounds, particu-
larly social, politics and Islamic studies. In general, however, the 
variant of intellectuals or academics chosen is limited to they who 
are so far known as scholars with liberal-progressive academic 
view –to distinguish them from scholars with conservative view. 
Almost all of the intellectuals from Indonesianists represent 
Western academics who, certainly, have highly liberal-typically 
orientalist view or thinking. The Indonesian Moslem intellectuals 
who mostly have Islamic and Western educational background 
also have relatively the same view (liberal). The difference, how-
ever, the latter group lives, resides and is active socio-geographi-
cally and academically in their own Country, Indonesia. Although 
the resources’ intersection chosen is relatively homogenous 
(equally have liberal-progressive academic/intellectual back-
ground), but their perspectives and discourses in understanding 
Islamic populism in Indonesia are in fact not exactly the same. 
The last point is the attraction of this research in offering the 
experts’ thinking construction of Islamic populism.
daily life nature. Schutz also later successfully introduces a set of principles which become the 
base of the theoretical and empirical frameworks for subsequent phenomenological, ethno-
methodological, and constructionist researches. Schutz states that social science should focus its 
attention on the ways the world/life (which is experiential world which is taken for granted by 
everyone) is created and experienced by its members. Subjective perspective needs to be main-
tained so that the world of social reality will not be replaced by fictive, apparent world created by 
scientific researchers. In this case, the world of subjectivity is the only principle which must not 
be forgotten when the social researchers define their research objects, Norman K. Denzin: 336.   
25  Johan W. Creswell, Penelitian Kualitatif & Desain Riset: Memilih di Antara Lima Pendekatan, 
Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2014, 110.
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Practically, this research is conducted for about 6 (six) months, 
from June to November 2019. Within such period, the research-
er collects data and information related to the research’s topic 
through bibliographic survey and field, documentation, and lit-
erature researches. Visiting and having dialogues and discussions 
with the experts to gather their view of the research’s topic is a 
technique used in this research to collect data in the form of the 
resources’ information directly. A series of interviews with the 
informants are conducted in Surabaya, Yogyakarta, Jakarta and 
Canberra (Australia). The Moslem Intellectuals from PTKI (Is-
lamic Religious Higher Education Institution) and PTU (Public 
Higher Education Institution) with social, political and religious 
scientific backgrounds and also various affiliated organizations 
(generally from intellectuals of NU and Muhammadiyah) are the 
domestic informants. Meanwhile, foreign informants are social, 
cultural and political experts or scholars who are concerned about 
Indonesian Islamic studies, such as Greg Fealy, Paul D. Kenny, 
Edwards Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, Thomas Power, Ronald 
Luken-Bull, and others.
Besides interview, the data are collected by literature and 
documentation search. Books, journal articles, and opinions pub-
lished in media, both printed and electronic, are the sources of 
literature and documentation which are really helpful for data 
enrichment. These literature sources are really helpful to the re-
searcher to collect the data related to the development of Is-
lamic populism in Indonesia written by domestic and foreign 
experts. Google scholar and open access journals are electronic media 
which is helpful to the researcher in searching for the necessary 
data.
The empirical data analysis in this research employs critical 
reflective method which starts from the hermeneutic analysis. As 
M .  K H U S N A  A M A L  |  DA M A N H U R I  |  I K S A N  K A M I L  S A H R I
2 2
stated by Mats Alvesson and Kaj Skoldberg, the reflective meth-
od is characterized by two things: first, method of careful inter-
pretation of a reality in consideration of authenticity, dependence, 
bias and space and time distance; and second, the reflection in this 
the interpretation is conducted systematically, by always confirm-
ing definition of producer, user, community and researcher. By 
positioning to always be corresponding to the reality studied, this 
research’s analysis is more the researcher’s interpretation of the 
subjects26.
Meanwhile, the data analysis process is conducted from field 
research to post-field data processing. The strategic measure for 
the purpose of data analysis is performed in two ways. First, data 
mapping and categorization. The collected data or information 
are mapped, which eventually results in grouping pursuant to the 
designed staging. Technically, reaching the staging --referring to 
Lavine as quoted from Huberman and Miles --shall use five 
phases, which are data formatting, correlating different data and/
or integrating the same data, indexation, abstraction, and num-
bering pursuant to the existing data category27. Second, data 
contextualization. After the data are categorized, the researcher 
attempts to conduct an analysis in order to understand the data 
in its context using various methods to identify the relation be-
tween different data elements, which are part of substance of the 
effort to build understanding and definition of the existing data 
and information inductively28.
26  Mats Alvesson dan Kaj Skoldberg, Reflexive Methodology New Vistas for Qualitative Research, 
London: Sage Publication, 2018.
27  Matthew B. Mile and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Anaysis, London: Sage 
Publication, 1994.
28  Joseph A. Maxweel, Qualitative Research Design an Interactive Approach, California: Sage 
Publication, 1996.
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G. Writing Systematics
The report of this research’s result is arranged in 5 (five) chap-
ters. Chapter 1 is regarding the research’s background and sig-
nificance, research’s focus, literature review, method, and writing 
structure of research report.
Chapter 2 contains theoretical review and conceptual-theo-
retical framework covering discussion of the concept of populism, 
Islamic populism, Islamic populism in Indonesian context, and 
relation between Islamic populism and democracy. 
Chapter 3 covers experts’ discourses of Islamic populism in 
Indonesia, overview Islamic populism in Indonesia, and factors 
which encourage the emergence and the rise of Islamic populism 
in Indonesia after the New Order. 
Chapter 4 contains explanation of the impacts of the emer-
gence of populism on the development of democracy in Indone-
sia. This chapter outlines a number of relevant issues, such as the 
dynamics of the development of democracy in Indonesia after the 
New Order, the impacts of populism on the development of 
democracy and paradox of anti-Islamic populism movement for 
the development of democracy.
Chapter 5 contains the conclusion and theoretical implication 
of the social-political phenomena studied in this research, which 
is the rise of Islamic populism and its implication for the democ-
ratization process in Indonesia after the New Order. 
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2
Islamic Populism and 
Democracy: Paradox 
Relationship?
The relationship between populism, including Islamic popu-lism, and democracy has been massively discussed by experts. 
Some hold the view that populism, no matter what form it takes, 
be it inclusive or exclusive, is considered negative for the develop-
ment of democracy. For these experts, populism is not different 
from poison which not only reduces, but also destroy the democ-
racy system. The attempts of populist leaders who prefer a cor-
ridor beyond the democracy institution to get their political 
agenda manifest show their distrust to the institution. Some 
other view populism more like a positive criticism towards the 
democracy. The populist actions made by elements of civil society, 
for example, can correct the corrupt political elites’ attitude and 
policy, can serve as a criticism towards democracy which is 
deemed to have failed in realizing prosperity and justice for all 
elements of the society. Which one of these two views is truer? 
This is no longer an important issue to debate about. What is 
important now is to find a way to elaborate and use these two 
different views as a theoretical as well as operational basis in 
studying the Islamic populism phenomenon in Indonesia along 
with its implication on the democracy.
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A. Populism  
Many concepts and theories on populism have been proposed 
by experts. Cas Mudde, a political scientist whose study on 
populism has been most referred to, defines populism as a po-
litical position which places the people in general and corrupt 
elites in an opposite or antagonistic direction against each other, 
and sees the politic as an expression of what people in general 
wish1. Hayward understands populism as a response to demo-
cratic elitism which is deemed defective. In this case, the elites 
tend to take an action not in favor of the public interest and even 
corrupt and in turn it discredits them2. Margaret Canovan inter-
prets populism as an attraction for the people in challenging the 
established power structure, dominant ideas and values in the 
people’s life3. Another opinion suggests that populism is more of 
a political expression which has some elements, namely, firstly, 
anti-establishment (expression of groups who think they are 
marginalized), secondly, the presence of leader authority both 
through personal charisma and apocalyptic message, and finally, 
the strong in-group feeling as shown in the we vs they sentiment4.
Meanwhile, Laclau places a people/elite antagonistic relation-
ship in class relations. However, the relationship between popu-
lism and class politics has been criticized for its failure to take 
into account the heterogeneous nature of ‘the people’ in popular 
politics. Laclau’s theory has now widened greatly; he now em-
phasizes that populist discourse ‘can start anywhere in a social-
institutional structure’. The populism discourse consists of conflict 
1  Read Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, Vol 39 (4), 542-563.
2  The elites have lost claims and can no longer be trusted to act on behalf of or for the interest of 
the public. Jack Hayward (ed.), Elitism, Populism, and European Politic, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996.  
3  Benjamin Arditi, Politics on the Edges of Liberalism, Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007, 42-45.
4  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”, 2017.
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of interests between a collectivity identified as ‘the people’ against 
those of the hegemonic elite, whose actions are considered not in 
favor of ‘the people’s best interests. Laclau stresses that populism 
arises out of a failure to meet certain demands. When the elite 
fails to handle a number of demands from different groups, the 
logic of equality becomes more dominant and thus antagonism 
arises between the people and the elite. This equality moment that 
marks the emergence of an instance of populism presupposes the 
constitution of the subject of global politics which unites a num-
ber of social demands. Therefore, populism cannot be found in 
the content of any particular attraction to the people, rather it is 
at the level where the logic of equality applies to differences5. 
The diverse conceptions of populism, as stated above, confirm 
that there is no single concept that is truly agreed upon by experts. 
Each expert has a tendency to define populism from the varied 
points of view of thought or theoretical perspectives. These dif-
ferent views on populism are also closely related to the use of 
these theories in understanding the equally varied populism 
phenomena in numerous countries, including in the United 
States, Latin America, Europe, and Asia. This is not to mention 
the variants of populism which are also not singular in nature. 
Based on certain characteristics, experts divide populism phe-
nomena into right, left and middle populisms. Also based on 
certain characteristics, some experts classify populism into such 
variants as classical and new populisms. On one hand, these di-
verse conceptions, however, also enrich the discourse, thoughts 
and understanding of what populism is and can at the same time 
provide alternative choices for those studying it. Yet, on the 
other hand, these plural and various conceptions of populism have 
5  Ben Stanly, “The thin Ideology of Populism”, Journal of Political Ideologies, February 2008, 13 (1), 
95-110.
I S L A M I C  P O P U L I S M  A N D  D E M O C R A C Y. . .
2 7
made this concept look like a puzzle which can also sometimes 
presents complexity for those studying it6.  
There are at least two important approaches to consider for 
the purposes of this study, namely the ideational approach 
(populism as an ideology) and the organizational approach 
(populism as mobilization). 
1. Populism as an Ideology
The discourse of populism as an ideology has been the domi-
nant academic discussion, especially among social and political 
scientists in Europe. Cas Mudde, as suggested above, is one of 
the prominent figures who made important contributions to the 
discourse of populism as an ideology7. Unlike the big ideologies 
such as socialism, communism, capitalism, ecology, feminism and 
the like, populism represents more of what Mudde calls thin 
ideology. Furthermore, Mudde suggests that:
a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be untimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be 
an expression of the volonte’ generale (general will) of the people8.   
6  Paul D. Kenny, Populism and Patronage Why Populism Win Elections in India, Asia, and Beyond, 
USA-OSO: Oxford University Press, 2017, 1-22
7  In addition to Cas Mudde, other authors who also contribute to the development of idea of po-
pulism as a thin ideology include Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens “Populism versus Democracy”, 
Political Studies, 55 (2) 2007: 405-24, Ben Stanly “The Thin Ideology of Populism”, Journal of 
Poli tical Ideologies, 13 (1), 2008: 95-110; Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser “The Ambivalence of 
Populism: Threat and Corrective for Democracy”, Democratization, 19 (2), 2012: 184-208; and 
Margaret Canovan “Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy”, in Y. 
Menny and Y. Surrel (ed.) Democracies and  the Populist Challenge, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002, 25-44.
8  By conceptualizing populism as a thin ideology, it can then be understood that populism has no 
pure form, rather it is present in the iteration of a mixture with other ideologies. Cas Mudde, 
Populist Radical Rights Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 23.
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To affirm that populism is an ideology, there is a need for a 
clear statement of ontological assumptions. However, these on-
tological assumptions are still implicit today. Hay in his argument 
of material-ideational dialectics argues that ideas play indepen-
dent roles in causing the creation of political outcomes and are 
capable of producing demonstrable material effects. The idea is 
in the dialectical relationship with social and historical conditions, 
arises and evolves from the cogitations of actors who are under 
certain material conditions and in turn it also has a material effect 
on the formation of context through the strategic actions of these 
actors. Regardless of whether it is noticed or not, these actors 
adopt and adapt established ideas and they surely also innovate 
with others, regarding the world they see themselves in. This 
ontological attitude includes the claim that what these actors do 
in having these ideas is to interpret the world they find themselves 
in9.
As an ideology, populism is a thin ideology that separates the 
community into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, a 
pure society versus a corrupt elite, and which argues that politics 
must be an expression of the volonté générale (public will) of the 
people. The populist rhetoric takes an opposition character, where 
people are pitted against the elite, whether the elite is understood 
in socio-economic or cultural terms. Populism can be attached to 
both left and right wing economic ideologies, yet in both cases it 
remains focused on the “people” as the main political protagonists. 
Thus, for some people, populism is about a conflict between the 
“high” and the “low,” rather than the traditional left and right 
divisions10.
9  Ben Stanly, “The thin Ideology of Populism”, 95-110.
10  Paul D. Kenny, Populism and Patronage, 23-24.
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The ideological perspective is not limited to focusing on 
popular/elite antagonism, as in Canovan’s conception, rather on 
understanding that antagonism plays an ideational rather than 
structural role in populism: it forms a key element of different 
political interpretations. In this case, it is important to consider 
populism as a different ideology because it conveys a certain way 
of interpreting politics in a specific interactions of its core con-
cepts. However, due to its thin nature, it cannot stand alone as a 
practical political ideology: it does not have the capacity to put 
forward a broad and coherent program for solutions to important 
political questions11.
Nevertheless, this ideological view is not without weaknesses. 
This minimalist definition provides little theoretical guidance on 
how we can expect the populist movements to apply in their 
campaigns or positions once they are successful. In this formula-
tion, populism as an ideology is so vague that it only tells us a 
little about what this populist movement is doing. Therefore, the 
populist movement, based on this conceptualization, must be 
further distinguished from one another in such a way that they 
can be compared in a beneficial manner. There have been several 
attempts made to develop the taxonomy of the populist move-
ment to overcome this problem, most importantly the difference 
between inclusive and exclusive populists (sometimes abbrevi-
ated as left-wing and right-wing populisms, but this should not 
be combined with movements, a position in an economic policy 
per se).12
The first variant (inclusive populism) describes a kind of eco-
nomic populism which tries to unite ordinary people in opposi-
tion to the wealthy ruling class. Meanwhile, the second one 
11  Ben Stanly, “The thin Ideology of Populism”, 95-110.
12  Paul D. Kenny, Populism and Patronage, 25.
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(exclusive populism) refers to nativist or ethnonationalist popu-
lism in which people purely oppose the cultural elite identified 
with ethnic pluralism. Exclusive populism is widely seen as a 
threat to immigrants and minorities, and therefore to the democ-
racy itself, although some scholars have also indicated that the 
list of exclusive populations has reached a high level of support 
in attracting economic interest in working class societies. Inclu-
sive populism poses greater analytical problems, with scholarship 
being continually split in debates over whether or not it threatens 
the democracy. While some observers see the inclusive populist 
movement as an authentic democracy, identifying, rather than 
covering up, divisions in which emancipatory political projects 
can be made, others suggest that nominally inclusive populist 
movements also tend to engage in the hyper-centralization of 
power and delegitimation of political opposition, thereby damag-
ing democracy.13
Another weakness of it has something to the ability of the 
conception in explaining how ideas turn into political behavior. 
Ideology cannot be extracted from the substantive conditions that 
gave rise to it. The lack of an institutionalized support base 
forces the populists to adopt anti-institutional postures that 
makes them erode many of the legal and social structures needed 
for the democracy—even in the minimalist sense.
2. Populism as Mobilization
As a mobilization, populism is known as the social movement 
which involves the mass in great number (particularly from social 
marginal groups), also known as popular mobilization. One of the 
characteristics of this popular mobilization is its political articu-
13  Paul D. Kenny, Populism and Patronage, 25.
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lation which is anti-establishment in nature or a resistance to 
various forms of the dominating social-cultural, economic and 
political systems. In this case, Jansen suggests that:
mobilization as any sustained, large-scale political project that 
mobilizes ordinarily marginalized social sectors into publicly visible 
and contentious political action, while articulating an anti-elite, 
nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people14.
It is said as an anti-establishment movement because populist 
mobilization always places the mass (people’s representation) face 
to face with the established power structures, ideas and dominant 
community values. In a democratic system, populism also means 
resistance to the established political parties.15 However, not every 
anti-system mobilization can in itself be classified as a populist 
movement. Unlike the social movements in general, the populist 
mobilization is characterized by not only resistance to established 
holder of power, but also to dominant elites’ values. The hatred of 
the populists is not only directed towards political-economic 
establishment, rather to the opinion shapers in academic world 
and the media as well.16    
Populism which is deemed as an anti-structural mobilization 
certainly has unequal content, depending on the type of the oc-
curing establishment in each country. If the dominant economic 
system is liberal, the populist mobilization is usually related to 
the resistance to free market hegemony by demanding protection-
ism from the state. The anti-immigrant sentiment in the US and 
European countries which became the campaign material of 
14  Robert S. Jansen, ‘Populist Mobilization: A New Theoretical Approach to Populism’. Sociological 
Theory, 29(2), 2011, 75–96.
15  E.g. J. Haider, The Freedom I Mean, Pine Plains, Swan, 1995, 104.
16  Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy”, Political 
Studies, 1999, XLVII, 2-16.
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populist politicians, is one example of populist mobilization di-
rected to criticize the domination of the liberal economic system 
in the West. Even the ideas and values the populists’ resistance is 
directed also depend on the character of the elite and the domi-
nant political discourse. When the political culture of the elite (as 
in modern Western countries) is strongly influenced by the values 
of liberal individualism, internationalism, multiculturalism, per-
missiveness, and trust in advancement, the populist mobilization 
will also be related to the resistance to these problems.17   
As a mobilization, populism is not only associated with the 
reaction to the establishment of the power structure, rather it is 
also interconnected with an interest in the recognized authority. 
The populists claim their legitimacy on the basis that they speak 
for the people; that is, they claim to represent sovereign democ-
racy, not sectoral interests such as economic classes. Even if the 
economic complaints are always important in the populist move-
ment, they are always translated into political questions in relation 
to democratic power.18 However, claiming to speak on behalf of 
the people is not as easy as it might look, yet the populists are 
quite adept at making its rhetoric seem possible.19  
Populism as a mobilization is also understood as the ability of 
charismatic leaders in mobilizing the masses to support their 
political agenda. Following Max Weber’s view, leadership author-
ity is distinguished at least into three, they are bureaucratic, 
patrimonial, and charismatic. As has been widely known, the 
exercise of authority in bureaucratic parties is bound by rules and 
procedures, while externally they are built on stable institutional 
17  Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy”, Political 
Studies, 1999, XLVII, 2-16.
18  G.S. Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History 1832-1982, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, 96-100.
19  Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People!” 2-16.
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relations with their supporters. Analogically, in patrimonial or-
ganizations, the authority is traditional and transactional in na-
ture. Leadership is often inherited and privileges are distributed 
to supporters in return for their loyalty. Externally, such patron-
age-based parties are involved in a quid pro quo with their sup-
porters in which case their votes are exchanged for certain mate-
rial benefits. The charismatic authority is otherwise characterized 
by a concentration of arbitrary control in the person of a popular 
leader.20
It is important to note that charismatic leadership, however, 
is not exactly the same as populism. Charismatic leaders some-
times rely on material inducements and party organizations and 
civil society to mobilize voters. For example, in Indonesia, even 
the most classic charismatic campaigners, Prabowo Subianto, feel 
compelled to distribute cash and other prizes to voters. While 
these prizes do not guarantee a vote, it may be the “entry ticket” 
required by each candidate in the hope of winning the election.21 
Meanwhile, populist mobilization targets tend not to be bound 
or floating voters. This is indeed not a defining feature of popu-
lism, yet the trends vary from one context to another in their 
intensity. As research elsewhere has shown, voters can be embed-
ded in party patronage networks at the local level, while still 
supporting populists at the national level. The difference between 
populist and non-populist leaders falls on the dimension of char-
ismatic organization, both with respect to internal control over 
the leader (or party) movement and with regard to external rela-
tions with supporters (the masses). A popular leader goes as far 
20  Paul D. Kenny, Populism in Shouteasht Asia, United Kingdom: Crambidge University press, 2019
21  Edward Aspinall, “Oligarchic populism: Prabowo Subianto’s challenge to Indonesian 
democracy.” Indonesia 99 (1), 2015, 1–28.
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as relying mainly on charismatic mobilization of mass move-
ments.22
Gino Germaini argues that populists are partly determined by 
the nature of their support base. In his opinion, populists mobilize 
previously marginalized citizens, including rural migrants, to 
outperform the established parties. Nicos Mouzelis, in his pio-
neering research on Latin America, accepts populism as a form 
of relationship between parties and voters that differs from the 
clientelistic or patronage-based dominant relationship in the 
continent. He argues that under populism it is a plebiscitarian 
leadership rather than a complex patronage network that provides 
a basic framework for political integration.23 Furthermore, Moun-
zelis suggests that:
As a rule, populist leaders are hostile to strongly institutionalized 
intermediary levels, whether clientelist or bureaucratic. The emphasis 
on the leader’s charisma, on the necessity for direct, nonmediated 
rapport between the leader and “his people” as well as the relatively 
sudden process of political incorporation all lead to a fluidity of 
organizational forms24.
Weyland defines populism as a political strategy through 
which a personalistic leader seeks for or uses government power 
based on direct, non-intermediate, and non-institutionalized 
supports from a large number of followers who are mostly unor-
ganized. In his statement, Weyland emphasizes that:
22  K. Weyland, Populism: A political-strategic approach. The Oxford Handbook of Populism. C. Rovira 
Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo and P. Ostiguy (eds.). New York: Oxford University 
Press. (2017).
23  Paul D. Kenny, Populism and Patronage, 28-29.
24  N. Mouzelis “On the concept of populism: Populist and clientelist modes of incorporation in 
semiperipheral polities.” Politics & Society 14 (3), (1985), 329–348.
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populism is best defined as a political strategy through which a 
personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on 
direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of 
mostly unorganized followers25.
For Weyland, populists always have an organizational struc-
ture behind their movements. This organizational level is at the 
lower end of the institutional scale. While populists sometimes 
make use of parties, trade unions, and other organizations in their 
efforts to win and maintain power, they rely more on institution-
alized and leader-centric organizational structures than formal 
and informal institutions or patronage parties. Alberto Fujimori 
from Peru makes a good example of this. He found that political 
parties were so restrictive that he effectively ruled without parties, 
creating only new political vehicles for his re-election campaign. 
Populist leaders rely greater on personal charisma and the use of 
media to build one-way connections with the masses of voters. 
Most importantly, according to this conceptualization, populists 
appeal to relatively disorganized voters, i.e. a large block of voters 
who are detached from existing parties and civil society organiza-
tions that are aligned, and as such are available for mobilization 
from above.26
The main difficulty with that definition is that it identifies 
organizational modes or strategies that emerge across the politi-
cal spectrum in many different articulations which usually never 
consider the reference of ‘populist’; a number of social movements 
(such as religious or millenarian one) or forms of community 
politics might fall into such a definition. Likewise, there is no 
reason to believe that populism only thrives in terms of institu-
25  Kurt Weyland, ‘Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American 
Politics’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 34 (1), 2001, 1-22.
26  Paul D. Kenny, Populism and Patronage, 28-29
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tionalization or low level organization. The fortune of Le Pen’s 
Front Nationalor Wilder’s Partij voor de Vrijheidprove proves 
that populism can indeed grow and develop within a strict party 
discipline and organizational environment.27 
B. Islamic Populism
As an ideology and mobilization, populism can overlap with 
various social, political and even religious groups. In politics, the 
issue of plural populism is used by politicians, political parties, 
and governments. Issues about economic inequality, increasing 
welfare, providing education and health subsidies, are forms of 
populism that are often used by politicians and governments to 
draw attract support. The same applies to mass organizations, 
Ornop and NGOs (non-government organizations)28 they also 
use populist issues in their social movements. Such issues as com-
munity empowerment, fuel price rise rejection, labor wage in-
crease demand, corruption, collution and nepotism eradication, 
as well as demand to change authoritarian regime and the like, as 
shown during the 1998 reform movement, are often used by 
NGOs to fight for their socio-political movement agenda. As 
civil society organs, NGOs basically have a tendency to be critical, 
27  Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey, “Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation, and Po-
litical Style”, Political Studies, 62 (2), 2014, 381-397.
28  These terms are sometimes used interchangeably in the same definition, yet at the same time, 
some have a tendency to distinguish and debate them. Some argue that NGOs are substantially 
similar to LSM (mass organization), what distinguishes them is their work pattern and 
movement. Another view states that LSM are those groups established independently and 
voluntarily by the community. Ornop is defined as an independent organization not coopted by 
the government, a movement entity established by the society beyond the state, and having its 
own characteristics as agreed upon by the international world as a voluntary organization beyond 
the government. Ormas and also Ornop actually share some characteristics, i.e. they both desire 
to give some space for expressing and appreciating themselves amidst the community and the 
state. The difference lies in their scope of work where Ornop focus specifically on such issues as 
corruptions and so forth, Ormas deal with various issues of life as a community. Luthfi J. 
Kurniawan & Hesti Puspitosari, Negara, Civil Society dan Demokratisasi, 44-50.
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independent and autonomous in dealing with power and various 
other dominant forces. Born from outside of the state, corpora-
tions, and political parties, NGOs also have a tendency to favor 
the interests of small communities. In this case, NGOs often 
present themselves as a countervailing power and even competi-
tors for the state domination.29
Nevertheless, it is also important to realize that the existence 
of NGOs that carry the issue of populism does not show a com-
pletely homogeneous character, both in terms of their ideology, 
scope, orientation of the movement. Borrowing the classification 
made by James Petras, NGOs (in response to bad regimes/bad 
government and the threat of global discourse) are polarized into 
three variants, i.e. firstly, NGOs which are willing to serve as 
agents of the interests of global discourse of neo-liberalism; sec-
ondly, reform NGOs which seek to criticize and reform the steps 
of the WTO, World Bank, USAID, IMF, UNDP and the like; 
and thirdly, radical NGOs which loudly and bravely keep on 
challenging the move of globalization, anti-racist campaigns and 
carrying the spirit of world solidarity. These three NGO variants 
have different strategies for selecting their target movements and 
issues (environment, gender, pluralism, anti-capitalism, etc.).30
29  M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Gerakan Keagamaan dan Penguatan Civil Society, Kata Pengantar (Re-
ligious Movement and Civil Society Strengthening, A Foreword)”, in Asep Gunawan and Dewi 
Nurjulianti (ed.) Gerakan Keagamaan dalam Penguatan Civil Society, Analisis Perbandingan Visi 
dan Misi LSM dan Ormas Berbasis Keagamaan (Religious Movement in Civil Society Strengthening, 
Comparative Analysis of Religion-Based NGO and Mass Organization’s Vision and Mission), Ja-
karta: TAF and LSAF, 1999, xix.
30  Mansour Fakih, Entjeng Sobirin, and Muslim Abdurrahman develop the mapping and sum-
marize it into a number of classification, i.e., firstly, Deveopmentalistic NGOs which serve to 
extend the government’s projects, nevertheless these NGOs sometimes successfully influence 
the decisions within the government; secondly, Grassroots NGOs which opt a strategy to move 
in the lowest level of community; and thirdly, Transformatory NGOs which choose to make 
their move among the urban middle-class community. Luthfi J. Kurniawan & Hesti Puspitosari, 
Negara, Civil Society dan Demokratisasi, 55-56.
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Included here are Islamic groups which, in their social activ-
ism, also frequently intersect with the issue of populism. The 
peaceful mass mobilization carried out by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
organization in the istighatsah Kubra recently, for example, which 
raised the issue of nationalism, tolerance and diversity, could be 
classified as a populist movement which at the same time used 
popular issues and media. Such a popular movement can be found 
in Indonesian Islamic organizations in its long history, especially 
since the era of colonialism and it continues to exist in the post-
colonial period. During the era of colonialism, NU even success-
fully mobilized the masses (their santri or students) in large 
numbers using the spirit or religious issues. Resolusi jihad was a 
kind of populist movement launched by NU in mobilizing the 
masses (people) to fight against the colonial elite.31
In the currently pluralizing environment, it can also be wit-
nessed how a number of religious activists with different back-
grounds and interests from the (traditional) scholars emerge. 
These populist da’i (preachers), celebrity clerics, neotraditionalist 
teachers and Sufi Muslims and new Muslim intellectuals who 
received secular education, challenge the religious monopoly 
(authority) that had been enjoyed by the scholars. Coming from 
outside of the ulema’s circle, these new activists orient themselves 
to a wider public than some religious experts. In some places of 
esoteric sharia debate, these public Islamic spokespeople present 
their beliefs in semi-ideological terms, as a source of practical 
31  Following the perspective of Canovan, Mouffe, and others, what the charismatic traditionalistic 
Muslim leaders such as K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari did in mobilizing the mass (people) to fight against 
the Dutch colonial elites could be deemed as a populist politic. For further reference, read Nicos 
Mouzeles, “On the Concept of Populism: Populist and Clientelist Modes of Incorporation in 
Semi-peripheral Polities”, in Politic & Society, Vol. 14, No. 3, September 1985; Robert S. Jansen, 
“Populist Mobilization: A New Theoritical Approach to Populism”, in Sociological Theory, Vol. 29, 
No. 2, Juni 2011; Margaret Canovan, Populism, London: Junction Books, 1981.
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knowledge.32 In this context, the emergence of new activists who 
help challenge the establishment of religious authority which has 
been the privilege of the ulema, can be understood as a symptom 
of Islamic populism in the public domain. 
Recently, the issue and movement of religious populism are 
revived by Islamists for their political struggle. The peaceful action 
of mobilizing the mass on a massive scale as happened in Aksi 
Bela Islam demanded for justice against Ahok, who was claimed 
to have defamed religion, was the real form of the populism 
movement. Therefore, the popular actions driven by Islamists us-
ing the flag of Aksi Bela Islam (Defend Islam Action), was known 
as Islamic populismist movements.33 Just like the character of 
Islamism groups in general, the popular action carried out by 
proponents of this Aksi Bela Islam was more representative of 
right-wing populism that tended to be exclusive, racist and sec-
tarianistic. 
Through this Defend Islam narrative, the emergence of popu-
lar action represented mainly the language of self-affirmation 
(Islamist agents) to mobilize people who thought they were 
marginalized by economic, political and cultural processes in the 
society. At the same time, those who thought that capitalist mo-
dernity and socialist utopia had failed then made the language of 
morality through religion and wanted a change in the political 
32  Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam, 27-30.
33  Defining Islamic populism is as equally problematic as defining what populism is itself. Even the 
experts are divided in defining the term. Some even go further as making classifications by dis-
tinguishing the term Islamic populism and radical Islam or political Islam which make their 
move in the electoral path. As a new term, it is of course important to study and test it further. 
However, the existence of Aksi Bela Islam at the end of 2016 and beginning of 2017 gave a litle 
picture of Islamic populist group. Vedi R. Hadiz places this group on par with a loose coalition 
between urban poor groups merged into vigilant groups (such as Front Pembela Islam), religious 
middle class, and some elites such as religious leaders, political and business figures. Ari A. Per-
dana, “Menguatnya Populisme, 2017.  
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system.34 The demand of those actors behind this Defend Islam 
movement for the government to be firm in giving punishment 
and ousting Ahok from the seat of the DKI governor because he 
was considered to have defamed Islam, can be understood as part 
of the interests of the Islamists in demanding political change. 
The Sharia-based Jakarta discourse also helped strengthen the 
interests of Islamists in changing the national political order. It 
is from this case that we can get a little picture of a populist Is-
lamic group, which is more like a loose coalition between urban 
poor groups who are members of vigilant groups, religious middle 
classes and some elite religious leaders, political figures and busi-
ness.35
Meanwhile, the narrative raised by Islamist populism in In-
donesia is slightly different from the populism in American and 
European countries. Even so, what happens in Indonesia in many 
respects has anatomical and elemental similarities to those in the 
two continents. There are at least three similarities between Is-
lamist populism in Indonesia and right populism in America 
(US) and Europe. Firstly, both are expressions of groups that are 
demographically majority, yet they think they are marginalized. 
Secondly, the use of nativism narratives to strengthen the identity 
of white Anglo-Saxon movements in the US, indigenous people 
(vs immigrants) in Europe, and Muslims in Indonesia. In this 
case, racial, religious and anti-foreign sentiments are the domi-
nant tone of the narratives of the right populist. Thirdly, both in 
Indonesia, the US and Europe, the rise of populism is aided by 
what is referred to as ‘post-truth politic’. The speed and volume 
of information in this digital age are not kept up with adequate 
verification mechanisms. As a result, fake news (hoaxes) became 
34  Asef Bayat, Post-Islamisme, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011, 12.
35  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”, 2017.  
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an effective way by populist agents to organize and mobilize the 
masses.36
C. Strengthened Islamic Populism 
The success of populist actors in winning political arena in 
various parts of the world such as the United States, Europe and 
Asia, has led to the arrival of a new period in the world of global 
politics known as the populism era.37 Donald Trump’s victory as 
the president of the US, the Brexit group in Britain, the appear-
ance of Marine Le Pen of the French National Front Party, Geert 
Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party, and Islamists such 
as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and its proponents in In-
donesia in mobilizing people for Aksi Bela Islam, as mentioned 
above, are said to be a variant of right populism. The term right 
populism is used by a number of experts to refer to conservative 
and fundamentalist ideological character, which is contrasted 
against the left populism which is described as critical, progressive 
and even revolutionary one.   
Under a circumstance where the power of right populism 
emerges as an important force in the political landscape in their 
respective countries, of course, the assumption that there are 
global issues that contribute to the event inevitably arises. Some 
experts believe that the increasingly strengthened conservative, 
fundamentalist and even ultra-nationalist forces coincides with 
the crisis of liberal democracy in various parts of the world. From 
corrupt political elites, economic inequality especially between 
indigenous people and immigrants, exclusionary economic sys-
tems siding towards the urban poor and other vulnerable groups, 
to such issues as prostitution, LGBT, and abortion legalization 
36  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”, 2017.  
37  Paul D. Kenny, Populism in Shouteasht Asia, 1-5.
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by liberal political elites, all are considered triggers for the emer-
gence of right populism.
The association between the liberal democracy crisis and the 
rise of right-wing populism seems to be fairly rational. Religious 
fundamentalists (referred to as conservatives in the United 
States), in many ways, have a close relationship with ultra-nation-
alist groups (often referred to as fascists). They want a highly 
protectionist economic policy, along with increasing intolerance 
towards other groups, centralization of state policy, and high at-
tention to national security and defense. At the same time, these 
two groups are often conflicting with the liberals. Religious fun-
damentalists often declare an open war to capitalism and those 
they label infidels. Meanwhile, the ultra-nationalists often rob 
giant corporate’s money for their political interests such as the 
development of the weapons industry and others.38 
In line with the expert’s views above, Inglehart and Norris 
offer two important hypotheses which can be used to explain the 
rise of right-wing populism, i.e. economic inequality and cul-
tural conflict. The first hypothesis refers to the fact that the 2008-
09 financial crisis had forced the economies in Western countries 
to look for a new balance. At the same time, economic globaliza-
tion created many job opportunities, especially in the manufactur-
ing sector, moving to various countries such as Mexico, India and 
Africa. The same also occured in the service sector; jobs which 
previously had to be done in Cleveland or Brimingham, could 
then be done remotely by workers in Mumbai or Manila39. 
Even if economic inequality plays an important role in trigger-
ing and spurring the right populism, it is not the only determinant 
38  Bima Satria Putra, “Kebangkitan Global Fundamentalis dan Ultra-Nasionalis: Bukan Akhir 
dari Sejarah”, Anarkis.org, 22 February 2017.
39  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”,  2017.  
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factor. Cultural backlash is considered a factor which cannot be 
underestimated. Within the last three decades, Western countries 
have experienced important changes, including the increased sup-
port for minority groups (LGBT, blacks, Hispanics, immigrants), 
feminism, multiculturalism, internationalism, and values identical 
with political correctness. While these ‘cosmopolitan liberal’ values 
are accepted by the younger generation, they make the older gen-
eration feel insecure. These older generation see it as a threat to the 
civilization and values they have been upholding. It is therefore not 
surprising that those elderly give their support to parties, politicians 
and people they think capable of maintaining their values.40  
In Indonesian context, the rise of right-wing populism spon-
sored by agents of Islamism, in addition to its intersection with the 
rise of fundamentalism and the crisis of liberal democracy at 
global level, cannot be separated from the long history of Islamiza-
tion, especially the dramatic rise of Islam in public life in the 1990s, 
one decade before the fall of the New Order regime (1966-98). 
According to a number of experts, Islamization has become the 
single most striking feature that colored the early period of reform 
(1998-present). Ariel Heryanto, for example, suggests that Islam-
ization to some extent has determined the framework, boundaries, 
and content of the power struggle in Indonesia. It must be admit-
ted that Ariel’s study of Islam after the New Order focused on 
popular culture. However, the study of popular Islam also has a 
direct association with the development of sharia economic ideas, 
the application of Islamic law (sharia regional regulations), and 
lately echoed the idea of  Islamic government (khilafah).41 
Populist mobilization can also be interpreted as a response to 
challenges to the political community which is defined by certain 
40  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”, 2017.  
41  Bima Satria Putra, “Kebangkitan Global Fundamentalis dan Ultra-Nasionalis”, 2017
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identities. In Europe, this often manifests itself as an opposition 
from the “native” populations to non-European immigrants (es-
pecially Muslims); in the United States, white nationalist senti-
ments that rose up against both Latin and African-American 
immigrants; and in Southeast Asia, such an identity-based mo-
bilization is usually drawn along the lines of domestic ethnic 
majority-minority divisions. In Indonesia, the Chinese and 
Christian minorities have become the subject of prejudice in the 
hands of fundamentalist Muslims. Mietzner (2018: 264) argues 
that the 2016 Islamist “mass movement” under the leadership of 
Rizieq Shibab must be understood as a case of populism.42 
Through a sociological-historical approach, Vedi Hadiz dis-
mantles the roots of the development of Islamic populism deep 
into the New Order era which made a great contribution in re-
pressing the political expression of Islamic groups. What is certain 
is that in the early 2000s a number of groups emerged carrying 
religious (Islamic) flags, acting vigilantly to crack down on ac-
tivities or places deemed incompatible with Islamic teachings - 
from discotheques, cafes, nightspots to discussion forums related 
to communism, LGBT and others. Among these vigilante groups, 
the most popular and influential one is FPI.  
Some experts often includes FPI in Islamist or political Islam 
groups. However, it’s slightly different from extremist Islamism 
groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI), Majlis Mujahidin Indone-
sia (MMI), Laskar Jihad (LJ), and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia 
(HTI); with the latter group being more representative of a reli-
gious movement based on clear ideology and goals. Gradually, the 
extremist Islamism movement was successfully minimized, and 
42  Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic 
Deconsolidation in Indonesia”, Pasific Affairs 91 (2), 2018, 261-282.
I S L A M I C  P O P U L I S M  A N D  D E M O C R A C Y. . .
45
their radical approach made the basis of support for them never 
become large enough.43  
Until the 2010s decade, the main narrative of Islamism in 
Indonesia was still monopolized by Islamic parties and Islamic 
politicians. FPI’s voice, while still loud, was not seen as a repre-
sentation of the aspiration of Muslims in general. FPI was also 
seen as a group of poor and marginal people in urban areas. 
Therefore, their movements are motivated more by economic 
interests and the search for social identity, rather than by ideol-
ogy. Later on, the support for FPI had strengthened along with 
the development of religious middle class that had been hit by 
frustration and insecurity in competition in the era of global 
capitalism. It is in such a context that Islamist populism in Indo-
nesia, like Trump, Brexit and others in the US and Europe, was 
born as an alternative choice for various cross-class groups.44 
Another view explains that the emergence and development of 
Islamist populism in Indonesia is closely related to, on the one 
hand, the surge in fundamentalism, conservativism and political 
Islam itself. On the other hand, the fact that progressive or reform-
ist moderate Muslim power and also leftist populism have not 
risen is considered by some experts to contribute greatly to the 
presence of this Islamic right-wing populism.45 Unlike the Islamic 
populist groups who are strict in fighting for their “da’wah” agenda 
in protecting the main values  of life from the influence of liberalism 
such as in the issues of communism, capitalism, LGBT and the 
like, moderate and progressive Muslims actually stagnate in con-
solidating their power to continue the agenda of the reform 
struggle in various aspects of life. Instead of continuing to show 
43  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”, 2017.  
44  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”, 2017.  
45  Bima Satria Putra, ANARKIS.ORG. 22 February 2017.
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consistency in fighting for its democratic agenda, not a few of the 
moderate Muslim elements are actually involved in counter-pop-
ulism actions which frequently contradict the democratic values.46
From the perspective of social movement theory, the emergence 
of Islamic populism cannot be separated from the structure of 
political opportunities (such as the openness and freedom of the 
post-New Order era), (social, cultural and financial) resource mo-
bilization and framing processes (issues, discourse and propaganda). 
1. Political Opportunity Structure Theory
As an important part of the political process approach, political 
opportunity structure theory focuses its study on the momentum 
of collective action and the outcome of movement activities. Peter 
Eisinger, one of the pioneers of political opportunity theory ex-
plains that collective action surfaces when political and economic 
systems, under certain conditions, are exposed and used by chal-
lengers to take their aims. Eisinger, by modifying Tocqueville’s ideas 
(that revolution occurrs not when social groups were in a depressed 
condition, rather in a condition of openness), tests it through re-
search into the phenomenon of the United States community 
protests in urban areas. He is interested in seeing the extent to 
which the role of political institutions influences the development 
of collective actions; when political institutions are enclosed, does 
collective action decrease in quantity or, vice versa, when political 
institutions are opened, the protests actually increase. In his various 
studies, he concludes that protests actually develop when political 
opportunities are opened.47
46  Greg Fealy, Reformasi and the Decline of Liberal Islam, Cornelll University Press, pp. 117-134; 
Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, Diatyka Widya Permata Asih and Luqmanul Hakim, “Populisme 
Islam dan Tantangan Demokrasi”, 48-59.
47  Peter Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cites”, American Political Re-
view 67, 1973, 11-28.
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McAdam and Tarrow describe the political opportunity struc-
ture theory in more detail. Four variables can be used to explain 
why collective action arises, i.e. firstly, when the level of access to 
political institutions is open; secondly, when the political balance 
is scattered, while a new political balance has not yet been formed; 
thirdly, when political elites experience major conflicts and this 
conflict is used by agents of change as an opportunity; and 
fourthly, when the agents of change gather support from the elites 
who are in the system to make changes. 48
Specifically, Sydney Tarrow reiterates that political tensions 
increase when the agents of change have the support of external 
resources to get out of trouble or to achieve the goals they want. 
In this case, the political opportunity structure theory is always 
associated with the external resources utilized by the agents of 
change by opening access to political institutions and divisions 
within the political elite.49
2. Theory of Resources Mobilization Structure
This theory concerns with informal networks, social move-
ment organizations and resistance groups at the meso level. Mc-
Carthy reveals that mobilization structure is a number of ways 
for social movement groups to merge in a collective action which 
includes movement tactics and forms of organization of social 
movements. This mobilization structure also includes a series of 
social positions in daily life in the mobilization structure at the 
micro level. In this case, family units, friendship networks, asso-
ciations of volunteers, workplace units and elements of the coun-
48  Read Sydeny Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 1998, 15;  Abdul Wahib Situmorang, Gerakan Sosial: Teori dan Praktik, 
34.
49  Sydeny Tarrow, Power in Movement, 15.
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try itself become the social locations for micro mobilization 
structures.50
In McCarthy’s mind, informal structures—in addition to 
formal structures, of course—are important contributors to local 
social movements. Later on, this concept develops more broadly 
when it is connected with the movement mobilization. Woliver 
emphasizes the importance of memory factors. Meanwhile, Gam-
son and Scheidler identify several informal structural network 
factors such as differences in sub-culture and protest infrastruc-
ture. Using micro mobilization mechanism, McAdam states that 
formal and informal relations between people could be a source 
of solidarity and facilitate communication structures when they 
colectively identify differences in government policies.51
3. Framing Process Theory
Whether or not a social movement is successful will be 
largely determined by, for example, how far the actors of the 
movement win the battle for meaning. This is a process in which 
social movement actors create and roll out discourses that can 
reverberate between those targeted to be mobilized. This relates 
to the efforts made by the agents of change to influence the mean-
ing in public policy. In this case, these agents of change have an 
important task of achieving what they are fighting for through 
the formation of framing of social and injustice issues. This is a 
way to convince diverse and broad target groups to make them 
encouraged to push for change.52
Framing can also be formulated as an art of communicating 
messages to persuade the masses and attract support and par-
50  Abdul Wahib Situmorang, Gerakan Sosial: Teori dan Praktik, 39.
51  Abdul Wahib Situmorang, Gerakan Sosial: Teori dan Praktik, 40.
52  Abdul Wahib Situmorang, Gerakan Sosial: Teori dan Praktik, 41.
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ticipation. Therefore, various issues and symbols are chosen and 
contextualized to achieve frame resonance, i.e. adequate respons-
es that will turn potential mobilizations into actual ones. This 
collective action frame resonance serves as the basis for movement 
actors to create their collective identity, a formulation of interac-
tive action orientation and opportunities and obstacles where the 
action occurs. A strong sense of identity determines the decisions 
to be taken by the actors and the way they adjust their activities 
to the constantly changing situations.53 
Zald identifies several topics which are not only related to the 
framing process, but also play an important role in forming fram-
ing. The first topic is cultural contradictions and historical lines. 
For Zald, political and mobilization opportunities are often cre-
ated through longstanding cultural tensions and contradictions 
that have been the subject of the framing establishment or forma-
tion process such as complaints and injustice, which makes col-
lective action possible. The second topic is related to the framing 
process as a strategic activity. Cultural cracks and contradictions 
provide context and opportunity at the same time for movement 
cadres, namely leaders, core participants, activists and sympathiz-
ers. There is an active process of framing and defining ideologies, 
symbols, events which can serve as icons by moral entrepreneurs.54
In order to reach the target group, the movement actors need 
tools in running the framing, namely the media. The media are 
one of the main targets for framing process efforts in social move-
ments. In this case, Zald argues that framing contesting occurs 
in vis-a-vis interactions and through a variety of printed and 
electronic media, books, pamphlets and so on.  Social movement 
activists use coffee shops, cafes, and meeting rooms as their media 
53  Noorhaidi Hasan, Islam Politik di Dunia Kontemporer, 134-135.
54  Abdul Wahib Situmorang, Gerakan Sosial: Teori dan Praktik, 43.
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for debate to disseminate issues to convince community groups 
and make them want to be involved in the movement.55 
D. Islamic Populism and Democracy
The consequence of the rise of populism for the democracy 
development (regime/government) is one of the most discussed 
topics by experts recently. This cannot be separated from the 
phenomenon of the rise of populist parties, political elites and 
movements in a number of countries in Europe, America and 
Asia.  Experts themselves have varied views on this matter. Some 
experts argue that populism is dangerous and essentially anti-
democracy. Others argue the opposite, that populism movement 
can actually be a reflection of an undemocratic political system. 
For those who see populism as a way to reframe political space to 
exert influence on people who were previously marginalized from 
the reach of government policy, populism has constructive poten-
tial. In this case, populism can support inclusive politics that 
expand democratic participation for groups who were previously 
marginalized as demonstrated by a wave of left-wing populism 
in Latin America.56  
Urbinati emphasizes that populism is a strategy to rebalance 
the distribution of political power among the emerging and es-
tablished social groups. She suggests that the tension between 
liberal democracy and populism stems from the way in which this 
ideology views the relationship between representative institu-
tions and “the will of the people.” She argues that for populists, 
the main task of political institutions is not to serve as a system 
55  Abdul Wahib Situmorang, Gerakan Sosial: Teori dan Praktik, 44-45.
56 Nadia Urbinati, ‘Democracy and Populism’. Constellations, Vol. 5 (1), 1998, 110–124; Margaret 
Canovan, ‘Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy’, in Meny, Yves 
and Yves Surel (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge. New York: Palgrave, 2002, 25-44.
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of checks and balances or as a protector of civil rights, rather as 
an instrumental tool for translating the majority into political 
decisions.57 Canovan also focuses on the tensions embedded in 
the institutional design of democracy: democracy is an ideology 
and practice of popular participation, yet at the same time it re-
quires a complex decision system which is often opaque and this 
in turn encourages populist actors to feel deeply dissatisfied with 
these representative institutions. As a result, populist ideology 
seeks to make up for this situation with its “claims of legitimacy 
based on the popular democratic ideology of majority sover-
eignty and rule” which is the return of “true” democracy led by 
“the people” and not by professional political elites.58
While, Canovan regards populism as a shadow of democracy, 
Arditi calls populist thinking as the “specter of democracy.” Ar-
diti argues that populism can be seen as “awkward dinner guests”, 
who are drunk and ask inappropriate questions, which might 
actually point to important hidden issues. This colorful metaphor 
captures well the duality between popular politics and democ-
racy: populism challenges the common sense of liberal demo-
cratic practices and may have unfavorable implications for lib-
eral democracy. At the same time, populism can function to 
identify the ignored political problems and provide a legitimate 
voice for marginalized groups.59
The ability of populist politics to improve the quality of de-
mocracy is illustrated by Postel’s analysis of the American Popu-
list Party. Postel explains that the rise of the American Populist 
57  Nadia Urbinati, ‘Democracy and Populism’. Constellations, Vol. 5 (1), 1998, 110–124
58  Margaret Canovan, ‘Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy’, in: 
Meny, Yves and Yves Surel (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge, New York: Palgrave, 
2002, 25-44.
59  Noam Gidron & Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research 
Agenda”, Working Paper Series, Weatherhead Center, Harvard University, 1-38.
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Party is largely in response to economic depression in the late 
19th century and technological innovation in transportation, 
industrial production, communication, and global trade. The 
Populist movement is a coalition of peasants, breadwinners and 
middle class activists, who work together to challenge the harsh 
economic and political realities of their day. Contrary to some 
accounts, Postel views the populist revival not as a reactionary 
opposition to modernity or rejection of democracy, rather as a 
struggle for economic reform through increased democratic par-
ticipation. In fact, Postel believes that the Populist Party is very 
democratic, mobilizing millions of citizens who are often mar-
ginalized, even if its ideology leaves little room for minority 
rights.60
Kaltwasser and Mudde argue that populism is actually posi-
tively related to democracy since it focuses on representing the 
will of the people. Among the positive effects of populism are the 
representation and mobilization of marginalized groups, estab-
lishment of cross-class political coalitions and an emphasis on 
accountability of democracy. Both recognize that the relationship 
between populism and liberal democracy is, in essence, ambigu-
ous; can be both corrective and a threat to democracy. Both rec-
ognize that the relationship between populism and liberal democ-
racy is, in essence, dualistic in nature; it can be either corrective 
or a threat to democracy. Everything depends on two main 
contextual factors, namely the degree of consolidation of democ-
racy and whether populists sit in the opposition or in the govern-
ment.  In a consolidated democracy,61 populism in the opposition 
60  Charles Postel, The Populist Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
61  Consolidated democracy is defined as “a political regime where the free and fair general election 
is institutionalized as a mechanism through which the access to political power is determined.” 
Steven Levitsky and James Loxton, ‘Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes’, 
Democratization, Vol. 20 (1), 2013, 107-136.
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is expected to have a small positive impact on the quality of de-
mocracy, and populism in the government should have a moder-
ate influence on democracy, be it positive or negative. In an un-
consolidated democratic country, on the other hand, populism in 
the government is expected to have a strong negative effect on 
democracy while populism in the opposition must play a correc-
tive role to democracy.62
Some other experts tend to assess that the relationship be-
tween populism and democracy is very contradictory or antago-
nistic. In general, they believe that populism is non-democracy 
and even anti-democracy.63 In fact, some even think that populism 
serves as none other than a toxic or poison to democracy. A harsh 
statement, for example, submitted by the president of the Euro-
pean Union, Herman van Rompuy, states that populism was “the 
greatest danger to Europe”, referring to the rise of xenophobic 
rights-wing parties in a large number of European countries64. 
Other observers also think populism as a virus that infects the 
party systems and spreads their epidemic effects.65 
Levitsky and Loxton also challenge overly optimistic views 
about the effects of populism on democratization. They argue that 
while populism may have a positive effect on liberal democracy, 
in an unconsolidated democracy, populism serves to obstruct 
further development of democratic institutions—even when it 
facilitates greater political inclusion. Some reasons can be men-
tioned for this ambiguous result, they are: firstly, populists are 
usually outsiders who do not value representative democratic 
62  Takis S. Pappas, ‘Populist Democracies: Post – Authoritarian Greece and Post-Communist 
Hungary’, Opposition and Government, 2013.
63  Read G. Pasquino, “Populism and Democracy”, in Daniel Albertazzi and Duncan MacDonell 
(ed.) Twenty-first Century Populism, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, 16; K. Abts and S. 
Rummens, “Populism versus Democracy”, Political Studies, Vol. 55 (2), 2007, 414.
64  Noam Gidron & Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism”, 1-38.
65  Noam Gidron & Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism”, 1-38.
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institutions; secondly, populists believe that they have received a 
mandate from the people to fight political stability, and thirdly, 
populist leaders often oppose the opposition in parliament, bu-
reaucracy and the Supreme Court, and therefore have strong 
incentives to weaken this institution. Loxton and Levistky argue 
that populist leaders in an unconsolidated democracy could con-
tribute in important ways to undermine democratic institutions 
and, in some cases, even to bring in competitive authoritarian-
ism66.
Other experts, such as Pappas and Müller, also tend to iden-
tify populism as a serious threat to democracy. This is based on 
the fact that populism is a form of illiberalism or anti-pluralism. 
In the (liberal) democracy concept , individual freedom in deter-
mining their political choices, freedom of expression, association 
and speech, and compliance with the rule of law, are the main 
principles in democracy.67 As has been widely known, the popu-
lism actions themselves tend to make a move beyond the law, 
contradict the formal political institutional system, and have an 
interest in creating change through non-democratic mechanisms. 
Populism, be it inclusive or exclusive (whether economic-based 
populism or not) or identity (nativist populism), is seen as a threat 
to immigrants and minorities, and therefore to democracy itself.68 
While some observers see the inclusive populist movement as 
an authentic democracy, identifying, rather than covering up, the 
divisions in which emancipatory political projects can be made, 
others show that nominally inclusive populist movements also 
tend to engage in the hyper-centralization of power and dele-
gitimation of political opposition, thus harming democracy. As 
66  Steven Levitsky and James Loxton, ‘Populism and competitive authoritarianism”, 107-136.
67  Margaret Canovan, Trust the People!” 2-16.
68  Paul D. Kenny, Populism and Patronage, 25;39.
I S L A M I C  P O P U L I S M  A N D  D E M O C R A C Y. . .
5 5
Takis Pappas said, populists are illiberal democrats. Political 
liberals are committed to the assumption that a society consisting 
of various cross-cutting intersections and compliance with insti-
tutional procedures—especially the rule of law—is the best way 
to moderate the conflicting interests of the people. On the con-
trary, the illiberal democrats totally reject the idea of  a plural 
society consisting of legally conflicting interests, thus posing a 
direct threat to the rights of the minorities.69
In relation to the populism actions taken by Islamist groups, 
in general, their involvement in politics is done in four ways, 
namely (1) establishing political parties as a formal vehicle in 
general election, (2) forming alliances to reach the policies in 
favor of their groups, (3) working through governments (state 
institution) to pass legislations, and (4) mobilizing through civil 
society. In this context, Islamist organizations seem to work in 
great coallitions to give national and regional parliaments some 
pressure on specific issues. In such a case, political parties mobi-
lize within the parliaments, and Islamist NGOs make some 
lobby, hold a rally, send some petitions and participate in the 
hearing.70
Simultaneously, the above methods can also be seen in Aksi 
Bela Islam carried out by Islamists and their proponents. The 
Islamist civil elements worked together to form a loose cross-class 
alliance with its main vehicle called the GNPF-MUI. In addition 
to utilizing their resources to mobilize street rally, they also col-
laborate with political forces, especially from among Islamist 
political parties and those who oppose the government. Included 
in their effort is the pressure they put on the parliament in 
Senayan to support their political struggle agenda.
69  Paul D. Kenny, Populism and Patronage, 24-25.
70  Julie Chernov Hwang, Umat Bergerak, 113.
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In democracy, the right to have different opinions, views and 
political choices is protected. Everyone, whoever he/she is, regard-
less of their origin, has the right to be different as their basic right 
or human rights.71 In the light of this view, it can be said that ex-
pressing aspirations through mass rally as demonstrated by propo-
nents of Aksi Bela Islam, certainly does not conflict with the values 
and basic principles of democracy. However, the democratic system 
guarantees the right of every citizen to express his/her opinion in 
acceptable ways.  At the same time, the right to be different (and 
the obligation to integrate) should never be extreme in the form of 
separatism and the like.72
On the contrary, when the right to be different is expressed 
through intolerant methods, this of course cannot be tolerated. In 
this case, Ricoeur sees intolerance as the negativity of tolerance. As 
a denial, intolerance is intolerable. The main reason lies in its effects. 
Any intolerance, be it religiously-, culturally- or politically-moti-
vated, is always destructive and, therefore, detrimental to democ-
racy. 73  
In relation to Aksi Bela Islam, the mass rally that aspires the 
SARA (race, religion, race and intergroup) issues, targeting mi-
nority ethnic groups, surely puts democracy to danger. The dif-
ference between the desire to enforce the law on the perpetrator 
of blasphemy (Ahok) and the wish to carry out the Islamization 
as a whole, can produce short-term and long-term consequences 
for democracy. Muslim support for similar actions is highly 
likely not to last long, because their support base in Muslim so-
cieties is limited. However, the effects of their SARA political 
71  Felix Baghi, Pluralisme, Demokrasi dan Toleransi (Pluralism, Democracy and Tolerance), Yogyakar-
ta: Ledalero, 2012, 37.
72  Felix Baghi, Pluralisme, Demokrasi dan Tolerans, 37.
73  Felix Baghi, Pluralisme, Demokrasi dan Toleransi, 40.
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narratives will last long enough. Such SARA narratives as infidels, 
blasphemer, Chinese, capitalists, Nine dragons, and the like, result 
in the strengthening of religious primordial sentiment among 
Muslims. 
Without having to play down the impact of demonstrations 
that have successfully gathered a large number of people (around 
500,000 to 750,000), these events still have a negative effect on 
the progress of democracy, especially on minority rights, and raise 
big questions for Indonesia’s self-image as a tolerant nation which 
respects security and diversity, and is committed to the suprem-
acy of law. In short, these actions in the name of Defend Islamic 
in the period of the Jakarta Election, have reduced the claim of 
Indonesia as a moderate Islamic democratic state.74 
In religious and democratic discourses, it is also important to 
consider the opinion that says that freedom (as the core of de-
mocracy) can be guaranteed if citizens are tolerant of the different 
beliefs held by others. Normatively, citizens should have the same 
opportunity to achieve their respective goals according to their 
social, cultural, religious and economic economic interests. These 
differences will become problematic if tolerance or willingness to 
accept differences is absent.75 While it must also be recognized 
that tolerance, in fact, is not identical with democracy, it is be-
lieved that tolerance is an important factor for making democ-
racy work.76 In this case, tolerance helps the stability of society, 
which in turn strengthens democracy. On the contrary, intoler-
ance makes it difficult for democracy to survive, let alone devel-
op.77 
74  Greg Fealy, “Bukan Sekedar Ahok”, 2016.   
75  Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 153-154.
76  Sullivan, Pierson, dan Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982: 5.
77  Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 153.
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In the view of elitist theory about democracy, it is explained 
that intolerant citizens usually tend to be apathetic or absent from 
politics, and therefore they do not pose any threat to the demo-
cratic system. While this theory’s claim is true, it is also important 
to criticize that under certain circumstance where violent conflicts 
occur among the elites, intolerant masses can be mobilized to 
support conflicting and elite-led groups. Thus, this mobilization 
surely carries a great potential danger and in turn might threaten 
the stability of democracy.78
78  Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 156.




Islamic Populism in 
Post-New Order Indonesia 
In the Indonesian context, the discourse on Islamic populism cannot be separated from the existence of Islamism or political 
Islam. This is quite understandable because an important actor of 
the mass mobilization movement that carries populist ideology 
which strengthened in the post-New Order period, is none other 
than Islamism groups. Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizb ut-
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Community Forum (FUI), Wah-
dah Islamiyyah (WI), and others, are agents of Islamism that play 
an important role in conducting popular mobilization at the end 
of 2016. Is it true that popular mobilization as represented by the 
Defend Islam Action, also known as the 212 movement, and the 
like, can be labeled as a phenomenon of Islamic populism in the 
Indonesian context? The views of experts in explaining this issue 
are various. Some of them understand it as a portrait of Islamic 
populism that is strengthening in Indonesia, and some others un-
derstand it more as a form of politics of Islamic identity. This chap-
ter will present the discourse of experts from Indonesian Muslim 
intellectuals and Western scholars who are concerned in studying 
Indonesia (read: Indonesianist) in reading the phenomenon of mass 
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mobilization under religious labels and at the same time some 
popular issues in its confrontation with the ruling regime.
A. Islamic Populism in the Indonesian Context
When a large-scale demonstration took place in May 1998, 
which demanded the overthrow of Suharto, the authoritarian re-
gime that had been in power for more than 32 years, the term 
populism was not so prominent. Experts label the mobilization of 
the masses who are fighting for a democratic or reform agenda, 
including Suharto’s ouster, more as a reform movement. This move-
ment involves an alliance between student activists, NGOs, and 
various other elements of civil society, including liberal-progressive-
oriented Islamic civil society. In Hefner’s note, the latter group 
(liberal-progressive Muslims) was the backbone of the Islamic civil-
ians who have been instrumental in overthrowing Suharto and at 
the same time giving birth to the birth of a new period known as 
the reformation era, the democratic era, and the post-New Order 
era.1
However, the 1998 reform movement which involved large 
numbers of masses carried the ideology of change by demanding 
the overthrow of Suharto, the elimination of corruption, collusion 
and nepotism (KKN), and the improvement of a more demo-
cratic system of social, political and economic life. This movement 
also faces the majority of people (people) vis a vis the corrupt 
regime that has been in power for more than 32 years. Judging 
from its characteristics, the reform movement which is driven by 
progressive civil society agents, can actually be categorized as a 
form of populism2. However, there are almost no experts who 
1  Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Islam dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001.
2  Populism has characteristics including, first, anti-establishment (the expression of groups who 
feel marginalized), secondly, the existence of authority of leaders through both personal charisma 
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label the social movement as a phenomenon of populism in In-
donesia. Likewise with the involvement and participatory role of 
Muslims, both from conservative Muslims such as KAMMI and 
moderate-progressive Muslims such as NU and Muhmmadiyah, 
in the reform movement that is concerned about fighting for a 
populist agenda such as declining economic resilience of small 
communities due to economic / monetary crisis, collusion cor-
ruption issues and nepotism (KKN), and others, not to bring up 
the discourse of Islamic populism in Indonesia.
Until the first decade after the New Order, the discourse about 
populism and especially Islamic populism had not been the sub-
ject of academic public or experts. Only in the decade of 2014 did 
this issue begin to surface and color academic discourse along 
with the power contestation involving two presidential candidates 
(Candidates) who shared the discourse of populism as their po-
litical strategy. Prabowo used the approach of classical populism 
or ultra-nationalism by emphasizing the revolutionary improve-
ment of the political-economic system and placing foreigners as 
his enemies. On the contrary, Jokowi tends to use a moderate 
populism approach that understands the political system needs 
to be improved, but not necessarily frontally, and does not criticize 
the rich and foreign parties as enemies.3
In the contestation of power, activism carried out by Muslim 
groups has not yet given birth to Islamic populism. In the midst 
of the domination of the two populist figures, the involvement 
and political activism of Islamic groups seemed to sink and only 
and apocalyptic messages, third, strong in-group feelings as shown in our sentiment vs. them. 
Read Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 39 (4), 542-563; 
Jack Hayward (ed.), Elitism, Populism, and European Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996.
3  Marcus Mietzner, Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy and Political Contestation 
in Indonesia, Honolulu-Hawai’i: East-West Center, 2015.
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became a sub-ordinate for the dominance of the two populist 
political elites. In fact, the mobilization of the masses, the use of 
symbols, and religious sentiment, took place massively, system-
atically and structured. Issues regarding communism, infidels, 
foreign henchmen, and other slogans of ethno-religious identity 
based populism have strengthened. The publication of the “Obor 
Rakyat”4 tabloit, which was considered to be very racist and sec-
tarianistic, contained a lot of hoax news and hate speech, because 
it discredited one of the candidates, was said to also involve actors 
who liked to politicize religion as a strategy in winning political 
battles.
Only in the 2016-2017 period did the issue of Islamic populism 
come to the surface, becoming the dominant discourse of aca-
demic experts and discourse in contemporary Indonesia. The 
emergence of a series of mass actions that used religious identity, 
known as the Defend Islam Action (1, 2, and 3), which demanded 
Ahok to be imprisoned for blasphemy, became a fuel for the debate 
associated with Islamic populism. Likewise with similar actions 
post 212 such as reunion 212, munajat 212, 209 replacing the 
president to the discourse of the people power movement, further 
strengthening the narrative of Islamic populism. Do the actions 
labeled Islam correctly represent what is called Indonesian Islamic 
populism? Not a few views that assess the success of the Islamists 
in mobilizing the masses, their success in imprisoning Ahok and 
at the same time defeated him in the Jakarta Election, as a victory 




5  Azyumardi Azra, “Populisme, Politik Identitas dan Demokrasi Indonesia”, Burhanuddin 
Muhtadi, Populisme Politik Identitas & Dinamika Elektoral, Mengurai Jalan Panjang Demokrasi 
Prosedural, Malang: Instrans Publishing, 2019, xiii-xviii.
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Burhanuddin Muhtadi, understanding the mass actions using 
the label of Islamic defense, is known as the political populism of 
Islamic identity in Indonesia. It is said so, because in its action, 
Islamist groups, the main actors of the Defend Islam Action, use 
religious symbols, sentiments and ideologies in mobilizing the 
masses to get involved in fighting for their political agenda. The 
masses involved in this action almost all came from Muslim 
circles in Indonesia. The dimension of populism is seen in narra-
tives that perceive or place the majority of society, including 
Muslims, in a confrontational or antagonistic position with the 
ruling regime that is considered corrupt, authoritarian and siding 
with religious dissidents6.
Strictly speaking, Vedi R. Hadiz called the actions labeled 
Islam a new form of Islamic populism. Different from the old 
populism which relies on the working class or peasantry, the social 
basis of new populism in the context of neo-liberalism is a multi-
class alliance which is articulated through an identity as the basis 
of the fabric of solidarity. If the old populism is associated with 
figures such as Peron in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil whose 
main social base is the working class7, then the basis of the new 
populism’s political coalition is very complex and internally con-
tradictory. This populism is a specific form of asymmetric multi-
class coalition-based social mobilization. These coalitions carry 
political and economic agendas that are less rooted in and driven 
by, interpretations of religious doctrines or cultural norms rather 
than concrete struggles to seize power and material resources in 
6  Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Populisme Politik Identitas & Dinamika Elektoral, Mengurai Jalan Pan-
jang Demokrasi Prosedural, Malang: Instrans Publishing, 2019.
7  See Michael L. Coniff (ed.), Populism in Latin America, Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama 
Press, 2012; Kurt Weyland, “Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe”, dalam 
Comparative Politics 31 (4), 1999, 379-401; Paul Cammack, “The Resurgensce of Populism in 
Latin America”, in Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 19 (2), 149-161.
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certain social and historical contexts. This echo of populism reso-
nates and has an allure because the claims made about upholding 
a morally strong society face the threat of mental erosion caused 
by what is perceived as shallow meterialist values  and the hedon-
ic-consumptive lifestyle associated with Western culture8.
Different from populism in other countries such as Europe 
and America, Islamic populism in Indonesia targets non-Muslim 
(Christian) minority groups, ethnic Chinese or Chinese9, and also 
foreign powers. This populist action carries a narrative about the 
decline of the Muslim-indigenous majority economically due to 
corrupt and pro-minority State policies. Whereas in Europe, 
populist politics has been linked to anti-immigrant tendencies 
represented by politicians such as Le Pan in France, Fortuyn and 
Wilders in the Netherlands, and by recent strong right-wing 
groups in the Nordic countries such as Norway , Sweden and 
Finland. Likewise in America, anti-immigrant sentiments and 
narratives to bring back the glory of the United States have been 
used successfully by populist politicians such as Donald Trump 
as a political strategy to win the power struggle10.
Marcus Mietzner has the view that the 2016 Islamist mass 
movement under the leadership of Habib Rizieq Shihab can be 
understood as a case of populism11. If Hadiz used the term Is-
8  Vedi R. Hadiz, Populisme Islam, 40-49; Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, et al., “Populisme Islam dan 
Tantangan Demokrasi di Indonesia”, Prisma, Vol. 36 (3), 2017, 48-59.
9  Activities carried out by a group of young bourgeoisie by positioning the Chinese Ethnic as a 
“common enemy” became the main thesis as well as the distinctive characteristics of Islamic 
populism in Indonesia. This continues to be reproduced by the young bourgeoisie for a long time. 
This is because the business fields cultivated by the Chinese have penetrated areas that have actu-
ally been cultivated by the Muslim bourgeoisie for a long time. In addition, the colonial political 
practices carried out by the Dutch in segregating Indonesian people also contributed to 
strengthening the thesis. Where ethnic Chinese are suggested as outsiders, rather than as indig-
enous people (insider). Endi Aulia Garadian, “Membaca Populisme Islam Model Baru “, Book 
Review, Studia Islamika, Vol. 24 (2), 2017, 379-393.
10  Vedi R. Hadiz, Populisme Islam, xiii-xxvii; 41.
11  Paul D. Kenny, Populism in Southeast Asia, 15.
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lamic populism, Muhtadi preferred to use the term political 
identity populism, Marcus tended to use the term Islamic popu-
lism12. Apparently, the use of this term is based more on the fact 
that the actors of the mass mobilization actions are none other 
than groups of Islamism or political Islam. The use of this term 
is also intended to distinguish between Islamic populism whose 
connotations are very general (referring to various forms of 
populism driven by Islamic groups both left, right and center) 
with specific Islamist populism referring to Islamist groups as 
actors13.
Some experts who tend to see mass actions that carry religious 
symbols and sentiments as a form of identity politics, are also 
based on consideration. Among the considerations is that these 
mass actions are not at all fighting for the real agenda being faced 
by the community such as rising labor costs, decreasing fuel 
prices, increasing subsidies for the poor, and the like. On the 
contrary, these mass actions actually display their elitist character, 
such as fighting for public space to be more Islamic or shar’i, 
fighting for regulations that can increase the worship and piety 
of the people, and others. The rest that is fought by this action is 
the ideological interests of the Muslim middle class who are be-
ing hit by anxiety due to the moral-religious crisis in the public 
sphere14.
Even though some experts tend to understand the Defend 
Islam Action and the like, more as a form of identity politics, but 
they also acknowledge the aspects of populism in these actions. 
According to them, the series of social actions carried out by the 
12  Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic 
Deconsolidation in Indonesia”, Pacific Affairs 91 (2), 261-82. 
13  Interview with Marcus Mietzner, 12 Sept 2019, also read Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s Grow-
ing Islamist Populism”, Asia Dialogues, December 19, 2016.
14  Interview with Hairus Salim, 23 July 2019, Najib Kaelani, 25 July 2019.
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Islamists, however, also used an ideology that perceived the 
people and the people in an antagonistic position with the elites 
who were now in power. They also mobilized the masses as a 
strategy to fight for their political agenda, starting from the pun-
ishment of Ahok, who was considered blasphemous, extending 
the application of Islamic norms and values  in the public sphere, 
to the most serious one being the Islamization of state power. 
However, some elements contained in the Defend Islam Action 
and the like, clearly represent what is called populism15.
Based on the discourse of the experts above, it can be under-
stood that a strengthening populism in the context of Indonesia 
after the New Order is nothing but a populism based on the 
politics of Islamic identity. In this case, Hadiz asserted that the 
use of religious (Islamic) identity was intended by Islamist elites 
to be an allure for Muslims from various circles. The issues of 
economic and political inequality were, in fact, not on their main 
struggle agenda, but rather as an effort to attract support from 
the broader elements of society. Similarly, the anti-immigration 
narration voiced by populist politicians in various parts of the 
country both Europe, America and other Asia. These right-wing 
politicians use populist narratives based on the issue of eco-
nomic inequality, not as the main agenda of their struggle, but 
rather as a political strategy to be able to attract public support 
and ultimately win the arena of power.
From the discourse of the experts above, it can be understood 
that Islamic populism in the Indonesian context refers to ideol-
ogy, social movements, and at the same time political strategies 
of Muslim groups in fighting for or maintaining power. As an 
ideology, Islamic populism describes and / or perceives the people 
15  Interview with Hairus Salim 23 July 2019, M. Amin Abdullah 26 July 2019, Muhammad Wil-
dan 26 July 2019, Moch Nur Ichwan 24 July 2019.
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and society in general to be in a subordinate and antagonistic 
position with a dominant power (in this case a ruling regime). As 
a social movement, Islamic populism is not limited to the forma-
tion of ideas, discourse and / or thoughts about the plight of the 
people / people in dealing with corrupt regimes, but also mani-
fested in the form of mass mobilization to counter what they call 
the corrupt ruling regime. In this case, mass mobilization is a 
reproduction of popular narratives, based on both religious and 
popular issues, and large-scale mass mobilization can be under-
stood by the political strategies of Muslim groups in fighting for 
their political agenda.
It must be acknowledged that Islamic populism in Indonesia 
is not only identical with discourse and social movements carried 
out by Islamism groups such as FPI, HTI, FUI, and others. In-
deed, these groups are arguably the most familiar and often use 
populism politics in the form of large-scale mass mobilization 
such as the 212 action to fight for their political struggle agenda. 
However, non-Islamic political groups such as NU and Muham-
madiyah also often intersect with populism politics. In the 1990s, 
for example, these two civilian Islamic organizations were in-
volved in ideological battles and at the same time social move-
ments whose interests were not merely to overthrow the corrupt 
New Order regime, but also to fight for reform and democracy 
agendas.
For this reason, the picture of Islamic populism is not mono-
lithic, but pluralistic. Populism politics carried out by moderate 
and progressive Islamic groups, will give birth to a picture of 
middle populism (washatiyyah) and reformation. Conversely, 
populism politics carried out by conservative Islamic groups, 
radicalists and/or Islamism, will give birth to a picture of conser-
vative populism or known as right populism. In the discourse of 
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populism itself, there are various types of populism including 
right populism (conservative), middle populism (moderate) and 
left populism (progressive). In the context of post-New Order 
Indonesia, the type of populism that strengthens is none other 
than conservative populism or borrowing the term Mietzner 
known as Islamist populism.
In this study, what is desired with Islamic populism refers to 
populism practiced by political Islamic groups or Islamism. This 
reference is based on the phenomenon of popular mobilization 
in action throughout the 2016-2019 period. During this period, 
mass actions or popular mobilization were carried out by many 
Islamist groups in their alliance with political elites who opposed 
the ruling regime. These pual movements are gaining the atten-
tion and attention of Indonesian Islamic scholars and politicians, 
both from within and outside the country, which are then framed 
in the discourse of Islamic populism.
B.  The Emergence of Islamic 
      Populism: Some Features
At the empirical level, the discourse on Islamic populism in 
Indonesia refers to the socio-political events that took place after 
the New Order, especially in the 2016-2019 period. At least there 
are a number of important events that represent Islamic populism 
that emerged during the political period. Said to be a political 
period because the span of this period is in the electoral political 
momentum starting from the DKI Jakarta Election (2016-2017), 
Presidential Election and Post Presidential Election (2018-2019). 
By coincidence or not, the emergence of Islamic populism move-
ments is within the electoral political momentum. Among the 
aforementioned events can be described as below.
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1. The Defend Islam Action 212
The Defend Islam Action 212 is touted as the most phenom-
enal representation of Islamic populism in Indonesia after the 
New Order. Because the movement - borrowing the term used 
by Tempo Magazine - mobocracy involving Muslims from vari-
ous regions in Indonesia succeeded in fulfilling the streets and 
Taman Medan Merdeka in Jakarta with a fantastic mass16. The 
picture of the drone shows a sea of  people with people sitting on 
a prayer rug in the rain. It is estimated that the masses who are 
members of the Defend Islam Action III reached around 
500,000-750,000 people17. This number has doubled compared 
to the Defend Islam Action I (4 November 2016) which was 
followed by around 50,000 people and the Defend Islam Action 
I with a number of participants around 150,000-250,000 people18.
There is an interesting debate related to the number of mass-
es who took part in 212 Action. The proponents of the 212 Action 
claimed that the number of masses penetrated the numbers above 
5 million people. The GNPF-MUI who organized the action 
claimed that the action was attended by around 7.5 million 
people. This claim is considered rather excessive, especially by 
groups that are counter-action 212 or analysts who estimate the 
number of participants of the action not more than 500,000 
thousand people. An estimation using Google maps estimates the 
mass reaches 2.3 million19. As a result of these differences, each 
group was involved in a debate that led to curses, insults, satire or 
16  Greg Fealy, “Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally”, Indonesia At Mel-
bourne, December 12, 2016.
17  Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in 
Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Group, and the Politics of Accommodation”, Asian 
Studies Review, 2018
18  Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation”, 2018
19  https://indopress.id/eksklusif-misteri-jumlah-massa-aksi-super-damai-212.
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nyinyir on social media20. Apart from the debate over numbers, 
one thing is certain that the 212 action led by Islamism groups is 
considered by observers to be the largest religious action in the 
history of Muslims in Indonesia, especially after the New Order21.
However, the presence of 212 actions which succeeded in 
mobilizing the masses in large numbers, did not just appear. It is 
true that this action emerged as a response or rather the reaction 
of the people to Ahok’s controversial statement regarding the 
Al-Maidah letter. However, the presence of this action cannot be 
separated from the previous actions, carried out by Islamist groups 
targeting Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok (the governor of 
DKI Jakarta, a Chinese and Christian) whose memorandum bene 
they hated. Indeed, the hatred of the Islamists, especially the FPI, 
was not only related to Ahok’s Chinese and Christian status, but 
also in his capacity as governor. As is known, Ahok is known as 
an effective governor, focused on governance, anti-corruption and 
has a high commitment to pluralism. This kind of condition 
which has been dispelled has made many parties, especially eco-
nomic brokers and politicians and Islamist groups dislike Ahok.22
It is important to note that the resistance of Islamist groups 
in their alliance with political-economic brokers, against Ahok, 
had actually been going on for quite a long time, not only when 
Ahok was governor of DKI Jakarta, but also during the 2012 
Jakarta Election which was won by Jokowi-Ahok. Their protec-
tion was not only expressed through political actions such as 
being involved in the elections, but also in street politics such as 
20  Read the BBC Indonesia reporter Cristine Franciska “seven million or 500,000? When social 
media debated the number of participants in 212 actions at Monas in https://www.bbc.com/
indonesia/trensocial-38204802 
21  Interview with Greg Fealy 9 Sept 2019, Thomas Power 8 Sept 2019, and Burhanuddin Muhtadi 
8 Sept 2019.
22  Sumanto Al Qurtuby, Indonesia’s Islamist Mobilization, pp. 15-21.
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demonstrations and various other ways. The inauguration of a 
rival governor by FPI, for example, can be understood as a form 
of resistance by Islamist groups in their efforts to delegitimize the 
governor in power. It’s just that the actions of resistance they did, 
did not get broad public support. Habib Rizieq’s propaganda 
which carries religious (Christian), ethnic (Chinese), ideological 
(communist) sentiments, was not sufficiently successful in mas-
sively provoking the masses to delegitize Ahok. In fact, this action 
also received support from opposition groups in parliament and 
political parties who did not respect the governor in power23.
The Islamist resistance movement really found its strategic 
momentum when Ahok experienced a tongue sprain in his speech 
in the Thousand Islands on September 27, 2016. In his speech, 
Ahok told residents in the Thousand Islands not to be easily 
fooled by people who used the verse Al- Quran (Surah Al-
Maidah: 51) for political purposes. The situation became more 
problematic when posting Ahok’s speech video with the heading 
“Defamation on Religion?” Which was slightly processed was 
spread by Buni Yani through her Facebook account on October 
6, 2016. This video posting later triggered a strong reaction from 
Muslims who demanded that Ahok be tried immediately and 
imprisoned. Even more than a dozen Islamic organizations then 
reported governor Ahok to the police over the blasphemy case.24
On October 11, 2016, a number of non-mainstream Islamic 
figures such as Bachtiar Nasir (MIUMI chairman), K.H. 
Fakhrurrozi Ishaq (Chair of the Jakarta Community Movement), 
23  Discussion with Abdil Mughis during a coffee moment in Canberra, 6 Sept 2019.
24  The 212 actor must thank Ahok because thanks to Ahok as he slipped his tongue when quoting 
the Al-Maidah chapter, the 212 rally really gained momentum which he did not have to pains-
takingly create. If there were no such trigger, it would be impossible that 212 rally would be that 
big. Excerpted from the results of discussions with Burhanuddin Muhtadi and friends, 7 Sept 
2019.
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K.H. Ahmad Shabri Lubis (FPI Chairperson), Tgk Abdullah 
Ibrahim (Chairperson of the Majlis Dhikr SBY Nurus Salam), 
and others, came to the central MUI. In their hospitality, they 
asked MUI to issue a statement or fatwa related to the Ahok case. 
On that same day, the MUI then held a meeting and then issued 
an “opinion and attitude of reluctance” which in essence that 
Ahok’s statement was categorized as insulting the Qur’an and / 
or insulting scholars who had legal consequences. The MUI’s 
religious opinion and attitude in its recommendations also 
obliges the government and law enforcers to, among other things, 
“prevent any desecration and defamation of the Koran and the 
Islamic religion by not paying any attention to these acts” and 
“cracking down on those who commit the blasphemy and defa-
mation al-Qur’an and Islamic teachings and insults to scholars 
and Muslims in accordance with applicable legislation “and” 
proactively enforce law enforcement in a strict, fast, proportionate 
and professional manner with due regard to the sense of justice 
of the community so that people have confidence in the enforce-
ment of law25.
Not long after the MUI issued its religious attitude, a popular 
alliance called the National Movement to Defend Fatwa MUI 
(GNPF-MUI) was immediately formed with Rizieq Shihab (FPI 
High Priest) occupying the position of Trustees and Bachtiar 
Nasir (MIUMI/Muhammadiyah/MUI) as its chairman. Misba-
hul Anam (FPI) was appointed as Deputy Chairman I, Zaitun 
Rasmin (Wahdah Islamiyah/MUI) as Deputy Chair II, Muham-
mad al-Khaththath (FUI/former HTI senior official) as Secretary 
General, and Munarman (FPI) as Field Commander. The GN-
PF-MUI played an important role in mobilizing the masses and 
25  Moch Nur Ichwan, “MUI, Gerakan Islamis dan Umat Mengambang”, Ma’arif Vol. 11, No. 2, 
December 2016, pp.1-104.
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organized a series of demonstrations to demand that Ahok be 
jailed because he was considered to have defamed Islam. In the 
name of the Defend Islam Action, GNPF-MUI succeeded in 
mobilizing a sizable mass of around 50,000-100,000 people on 
October 14, 2016. Next, on November 4, 2016, the Defend Islam 
Action was followed by no less than 350,000 people26.
The climax, on 2 December 2016 (212), the Islamist group 
which had consolidated itself into the GNPF-MUI, succeeded 
in mobilizing a massive mass to carry out the Defend Islam Ac-
tion III. As mentioned above, there are no less than 700,000 
people involved in the Defend Islam Action. Many experts are of 
the opinion that a mass of this size, driven not to the extent of 
members of Islamist organizations which are the main propo-
nents of the Defend Islam Action. However, members of MUI, 
FPI, FUI, MIUMI, Wahdah Islamiyah, HTI, and the Defend 
Islam Action organs, are certainly not many in number compared 
to members of mainstream Islamic organizations such as NU and 
Muhammadiyah. It was predicted that many NU and Muham-
madiyah people were involved in the Defend Islam Action. In his 
statement Nur Ichwan said that
“... ... ... not a few Muslims both in urban areas and especially 
in the countryside, from modernists and traditionalists, who are 
innocent and pious, who believe very well that Ahok has defamed 
their beliefs. Because of that, they voluntarily came to Jakarta to 
defend their religion “27.
The same thing was also stated by M. Amin Abdullah. Ac-
cording to him, it is impossible for such a large mass, only coming 
26  Moch Nur Ichwan, “MUI, Gerakan Islamis dan Umat Mengambang”, 1-104.; IPAC (Institute 
for Polity Analysis on Conflict), After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia, IPAC Report No. 
44, 6 April 2018, 2.
27  Interview with Moch Nur Ichwan, 24 July, 2019.
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from the membership of FPI, HTI, PKS and the organization 
that drives Islamic Action. There is no doubt that many members 
of the two mainstream Islamic organizations (Muhammadiyah 
and NU), especially those who are conservative or sympathetic to 
the agenda of the Defend Islam Action struggle participated in 
the action. In fact in Muhammadiyah itself figures such as 
Bachtiar Nashir were also involved in organizing mass actions. 
Outside of all these organizations, it is very possible that there 
are also new Muslims who have been stricken by religious vio-
lence or religious euphoria, participating in the Defend Islam 
Action28. Borrowing the term Nur Ichwan, the floating ummah 
and the floating ummah are many who are involved in praxis to 
do what is known as jihad to defend their religion29.
Not limited to the success of mobilizing the masses in large 
numbers, a series of the Defend Islam Action also succeeded in 
forcing the government to pay serious attention to the power of 
Islamist groups. In the Defend Islam Action III, for example, 
President Jokowi even had to be willing to meet with a mass of 
protesters led by FPI’s high priest (Rizieq Shihab) to give a speech 
even if only for a short time. The court’s decision which sentenced 
Ahok to 2 years in prison on blasphemy charges on May 9, 2017 
was cited as a prestigious achievement of the Defend Islam Ac-
tion. Meanwhile, Anis Baswedan’s victory in the second round of 
the Jakarta Regional Election (April 19, 2017) with 58 percent 
28 Interview with M. Amin Abdullah, 27 July, 2019.
29 According to Nur Ichwan, the floating congregants are people who are not affiliated to any Is-
lamic organization or movement which may agree on certain issues with certain organizations or 
movements and on other issues agree with others. Whereas the floating people are people who 
are affiliated to certain Islamic organizations or movements and in many ways follow the per-
spectives of those organizations or movements, but in certain issues they become embroiled, in 
the sense of leaving the official views of the affiliated organizations or movements and agreeing 
and choosing opinions or organizations or other Islamic movements. Read Moch Nur Ichwan, 
“MUI, Islamist Movement and Floating Muslims”, 1-104.
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of votes compared to 42 percent for Ahok, also cannot be sepa-
rated from the influence of the Defend Islam Action30. This fact 
further affirms the authority and legitimacy of political Islamic 
groups, as represented in the Defend Islam Action, in the constel-
lation of power in Indonesia31.
2. 212 Reunion
The populist actions that were driven by Islamist groups in-
corporated in the GNPF-MUI did not stop only in the case of 
blasphemy by the governor of DKI Jakarta (Ahok). Greg Fealy’s 
analysis which revealed that the 212 action had a far greater 
agenda than just imprisoning Ahok, had a point32. Evidently, 
after the 212 action successfully led Ahok to prison for 2 years, 
as a court decision, and at the same time making this incumbent 
governor must accept the harsh reality of defeat in the Jakarta 
Election, the 212 exponents kept trying to continue to inflame 
his populist movement. The actions they take are also projected 
to target political actors who occupy positions of power higher 
than Ahok, who else if not president Joko Widodo ( Jokowi).
Why Jokowi? One of the reasons is because Jokowi, in addi-
tion to serving as president and having partnered with Ahok 
when he was governor of DKI Jakarta, he is also the most poten-
tial presidential candidate and at the same time disliked by Is-
30  Some post-Local elections (Pilkada) investigations showed that most of Jakarta’s population, es-
pecially Muslims, did not vote for Ahok, especially in the second round because they were: (1) 
afraid of a recurrence of the anti-Chinese/Christian riot tragedy, (2) it was feared that it would 
violate the rules in Al-Qur’an and get God’s punishment, (3) worried if they know their family 
member died, no one is willing to pray and bury their bodies, and (4) want to obey the “Al-Qur’an 
command” which obliges believers to support Muslim candidates for political-government lead-
ership. This fact affirms that Islamic religion and identity have an important role in the election of 
the governor of Jakarta. Sumanto Al Qurtuby, Indonesia’s Islamist Mobilization, 15-21.
31  Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilization”, 
2018; IPAC (Institute for Polity Analysis on Conflict), After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in 
Indonesia, IPAC Report No. 44, April 6, 2018, 2-3.
32  Greg Fealy, Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally, December 7, 2016. 
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lamists. Not much different from Ahok, Islamist’s dislike of 
Jokowi was more due to the president from civil society, known 
to be very concerned with government and development, and 
notorious for not being friendly enough to groups identified as 
radical. Different from the era of SBY who was more accommo-
dating towards Islamists, Jokowi actually took an exclusionary 
attitude33. Instead of accommodating, Jokowi instead took a non-
compromising attitude towards the agents of conservativism-
radicalism. This attitude is seen in terms of, for example, the is-
suance of Perpu No. 2/2017 signed by president Jokowi on July 
10, 2017 which contains a ban on HTI organizations34.
Not long after the issuance of the Perpu, on 19 July 2017 the 
Indonesian government officially suspended the legal status of HTI 
and officially banned it. As stated by Wiranto, Menkopolhukam, 
the prohibition of HTI is because this trans-national Islamic or-
ganization has an ideology that is contrary to the state ideology 
(Pancasila), the constitution and at the same time poses a real threat 
to the unity and diversity of Indonesia. The government believes 
that the existence of HTI does not contribute to national develop-
ment and does not help the State to achieve its goals. For the 
propo nents of the 212 action, the HTI ban was considered as an 
attempt by the government to hit supporters of the Defend Islam 
Action which had successfully blocked Ahok from being elected 
in the DKI Jakarta Regional Election in April 2017. As stated by 
Ismail Yusanto, the ban and freezing of HTI had been planned by 
the government because This organization is all out in support of 
the Defend Islam Action which demands governor Ahok to be 
33  Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation”, 2018
34  “Ini Alasan Pemerintah Bubarkan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (These are the Reasons Why the 
Government Disbands Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia)”, http://nasional.kompas.
com/2017/05/08/14382891/ini.alasan.pemerintah.bubarkan.hiznut.tahrir.indonesia. 
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sentenced for his blasphemy. Others understand this policy as 
Jokowi’s strategy to win the presidential election in the second 
period in 2019 by suppressing his enemies, especially conservative 
Muslims35.
On the other side, Jokowi established intimacy and intimacy 
with moderate Islamic groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah 
who had relatively similar national visions in affirming the integ-
rity of the Republic of Indonesia. Jokowi’s familiarity with moder-
ate Muslims, especially NU, has increased especially after the mass 
mobilization of the Islamists against Ahok. On several occasions, 
Jokowi came to PBNU to have a dialogue with the leader of this 
largest Islamic organization. As a result, NU then gave full support 
to the Jokowi government, especially in combating radical Is-
lamic groups. At the same time, Jokowi also supported the NU 
program in promoting the Islamic archipelago, encouraged the 
Minister of Religion to build cooperation with NU in designing 
various strategic programs, providing state-owned land grants as 
part of the land redistribution program and access to microcredit 
schemes for pesantren, known with Sharia Micro-Finance Institu-
tions or LKMS. In short, NU has enjoyed a variety of contribu-
tions to the generosity of the Jokowi government36.
The fact that Jokowi is getting closer to moderate Islamic groups 
and his potential to win the 2019 Presidential Election, has cre-
ated concern among Islamist groups who are proponents of the 
Action for the Defense of Islam 212. Because of that, they then 
tried their best to be able to block and if possible thwart Jokowi’s 
vic tory at April 2019 Presidential Election. To realize this wish, 
they inevitably have to collaborate with its ultra-nationalist Jokowi 
35  Buya Syafi’i: Isu Perpu Ormas Digoreng untuk Pemilu 2019, https://news.detik.com/beri-
ta/3562829/buya-syafii-isu-perppu-ormas-digoreng-untuk-pemilu-2019. 
36  Greg Fealy, “Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics Trap”, 11 July 2018.
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competitor, namely Prabowo Subianto. However, it is difficult to 
cover up, if in fact their worries about Jokowi’s victory are far 
greater than their doubts about the candidate he supports, Prabo-
wo37.
Actually, Islamists really hope that Jokowi can be defeated in 
the 2019 Presidential Election. But they are well aware that real-
izing it is not easy. As an alternative, they want as many elected 
legislators as possible both nationally and locally to press the 
agenda of upholding the morality and orthodoxy of the state. They 
see a good prospect of being able to create a significant Islamist 
bloc in the national House of Representatives (DPR), investing the 
next election in 2024 They also intend to mobilize their grassroots 
base in the case of Prabowo’s defeat to protest what they have seen 
as cheating election system. However, this will be another show of 
force, demanding the support of Jokowi and his vice-president, old 
cleric Ma’ruf Amin, for a new law that reflects the principles of 
conservative Islam38.
In this context it is clear how the evolution of the Islamic 
populism movement launched by Islamists from before was ori-
ented towards the overthrow of the then Jakarta governor, Ahok, 
into an anti-Jokowi campaign. Although the populist actions they 
carried out were not as phenomenal as the 212 actions, they re-
mained a serious threat by Jokowi’s camp. As is known, the forces 
of the Defend Islam Action 212 began to decline both due to 
internal conflicts and divisions as well as the effects of political 
intervention by the ruling regime39. Ma’ruf Amin, Ali Mochtar 
37  IPAC, Anti-Ahok To Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign, 
IPAC Report No. 55, 15 March, 2019.
38  IPAC, Anti-Ahok To Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign, 
IPAC Report No. 55, 15 March 2019.
39  According to informants the decline in strength of 212 was closely related to the internal division 
of the group 212. This was because there were no more common enemies or someone who was 
made a coming enemy like Ahok. While related to the direction of practical political support 
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Ngabalin and Yusuf Mansur who previously were in the 212 
stronghold, in their development were actually closer and were 
eventually embraced by Jokowi. Habib Rizieq, who is a high priest 
and has always been at the forefront in carrying out acts of resis-
tance against the ruling regime, must leave Indonesia due to the 
snare of police law on pornography charges. Meanwhile, the 212 
proponents were split between the 212 Alumni Association (PA) 
led by Slamet Maarif, the 212 Presidium Alumni led by Aminud-
din and Garda 212 under the leadership of Ansufri Idrus Sambo40.
In various reports it was mentioned that the split of the 212 
alumni because it was triggered by a change in movement direction 
from the previous purely religious or Shari’ah struggle to a struggle 
that was more oriented towards practical political interests. In this 
context, Usamah said that the initial enthusiasm of the 212 move-
ment was to uphold the law of Allah SWT who had been flicked 
by the former Governor of DKI Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama 
alias Ahok. According to him, at that time Ahok offended Muslims 
in Indonesia and even around the world by quoting Surat Al-
Maidah verse 51 which obliged Muslims to be led by Muslim 
leaders. In his statement, as reported by CNN Indonesia, Osama 
said that:
(Pilpres) they are no longer solid, some of them want the figure of Habib Rozieq as an Islamist 
figure to be challenged with Jokowi, while others prefer to propose Prabowo Subianto. At the same 
time, the politics of accommodation carried out by the Jokowi government by taking several figures 
who had previously been activists in 212 actions such as K.H. Ma’ruf Amin, Yusuf Mansur, Ali 
Mochtar Ngabalin and others proved to be effective in breaking the strength of strength 212. In-
terview with Edward Aspinall, 12 Sept 2019, Greg Fealy, 8 Sept 2019, Nur Ichwan 24 July 2019, 
Hairus Salim 23 July 2019.
40  https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20181128064816-32-349787/perpecahan-
212-jelang-reuni-akbar-di-tahun-politik. 
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“Pure saw when the spirit of building unity of the people, defending 
Al-Maidah verse 51 about Muslim leaders. Single, one issue, there is 
no other issue only defending religion,” said Usamah41.
The same thing was expressed by Ali Mochtar Ngabalin who 
now holds a position as one of the presidential expert staff. Ac-
cording to him, after Ahok who was the main target had been 
thrown into prison, the 212 action was over. There is no longer 
any strong reason to continue the Defend Islam Action. Jokowi 
who was criticized or targeted was none other than a Muslim. 
The desire to continue to turn on the post-Ahok 212 action is 
just romanticism with no essence at all. In his statement, as 
quoted by CNN Indonesia, he said that:
“It’s more romanticism because there are no more enemies. Which is 
always heralded Ahok. Now there are Mr. Ma’ruf Amin and Sandiaga 
Uno as running mate. Candidates are Mr. Jokowi and Mr. Prabowo. All 
Muslims obey, no problem,” Ngabalin said, Tuesday (11/27)42.
Despite the divisions, the 212 anti-Jokowi proponents con-
tinue to fight against the ruling regime. In an effort to consolidate 
their power, they then initiated the implementation of 212 re-
union activities centered on the National Monument (Monas) 
area, Central Jakarta, on 2 December 2018. In fact, the masses 
involved in the 212 Reunion were not as large as the masses at 
the Defend Islam Action 212. Many proponents of the Defend 
Islam Action are not involved and are present in the 21st Re-
union. Not a few people consider that Reunion 212 has lost its 
41  https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20181128064816-32-349787/perpecahan-
212-jelang-reuni-akbar-di-tahun-politik. 
42  Meanwhile, Kapitra also made a statement with the same tone. Movement 212, he said, was over 
when Ahok was convicted. He considered that the 212 alumni movement had deviated from its 
initial enthusiasm, namely guarding the case of blasphemy by Ahok. https://www.cnnindonesia.
com/nasional/20181128064816-32-349787/perpecahan-212-jelang-reuni-akbar-di-tahun-
politik. 
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religious orientation orientation. Instead of remaining grounded 
in the khittah struggle for the enforcement of religious teachings, 
Reunion 212 is considered loaded with nuances of practical po-
litical struggle ahead of the 2019 Presidential Election.
However, Reunion 212 was still flooded with hundreds of 
thousands of people from the proponents of action 212. Unlike 
the Defend Islam Action 212, the actors who were present and 
seen in the reunion 212 were dominated by political party leaders, 
especially PKS, Gerindra and PAN. Zulkifli Hasan, chairman of 
PAN and also chairman of the People’s Consultative Assembly, 
who was present from the beginning and participated in a series 
of activities ranging from tahajjud prayer and dawn prayer in 
congregation, described the 212 reunion as a form of peaceful, 
polite and tolerant action. Through this kind of depiction, it seems 
that Zulkifli wants to counter various stereotypical views on the 
212 movement which is often perceived as a form of radicalism. 
In his remarks, Zulkifli said that
“The 212 reunion was always peaceful, clean and safe. Therefore I invite 
212 alumni to be the pioneers of peaceful elections, happy elections 
and elections that bring progress to Indonesia ”43.
3. 2019 Change President
Despite the splits, some proponents of the 212 action contin-
ued their actions. In the context of the Presidential Election, the 
populist actions they carried out were of course closely related to 
the affairs of the constellation of power in 2019. The main target 
was none other than how, first and foremost, frustrated Jokowi to 
win the Presidential Election again. In March 2018 they made a 
43  https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3798455/zulkifli-hasan-ingin-massa-reuni-212-jadi-
pelopor-pemilu-damai
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quite popular and viral hag named # 2019 Change the President 
(Change the President 2019). This hastag was also made as a 
reaction to the hashtag created by the pro-Jokowi group which 
reads # Jokowi2Periode ( Jokowi 2 term). Hastag war became 
inevitable and at the same time marked a new round of polariza-
tion between the anti-Jokowi group and the pro-Jokowi group. 
In a number of media reports, hashtag #2019GantiPresiden is 
becoming more popular and is said to have succeeded in defeat-
ing hashtag #Jokowi2 Periode44.
Apparently, the hashtag war which is part of cyber war is in-
evitable in the contestation of power in the internet era as it is 
today. Not a few experts who say that the two contestants in the 
2019 Presidential Election, both use buzzers45 - famous people 
and have many followers who are usually paid to spread propa-
ganda through social media - and cyber soldiers to win public 
opinion. In general, the communication strategy that they are 
working on is to disinform and apply messages in social media 
through the hashtag creation or accelerate the circulation of dis-
information. They make new social media like Twitter, Youtube, 
Instagram, WhattApps and Facebook, as a new propaganda tool 
to spread disinformation and misinformation to the public46. In 
fact, it is not uncommon for them to create fake or robot accounts 
for the benefit of propaganda.
So, social media has become an important weapon for agents 
of Islamic populism under the umbrella of the GNPF-MUI, to 
streamline its political struggle agenda. Even though their 
44  “#2019GantiPresiden Kalahkan #Jokowi2Periode”, viva.co.id, 11 April 2018.
45  Buzzers can be human, computer-generated bots that are designed to amplify messages - or a 
combination of humans and bots. Because it is not surprising that the presence of buzzers con-
tinues to increase in number because social media platforms do allow anonymous or fake ac-
counts. Read “Buzzer” and the Narrative Fight, Kompas, 11 October 2019; “Buzzer” Social 
Media and Public Trust, Opinion, Kompas, 14 October 2019.
46  Interview with Nur Ichwan, 24 Sept 2019 and Martin Slama, 22 Sept 2019.
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struggle in imprisoning Ahok was successful, in reality they still 
used the same fuel, namely the politicization of religion. For ex-
ample, to subvert the ruling regime ( Jokowi) and thwart it to win 
back the power contestation in the 2019 Presidential Election, 
Islamic populism agents brought up the issue through WhatsApp 
Messenger regarding the Jokowi’s regime’s position which was 
not pro-Muslim. The issuance of the Perppu of Civil Society 
Organizations, the regime’s tendency to defend Ahok the reli-
gious blasphemers and, most recently but actually irrelevant to 
the struggle of the ummah, boycotted presidential and legislative 
candidates proposed by the PDI-P, Nasdem, PPP, PKB, Hanura 
and Golkar for agreeing to presidential thresholds. (Presidential 
Thresshold) of 20%. This, especially number three, is a political 
message which, when observed, is full of the interests of the po-
litical elites who are members of the Defend Islam Action47.
Not limited to war hashtags and cyber warfare that rely on 
buzzers (buzzers) and their cyber troops (cyber army) through 
social media, the two groups are also involved in the war of door 
to door campaigns and mass mobilization. Regarding the latest 
strategy, the anti-Jokowi group spearheaded by the action propo-
nents of 212 chose Neno Warisman as his main spokesperson in 
campaigning for the 2019 Presidential Change. Since May, thou-
sands of people have joined the 2019 long march to replace the 
president in Jakarta, Solo, Lampung, Makassar and other major 
cities. At first glance, it looks like a spontaneous movement that is 
growing rapidly and organically, but in reality the leaders rely on 
existing mobilization machines through the WhatsApp network 
that they used successfully in the past when anti-Ahok reported48.
47  Endi Aulia Garadian, “Membaca Populisme Islam Model Baru”, 379-393. 
48  Interview with Thomas Power 8 Sept 2019, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, 8 Sept 2019, Edward As-
spinall, 12 Sept 2019.
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With hashtag # 2019 to replace the President, the Islamists 
are trying to launch a movement and at the same time an anti-
Jokowi campaign. Three issues were used in the campaign, firstly, 
the issue of increasing injustice triggered by the imprisonment of 
Islamic leaders on the charge of controversy or “criminalization 
of the ulama” as it is widely known. Second, the politicization of 
labels such as “intolerant” and “radical”, which is believed and felt 
by the leaders of 212 aimed at stigmatizing dissent and providing 
the basis for repressive measures such as the banning of Hizb 
ut-Tahrir. Third, the controversy over the large number of foreign 
workers especially from China49 who were brought to work on 
infrastructure projects funded by China. These issues revive a deep 
fear of the “latent threat of communism”, a legacy of the Suharto 
era that proved successful in mobilizing Muslim paramilitary 
groups against suspected members of the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI)50.
In its development, the 2019 Movement to Change the 
President must be stopped due to government policies that do 
not give permission for activities that are considered to divide the 
community. true that #2019GantiPresiden is increasingly viral in 
cyberspace. Likewise with the various program activities initiated 
by the proponents of the 212 actions, such as healthy walking, 
grand recitation, and the like, always succeeded in drawing inter-
est and broad public involvement. Many people consider that such 
government policy was taken because the government panicked 
about the potential of the 2019 movement to change the Presi-
dent. This policy is considered as a political strategy for Jokowi 
49  The Islamists also use the issue of foreign workers to show that Jokowi prioritizes the construc-
tion of grand infrastructure that depends on foreign loans for poverty alleviation and the devel-
opment of Muslim-owned companies. PAC, Anti-Ahok to Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on 
Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign, IPAC Report No. 55, 15 March 2019.
50  Interview with Marcus Mietzner, 12 Sept 2019 and Greg Fealy, 9 Sept 2019.
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who wants to move forward again in the 2019 Presidential Elec-
tion.
In the view of experts, the policy taken by Jokowi was very 
counter-productive with the spirit of democracy, especially re-
lated to freedom of expression and opinion. What was done by 
the proponents of 2019 Change the President is legal and does 
not conflict with law. The argument that this movement leads to 
treason or is a source of polarization and social division, is con-
sidered too excessive. In this context, the government ( Jokowi) 
has used the State instrument (power) to delegitimize and sup-
press opposition groups51. In a statement, Thomas Power said that
2019 replace the president because this is not a purely Islamist group 
even though it may depart from the Islamist because the aim is not to 
establish the Islamic caliphate, not that. When they are prohibited from 
gathering to make declarations, the impact is very negative because the 
government has used State apparatus to repress as the 2019 group 
replaced the president. The consideration might be that if they (the 
government) lose the election, it would be better if we suspended it52.
4.  Ijma’ Ulama
The involvement of the exponents of action 212 in the practi-
cal political arena is increasingly apparent. A number of Islamist 
scholars who are still consistent in being on the anti-Jokowi side, 
continue to try to play an important role in the constellation of 
power. On 27-29 July 2018, the GNPF-MUI then held an ijma 
’ulama (gathering of religious scholars) to determine presidential 
and vice presidential candidates in accordance with Islamic cri-
teria. There are at least two criteria desired by Islamist scholars 
51  Interview with Burhanuddin Muhtadi 8 Sept 2019, Greg Fealy 9 Sept 2019, Edward Aspinall 
and Marcus Mietzner, 12 Sept 2019.
52  Interview with Thomas Power, 8 Sept 2019.
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for the presidential and vice presidential candidates, namely po-
litical protection and greater access to policy making in order to 
strengthen the principles of Sunni orthodoxy53. The main conver-
sation during the ijma ‘is not related to the issue of which candi-
dates have the most Islamic criteria, but who has a great chance 
of winning the battle and implementing their agenda54.
Before the implementation of ijma, political lobbies had been 
intensively carried out by Islamist groups. On May 29, 2018, PA 
212 organized a national congress which was attended by 21 
provincial branches, mostly based on the FPI branch, to discuss 
national political developments, especially the 2019 election. 
Congress recommended 5 names that could be proposed as 
presidential candidates, namely Rizieq Shihab, Prabowo Subian-
to, TGB Zainul Majdi, Zulkifi Hasan and Yusril Ihza Mahendra. 
Whereas PKS-based figures such as Ahmad Heryawan and 
Hidayat Nur Wahid were nominated as vice presidential candi-
dates. Gatot Nurmantyo, who had been predicted by a number 
of Islamists, was eventually eliminated by PA 212 because he was 
considered an opportunist figure55.
Although not too fierce, competition among Islamist groups in 
the context of determining presidential and vice presidential can-
didates is quite dynamic. Habib Rizieq himself is still a magnet and 
a central figure in determining the direction of the congress policy 
that was held both by PA 212 and ijma ’ulama. Evidently, many 
elites from political parties and Islamic scholars from Amin Rais, 
Prabowo Subianto, Salim Jufri Assegaf and Slamet Maarif, visited 
53  IPAC, Anti-Ahok To Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on  Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign, 
IPAC Report No. 55, 15 March 2019.
54  Discussion with Thomas Power, Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Irsyad, 8 Sept 2019.
55  In the end Zainul Majdi was also eliminated by PA 212 because it anchored to Jokowi’s camp. 
IPAC, Anti-Ahok To Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign, 
IPAC Report No. 55, 15 March 2019.
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Habib Rizieq in Mecca to discuss presidential candidates. Ijma 
’ulama themselves on the last day of July 29, 2018 finally agreed 
and decided Prabowo as a presidential candidate to be accompanied 
by Salim Segaf al-Jufri and Ustadz Abdul Somad. The GNPF 
claims that the two figures offered as vice presidential candidates 
accompanying Prabowo are based on the results of an internal 
survey where Salin al-Jufri has high electability compared to Zulki-
fli Hasan, while Ustadz Abdul Somad is the most popular da’i 
figure at the moment56.
Ijma ’ulama which were held by Islamists received criticism 
from various Muslim groups, especially the ulama from among 
mainstream Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadi-
yah. Nasaruddin Umar, the high priest of the Istiqlal Mosque, for 
example, quipped the results of the ijtima ulama of the Fatwa 
Guards National Movement (GNPF). According to him there has 
been no precedent for ijtima ulemas in Indonesia which gave birth 
to political-practical ijma (decisions). Nasaruddin said that if there 
was an activity called ijtima ulama, the legitimacy of the ijtima 
results would certainly be determined by who the ulemas were 
present. According to him only mujtahid scholars with the under-
standing of qualified jurisprudence can produce an ijma. However, 
if some of the participants are not scholars, that cannot be called 
ijtima ulama. The so-called ulama who understand religion. Nasa-
ruddin saw that the GNPF Ulema Ijtima did not fully represent 
mujtahid scholars who came from major Islamic mass organiza-
tions in Indonesia. So the decision or ijma ‘of the ijtima only binds 
the people involved. That is also a note if the decision-making 
56  IPAC, Anti-Ahok To Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on  Indonesia’s 2019 Election Campaign, 
IPAC Report No. 55, 15 March 2019.
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process is carried out with the argument of a solid religious argu-
ment57.
5. People’s Power
The term people power is actually not a new phenomenon in 
the history of Indonesia. In 1966 and 1998, the mass movement 
also came out with a sharp criticism of the government to demand 
the fall of the regime. At the international level, the term is often 
identified with the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) Revo-
lution, the name of a street in Metro Manila, Philippines. This was 
a mass demonstration without violence for four days in 1986 to 
end the authoritarian regime of President Ferdinand Marcos. The 
form of people power can also be seen from the community move-
ment in Iran in 1977, the 1988 Burmese pro-democracy movement, 
1989 China, 1998 reform, to the 2011 Arab Spring58.
This term then echoes back in Indonesia in a different context, 
namely the contestation of power in the 2019 Presidential Elec-
tion involving the incumbent ( Joko Widodo) and incumbent 
challenger (Prabowo Subianto). In the 2019 Presidential Election 
process, Islamist groups who had contributed greatly to mobiliz-
ing the masses to overthrow Ahok in the DKI Jakarta Election, 
which again carried the political power narrative of the people. 
In line with the fraudulent Election discourse, Islamists also 
produce people power narratives in response to the results of the 
Presidential Election which are considered unaccountable. The 
main objective is none other than to build public opinion and at 
the same time delegititize electoral political results59. Some con-
57  https://tirto.id/sindiran-imam-besar-istiqlal-soal-hasil-ijtima-ulama-gnpf-cQqq 
58  Mouliza K. Donna Sweinstani, “People Power dalam Dinamika Elektoral”,   https://kolom.
tempo.co/read/1208766/people-power-dalam-dinamika-elektoral 
59  The Executive Director of the Indonesian Public Institute (IPI), Karyono Wibowo, said there was 
a correlation between the accusations of election fraud and the discourse of people power or mass 
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sider that the use of these issues, primarily people power, is the 
last weapon or bullet owned by the Prabowo-Sandi faction which 
is fully supported by Islamist groups60.
Approaching the period of the determination of the presiden-
tial election results by KPU (May 22, 2019), the Prabowo-Sand-
iaga camp continued to echo fraudulent elections and mobilize 
people power. Most recently, thousands of people, both young 
men, women and adult men demonstrated at the Election Over-
sight Body (Bawaslu) on Friday (11/5). They escorted the 
Prabowo-Sandiaga National Election Agency (BPN) when re-
porting the alleged 2019 election fraud. Both of them ordered 
their team to use the existing legal loopholes to expose the alleged 
fraud in the 2019 election. Sandiaga Uno, Sufmi Dasco said that:
“In accordance with the message of Pak Prabowo, our president, that 
we must use any legal loopholes to expose the alleged fraud that 
occurred in this election”61.
Actually, the narrative of election fraud had been blown away 
by Prabowo-Sandi’s camp well before the voting. Before the vot-
ing, Prabowo-Sandi’s camp also spread the discourse of people 
power or mobilizing the power of the masses because the election 
was considered cheating. Prabowo’s sister, Hashim Djojohadiku-
sumo, who first expressed allegations of election fraud. On March 
11, 2019, Hashim complained about the potential of a double 
mobilization. “The fraud was associated with people power brought up by certain parties to cancel 
the election results”. Katadata.co.id with the title “People Power Movement, Prabowo’s Last Strat-
egy Towards May 22”, https://katadata.co.id/berita/2019/05/13/gerakan-people-power-siasat-
terakhir-prabowo-jelang-22-mei  
60  Interview with Muhammad A.S. Hikam, 31 Sept 2019 and Tomas Power, 8 Sept 2019.
61  Katadata.co.id entitled «Gerakan People Power, Siasat Terakhir Prabowo Jelang 22 Mei (People 
Power Movement, Prabowo Final’s Tactic as May 22 Draws Closer)”, https://katadata.co.id/
berita/2019/05/13/gerakan-people-power-siasat-terakhir-prabowo-jelang-22-mei 
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Permanent Voter List (DPT) of around 17.5 million to the Gen-
eral Election Commission (KPU). Later, the KPU verified and 
stated that there was no double DPT.
Meanwhile, Chairman of the BPN Steering Board Prabowo-
Sandiaga, Amien Rais, since April 1, 2019 has threatened to 
encourage people to move in droves when there is fraud in the 
election. Amien said the action plan was part of a social uprising 
or social revolt of the people to the authorities. “If there is fraud, 
we will push the people to Monas,” Amien said. The narrative of 
election fraud was reheated after the voting day on 17 April. A 
few hours after the voting, a number of pollsters had announced 
the results of the quick count. Most of the results of the quick 
count also showed Jokowi-Ma’ruf ahead of Prabowo. As a com-
parison, Prabowo claimed to win the Presidential Election based 
on the results of his own calculation with a figure reaching 62%, 
on the same day as the results of the quick count62.
The action that carried the people power discourse ran aground 
when the government, in this case the police, responded to the 
discourse by setting a number of political elites such as Kivlan Zen, 
Eggi Sudjana and Permadi, who were involved in it on treason 
charges. The police set Permadi on charges of treason and Kivlan 
Zen on charges of possessing illegal and treasonous firearms. Kiv-
lan Zein, in a short video spread on social media, invited people 
present to come to the General Election Commission (KPU) 
building and the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) with the 
aim of disqualifying Jokowi-Ma’ruf from the 2019 Presidential 
Election contest.
62  Katadata.co.id entitled «Gerakan People Power, Siasat Terakhir Prabowo Jelang 22 Mei (People 
Power Movement, Prabowo Final’s Tactic as May 22 Draws Closer)”, https://katadata.co.id/
berita/2019/05/13/gerakan-people-power-siasat-terakhir-prabowo-jelang-22-mei
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“On the 9th we are independent. Follow me to the Banteng Square on 
the 9th we will be free. Whoever prevents us from fighting,” said Kivlan63.
While Permadi, cited the path of revolution as the only way 
to solve the problem in which “China and its two billion inhabit-
ants” he called parties “that would invade Indonesia”.
“I said earlier, what you said is all true, but it cannot be resolved through 
negotiations and the constitution, except with a revolution. Because of 
that the victims must have been large64.
While Eggi was named a suspect on the basis of speeches on 
Wednesday (17/4) when Prabowo declared the victory claim 
based on his own calculation results in Kertanegara, Jakarta. Fol-
lowing fragments of Eggi’s speech at the time:
“So, if all these cheats continue to be accumulated, I heard earlier, God 
willing, around 7 o’clock, 8 o’clock, it will be officially announced 
whether there is really serious fraud. So the analysis that has been done 
by our leader is also the father of Prof. Dr. Amien Rais, the power of 
people power is must be done. Agree? Dare? Dare? “If people power 
happens, we no longer need to follow the context of the stages, because 
this is the people’s sovereignty. Maybe even this is God’s way to speed 
Prabowo inaugurated. Do not have to wait October 20. This is the 
power of people power. Insha Allah. But we hope that Indonesia’s unity 
must be maintained. We must not break up between nations65. “
Not a few scholars rate that the government’s actions in re-
sponding to demonstrations that carry the discourse of people 
63  https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-48244103 
64  https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-48244103 
65  Katadata.co.id entitled «Gerakan People Power, Siasat Terakhir Prabowo Jelang 22 Mei (People 
Power Movement, Prabowo Final’s Tactic as May 22 Draws”,  https://katadata.co.id/beri-
ta/2019/05/13/gerakan-people-power-siasat-terakhir-prabowo-jelang-22-mei
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power, is appropriate. However firm action taken by the govern-
ment can close the gap for the possibility of wider socio-political 
conflicts which in turn can threaten the integrity of the Republic 
of Indonesia. In their view, people power is a continuation of 
Islamic populist actions that clearly have a high-level ideological 
and political agenda to (not just delegitimize legitimate govern-
ment) to replace the state ideology. Actors involved in people 
power remain the same as previous popular actions, namely Is-
lamist groups, some of whom want the establishment of the 
sharia system in Indonesia66.
Some other experts have the opposite view. According to them 
the attitude shown by the government by capturing the actors 
involved in the action of people power, as a reactive and excessive 
attitude. If the arrest is based on the enforcement of the rule of 
law (rule of law), but why the main actors behind the action were 
not arrested, so their views. Some even consider that what the 
government does represents its authoritarianism. It is said so 
because what the government has done is considered counterpro-
ductive to the spirit of democracy, especially with regard to free-
dom of expression and opinion67.
C. The Causes of Islamic Populism
There are at least two main stream views that explain the 
things that drive the rise of right populism, namely economic 
inequality and cultural conflict. The first hypothesis refers to the 
fact that the 2008-09 financial crisis has made economies in 
Western countries looking for a new balance. At the same time, 
economic globalization created many jobs, especially in the 
66  Interview with M. Amin Abdullah, 26 July 2019 dan Muhammad A.S. Hikam, 31 Sept 2019.
67  Greg Fealy, 9 Sept 2019, Thomas Power, 8 Sept 2019, Edward Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner, 12 
Sept 2019, Nur Ichwan, 24 July 2019, Sunarwoto, 26 July 2019.
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manufacturing sector, moving to various countries such as Mex-
ico, India and Africa. The same thing happened in the service 
sector which previously had to be done in Cleveland or Briming-
ham, now it can be done remotely from workers in Mumbai or 
Manila68.
Whereas prostitution, LGBT, and legalization of abortion by 
liberal political elites, are considered aspects that can bring about 
cultural opposition (cultural backlash) and at the same time trigger 
a revival of right populism. In the West, in the last three decades, 
it has experienced important changes such as increasing support 
for minority groups (LGBT, blacks, Hispanics, immigrants), 
feminism, multiculturalism, internationalism, and values  that are 
identical with political correctness. These ‘cosmopolitan liberal’ 
values  are indeed accepted by the younger generation, but make 
the older generation feel insecure. They see it as a threat to civili-
zation and the values  it has been upholding. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that those who are older give their support to parties, 
politicians and people who are considered to be able to maintain 
their values69.
What about the phenomenon of the rise of Islamic populism 
in Indonesia with its conservative character? Does the issue of 
economic inequality and cultural conflict contribute to the emer-
gence of Islamic populism as represented in the case of anti-Ahok 
or anti-Jokowi actions? This issue has been a long debate among 
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and at the same time Indone-
sianists from various perspectives. In general, they refer to Is-
lamic populism in Indonesia on a number of important events, 
the most important of which is the 212 movement or popularly 
called the Defend Islam Action. Not a few of them are of the view 
68  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”, 2017.  
69  Ari A. Perdana, “Menguatnya Populisme”, 2017.
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that the main trigger (main trigger) of mass mobilization of 
Muslims in various regions in Indonesia, is none other than 
Ahok’s remarks related to Al-Maidah verse 51 which was then 
framed by Islamist elites as blasphemy religion. In framing the-
ory, what the Islamists do is a way to convince diverse and broad 
target groups so that they are motivated to engage in mobilization 
actions in pressing demands against Ahok’s trial70.
According to media reports, the main meeting point that 
unites Islamist groups to consolidate themselves, organize the 
masses and carry out demonstrations is nothing but the issue of 
defamation of religion addressed to Ahok. If there were no Ahok 
controversial remarks which were later justified as blasphemy, 
certainly, it was not easy enough for anyone to be able to mobilize 
the masses on a large scale71. The economic crisis that took place 
in the decade 2008-2009 also did not lead to mass demonstrations 
like the Defend Islam Action. This fact confirms that religious 
issues proved to be enormously used by political Islamic elites to 
ignite the emotions of religious people. Islamist shrewdness in 
using - borrowing the term George McTurnan - religion as an 
ideological weapon is actually more an effort to stir up emotions 
and public understanding both dogmatically and psychologically 
regarding worldly and ukhrawi affairs72.
The Ahok case is reminiscent of large-scale demonstrations 
in a number of countries in the Middle East known as the Arab 
Spring in 2011. The second event began with the self-immolation 
of Mohammad Bouzaizi, a Tunisian fruit trader before a Re-
gional Council Office Sidi Bouzid. As a result of this action, a 
70  Abdul Wahib Situmorang, Gerakan Sosial: Teori dan Praktik, 41.
71  Sumanto Al-Qurtuby, Indonesia’s Islamist Mobilization, 15-21.
72  George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1970, 67-68; Wasita Raharjo Jati, “Trajektori Populisme Islam di Kalangan Kelas 
Menengah Muslim Indonesia”, Prisma, Vol. 36 (3), 2017, 19-27.
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wave of massive demonstrations for months took place not only 
in Tunisia, but spread to a number of neighboring countries such 
as Egypt, Libya, Yemen and others. Demonstrations spread so 
quickly and massively through the help of social media. In gen-
eral, mass protesters demand the overthrow of regimes that have 
long been in power, are corrupt and undemocratic. In its action, 
the mass of the Muslim community also uses religious sentiments, 
in the interests of mass mobilization. The difference with the 212 
Action case in Indonesia, the masses involved in the Arab Spring 
revolution were not only dominated by Islamists, people of vari-
ous classes, cultural-religious identities, also many were involved. 
When the 212 action took the fight against a government regime 
that was portrayed as corrupt and not pro-people or people, the 
Arab Spring movement was oriented towards reform and democ-
ratization73.
According to a number of experts, the Ahok problem is actu-
ally purely political and not a religious problem. Ahok’s remarks 
about Al-Maidah in front of the citizens of the Thousand Islands, 
it might not be possible to contemplate the controversy and at 
the same time the emotions of Muslims when he conveyed it not 
in the context of the elections. Because it was spoken by Ahok 
who was a non-Muslim memorandum, came from ethnic Chi-
nese and at the same time held the status of a governor and in-
cumbent governor (incumbent) who was involved in power 
contestation, it was not surprising if his words became controver-
sial74. The justification of blasphemy that was pinned by the reli-
73  Shafira Elnanda Yasmine, “Arab Spring: Islam dalam Gerakan Sosial dan Demokrasi Timur 
Tengah”, Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2015, pp. 106-113; “Revolusi yang 
Berawal dari Media Sosial”, https://tirto.id/revolusi-yang-berawal-dari-media-sosial-cqNP.
74  Interview with M. Amin Abdullah, 26 July 2019; Nur Ichwan, 24 July 2019; Greg Fealy, 9 Sept 
2019; Paul D. Kenny, 11 Sept 2019; Edward Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner, 12 Sept 2019; Mu-
hammad A.S. Hikam, 31 Sept 2019.
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gious elites to Ahok was actually not a legal product produced 
through ijthad. Likewise, the terminology of the Defend Islam 
Action used by Ahok protesters who are members of the GNPF-
MUI ranks, is also purely a political movement because it is 
oriented towards practical political interests and not religious 
movements. In this case, religion is limited to being used as a tool 
or means for Islamists in their efforts to fight for power75.
In today’s media era, Ahok’s words alone will not have a sig-
nificant social impact without involving the role of the media, 
especially social media. As it is understood that Ahok’s contro-
versial remarks have received public attention from Muslims in 
various regions and even around the world, after a person named 
Buni Yani, who memorized a colleague and at the same time 
supported Anis Baswedan in the Jakarta Election, edited and 
uploaded the video on the page You Tube and Facebook. Cash, 
the results of this Buni Yani upload became viral, successfully 
influencing and shaping Muslim public opinion that Ahok truly 
blasphemed religion. Habib Rizieq Shihab, for example, the head 
of FPI is one of the important actors who is directly involved in 
creating propaganda through social media and at the same time 
mobilizing the masses to carry out massive demonstrations on 
behalf of Bela Islam. According to Martin Slama, Rizieq is a 
trigger media who has expertise in utilizing social media for the 
sake of propaganda. With the help of his cyber army and its buzz-
ers, Rizieq was quite successful at reproducing and simultane-
ously spreading his political narratives in the framework of influ-
encing public opinion to get involved in the mass demonstrations76.
It is well known that political narratives reproduced by buzz-
ers (buzzers) and cyber soldiers 212 are loaded with various ex-
75  Interview with Sahiron Syamsudin 22 October 2017
76  Interview with Martin Slama, 21 July 2019.
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pressions of hatred, lies (hoaxs), disinformation and misinforma-
tion. Video edits uploaded by Buni Yani are the most vivid 
examples of how disinformation is so easily accepted by the 
public as a truth. Likewise, Rizieq Shihab’s propaganda which 
continued to say that Ahok had blasphemed religion, tarnished 
the sanctity of the Qur’an, disbelieved, and dragged him to 
prison or tried was a jihad or part of a defense of Islam, accepted 
by the public as a fact of truth. Even though such narratives are 
reproduced and framed in such a way that their main purpose is 
to influence public opinion. According to Nur Ichwan, hoax is 
the basis for the success of the Islamists to mobilize the masses 
as the Defend Islam Action77.
In the Indonesian context, the strengthening of populist ac-
tions carried out by Islamist groups, however, cannot be sepa-
rated from the development of variants - borrowing the term 
James Fox - a new Islam78 with a conservative (or fundamentalist 
and radicalist) character that is increasingly popular after the fall 
of the regime The new order. In Islamic discourse, this new Is-
lamic variant is often contrasted with the old Islamic variant 
which has a long historical roots in the archipelago and is well 
known for its accommodative, inclusive, liberal and progressive 
character79. Different from the old Islamic variants, this new Islam 
carries the spirit of purification and even the application of Is-
77  Interview with Nur Ichwan, 24 July 2019. 
78  Interview with James Fox, 22 July 2019.
79  In Islamic literature, liberal Muslims refer to Muslims who in their struggle are concerned with 
promoting religious and community renewal through the reinterpretation of Islamic texts. The aim 
is nothing but to achieve greater freedom and justice in people’s lives. Democracy, separation of 
religion from practical politics, upholding human rights, including gender justice and people with 
different sexual orientations, ethnic and religious minorities, environmental protection and com-
munity empowerment, are a number of specific issues on the agenda of liberal Muslim struggle. 
Likewise with progressive Muslims, this group also has a high commitment in advocating for the 
realization of an open and inclusive socio-political life and universal enforcement of human rights. 
See Greg Fealy, Reformasi and the Decline of Liberal Islam, Cornell University Press, pp. 117-134.
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lamic teachings in various realms of life as a kaffah (totality) and 
not even a few which are oriented towards the creation of an 
Islamic State. FPI, FUI, MMI, Wahabi Salafi, and HTI, for ex-
ample, are a number of new variants of Islam that are more ori-
ented towards orthodoxy affirmation than heterodoxy or plural-
ity of diversity in Indonesian Islam80.
Even a number of organizations that are often labeled radical 
both in ideology (thought) such as (HTI) and actions such as 
Jema’at Islamiyah ( JI) and JAD, consistently fight for the Is-
lamic political system in lieu of the secular political system. These 
new variants of Islam, which are quite plural, are then known by 
various names such as conservative Islam, fundamentalist Islam, 
radical Islam and various similar designations. Considering the 
character of this new Islam is not only literalist, textualist and 
dogmatic in understanding religious teachings, but also ideo-
logical and even political, many experts have gathered it into one 
cluster known as Islamism or political Islam - ideas, ideas, dis-
course and movements that bring Islamic principles into all as-
pects of life81.
Not a few experts are of the view that the strengthening of 
conservatvism which is rooted in the new Islamic variant is what 
contributed to the important whip of Islamic populism in Indo-
nesia. M. Amin Abdullah, for example, believes that the mass 
mobilization action as represented by the 212 movement, is the 
culmination of the development of what is popularly known as 
the conservative turn and religious intolerance that has occurred 
80  Al Makin, “Homogenizng Indonesian Islam: Persecution of The Shia Group in Yogyakarta”, 
Studia Islamika, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2017, pp. 1-31.
81  Literalism, as the most prominent characteristic of Salafism, has the potential to bring Indone-
sian Islam to be more conservative and even tends to lead to Islamism. Muhammad Wildan, 
“Islamism and Democratization in the Post 411 and 212 Rallies of Indonesia”, in Thinking 
Asean, Issue 19 / January 2016, pp. 2-5; Greg Fealy, Reformasi and the Decline of Liberal Islam, 
Cornell University Press, pp. 117-134.
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in Indonesia especially in the last ten decades82. Amin Abdullah 
stressed that Indonesia is currently surrounded by an extraordi-
nary number of trans-nationalist Islamic schools, ranging from 
HTI, JI, Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIS and its interests. In the 212th 
action, the variants of conservative-radical Islamism were consid-
ered to have an important role in supporting the Defend Islam 
Action. Without the basis of conservativism, fundamentalism and 
radicalism which in reality are developing rapidly in Indonesia, 
the actors of the movement, will find it difficult to be able to 
mobilize the masses in such large numbers83.
However, the strengthening of conservativism in Muslim com-
munities in Indonesia cannot be separated from the long-standing 
Islamization. This Islamization underwent a dramatic resurgence 
in the 1990s and continues to grow rapidly and has even become 
the single most striking feature that colored the early decades of 
reform (1998 - present). According to Ariel Heryanto, Islamiza-
tion in a certain degree has determined the framework, boundar-
ies, and content of the power struggle in Indonesia. Ariel’s study 
of Islam after the New Order was indeed associated with popular 
culture. However, the rise of hijabisasi, religious films and soap 
operas, and the like, in fact have a direct relationship with the 
development of sharia economic ideas, Islamic law, and Islamic 
government84. Even though these urban middle class Muslims no 
longer contradict the dimensions of religiosity and modernity, or 
in the language of Asef Bayat they are known as the post-Islamism 
generation85, but their dominant religious views remain conserva-
82  Kikue Hamayotsu, Moderate-radical Coalition in the Name of Islam: Conservative Islamism in In-
donesia and Malaysia, pp. 1-7.
83  Interview with M. Amin Abdullah, 26 Juli 2019 dan Muhammad Wildan, 26 July 2019.
84  Ariel Heryanto, Identitas dan Kenikmatan: Politik Budaya Layar Indonesia, Jakarta: Gramedia, 
2015, p. 37-40.  
85  Asef Bayat, Post-Islamisme, Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011.
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tive rather than progressive. Even these people remain actively 
involved in the 212 movement even though the agenda is no 
longer a matter of Islamization, but rather towards pietization86.
Lutfi Assyaukani also expressed his views on the important role 
of conservativism in encouraging the rise of Islamic populism in 
Indonesia. According to him, the protest movement labeled Islam 
is the tip of the iceberg of Islamic conservativism that emerged 
since 15 years ago. Referring to the influx of Middle Eastern values 
as a consequence of the opening of democracy after 1998, Assyau-
kani believes that the large number of Indonesian Muslims who 
are trying to adopt the Saudi Arabian lifestyle is the fruit of the 
Wahabi campaign’s success87.
However, the view that argues that the emergence of Islamic 
populism is a logical consequence of the strengthening of con-
servativism, is quite relevant if related to the results of a number 
of survey institutes. Almost all survey institutions reported that 
the trend of conservativism and radicalism in Indonesia tended 
to increase in the post New Order period. Setara Institute for 
Democracy and Peace noted an increase in violence with 144 
cases in 2011 and 264 in 201288. The latest picture was delivered 
by the National Human Rights Commission which reported 74 
cases in 2014 and experienced a surge of 78 cases in 2015, and 
reached almost 100 cases in 201689. The Wahid Foundation in 
2016, showed that 11 million of the 150 million Muslim popula-
tion in Indonesia were ready to take radical action. Of that 
amount, 0.4 percent have committed radical action. This number 
reaches 7.7 percent of the total Muslim population in Indonesia.
86  Interview with Najib Kailani 26 July 2019
87  Marcus Mietzner & Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation”, 1-19.
88  Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein (ed.), Islam, Politics and Cahnge, the Indonesian Experience 
after the Fall of Suharto, Leiden University Press, 2016, p. 14.
89  Kompas.com, 05/01/2017.
I S L A M I C  P O P U L I S M  A N D  D E M O C R A C Y. . .
1 0 1
The development of conservativism can not only be understood 
as the fruit of Islamization carried out by Islamist agents in a 
fairly long period of time. Nor does it relate to the ability of this 
group to survive and at the same time promote its ideological 
diversity. These groups can continue to survive and thrive because 
they generally have a close relationship or special relationship with 
the military, especially retired generals and their supporters. FPI, 
for example, this paramilitary organization is said to have closeness 
with Prabowo, Wiranto, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono and other 
influential generals. Some argue that they are often partners and 
even an arm of the security apparatus (TNI and Polri) who don’t 
want their hands to be dirty again due to bad report cards on hu-
man rights violations. In many ways, both of them often appear 
in tune in dealing with communism and other issues90.
Even though the trend of conservativism continues to increase 
in Indonesia after the New Order, the position of Islamist groups 
(agents of conservativism) remains a minority when compared to 
mainstream Islamic groups. However, they are relatively successful 
in raising alternative Islamic discourse into the public Islamic reli-
gious discourse. Ideology that led to efforts to build this Islamic 
order - including establishing an Islamic State, applying Islamic 
law (shari’a) and certain religious moral standards for Muslim 
communities - succeeded in spreading and attracting the attention 
of the wider community through various media and ways such as 
books, magazines, pamphlet, internet, religious studies on campus, 
school, youtube, and training91.
90  Bima Satria Putra, “Kebangkitan Global Fundamentalis dan Ultra-Nasionalis: Bukan Akhir 
dari Sejarah”, Anarkhis.Org, 22 Feb 2017.
91  Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militansi, dan Pencarian Identitas di Indonesia Pasca Orde 
Baru Jakarta: LP3ES & KITLV-Jakarta, 2008. 
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Meanwhile, some experts argue that the rise of Islamic popu-
lism is not merely understood as a phenomenon of strengthening 
conservativism among Indonesian Muslims92. One of the reasons 
that made them doubt the effect of conservativism in encouraging 
the emergence of the Islamic populism movement was related to 
their academic tradition in seeing the election results as a bench-
mark in understanding the rise of Islamist sentiment. Himayotsu, 
for example, argues that when Islamic parties were not sufficiently 
successful in getting enough convincing votes in the 2009 elections, 
he concluded that the fate of political Islam was over. A similar 
view was expressed by Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle who 
saw the results of the 2009 Election as evidence that Muslim vot-
ers had turned away from Islamic law as their political priority. 
However, when Islamic political parties succeeded in increasing 
their votes in the 2014 elections, an international television network 
anxiously asked whether political Islam had risen in Indonesia93.
Greg Fealy saw the mobilization of Islamists as a unique 
phenomenon that reflected the specific situation of the Ahok case. 
The special situation that arises in the Ahok case is not a signal 
of the widespread trend of community support for the Islamist 
agenda in Indonesia. Based on his observations during the dem-
onstration, he claimed that for most participants, this was a reli-
gious event, rejecting attempts to Islamize the law and limit the 
rights of non-Muslims94. In his statement, he explained that
92  This view was expressed among others by Lindsey, Jones, Assyaukanie, and Varagur, as well as 
various international media such as The Wall Street Journal. Read more about Tom Lindsey, 
Blasphemy charge reveals real fault lines in Indonesia deomocracy, Indonesia at Melbourne, 25 
November 2016; Sidney Jones, Why Indonesian extremists are gainig ground, The interpreter, 1 
November 2016; Lutfi Assyaukanie, “unholy alliance: ultra-conservatism and political pragma-
tism in Indonesia”, Thinking ASEAN, 19, January 2017; K. Varagur, “Indonesia’s moderate Islam 
is slowly crumbling”, Foreign Policy, 14 February 2017.
93  Marcus Mietzner & Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation”, 1-19. 
94  Interview with Edward Asspinal 12 Sept 2019 and Greg Fealy 9 Sept 2019
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There are good reasons to doubt that (the December demonstration) 
does mark some conservative surge. To begin with, only a minority 
appeared to be affiliated with known Islamist groups or drawn to the 
more ideological Islamist message in the rally95.
According to Greg Fealy, there are a number of compelling 
reasons to doubt that popular mobilization marked a surge in 
conservativism. First, only a few participants in the action were 
affiliated with Islamist groups or were interested in Islamist ide-
ology in the demonstration. For example, when the speakers 
called for Ahok to be arrested, the crowd immediately shouted 
“hold, hold, hold!”. But when the Islamist leader declared that 
God’s law was superior to man-made Indonesian law, there was 
absolutely no response from the participants in the action. For 
most participants in the action, the event was basically a religious 
event, both in the sense of defending their faith from insults and 
also to expressing their piety through mass prayers in symbolic 
national locations. They are not very interested in the fundamen-
tal change in the role of Islam in the State96.
Second, the feelings of anti-China and anti-Christianity were 
manifested in Ahok, a politician who spoke straightforwardly and 
aggressively, and had achieved many things as governor, but also 
disappointed many voters in Jakarta. Slander about race and 
sectarians openly against Ahok has become commonplace. As a 
miss, the Muhammadiyah and PAN chairmen, Amin Rais, de-
scribed Ahok as “The Chinese Infidel” and commented with 
hatred towards Ahok. The GNPF-MUI is also smart enough to 
use this racism sentiment in mobilizing the masses97.
95  Marcus Mietzner & Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in In-
donesia” 2018.
96  Greg Fealy, “Bukan sekedar Ahok: menjelaskan aksi massa pada 2 Desember”, Indonesia At Mel-
bourne, December 12, 2016, interview 9 Sept 2019.
97  Greg Fealy, “Bukan sekedar Ahok” 2016, interview 9 Sept 2019.
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Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi asserted that the 
emergence of Islamic populism in Indonesia was more closely 
correlated with the exclusion of Islamist groups such as FPI from 
the realm of power rather than the strengthening of conservativ-
ism in the lives of Muslims. In the era of president Susilo Bam-
bang Yudoyono, his political policies tended to be accommodat-
ing towards Islamist groups. For example, SBY tends to be 
tolerant in responding to attacks by FPI and other militant groups 
against sects and religious minorities such as the Ahmadiyya and 
Shi’a. When SBY condemned such incidents of religious violence, 
he also described the violence as a horizontal conflict between 
two antagonistic social groups, rather than an attack on law by an 
Islamist against a minority98.
The results of research conducted by survey institutions such 
as LSI, also showed that conservative and radical sentiments in 
the Indonesian Muslim community in general, showed a declining 
trend between 2010 and 2016. For example, a number of Muslims 
who objected to non-Muslim religious events in neighboring life 
decreased from 51.6 percent in 2010 to 49.6 percent in 2011 and 
39.6 percent in 2016. Likewise, the percentage of Indonesian 
Muslims who objected to the establishment of places of worship 
in their neighborhoods decreased from 63.8 percent in 2010 to 
60.6 percent in 2011 and 52 percent in 2016. Similarly, respon-
dents who said that those who had made donations to organiza-
tions committed to implementing Islamic law reached 37.4 per-
cent in 2010, 25 percent in 2011 and 13.7 percent in 2016. Attacks 
on non-Muslim places of worship was at the position of 1.3 per-
cent in 2010, 1.8 percent in 2011, d an 0.4 percent in 201699.
98  Marcus Mietzner & Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in In-
donesia”, 2018.
99  Interview with Marcus Mieatzner 12 September 2019 and Burhanuddin Muhtadi 8 September 
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Based on the facts above, it is not doubtful to say that the 
mobilization of radical Islamists is only as an intermediary to 
pursue ideological-political-economic goals. Religious narratives 
and ethnic identities are merely tools used to achieve political and 
economic interests. Anti-Aseng (Chinese) and anti-Foreign 
sentiments, for example, as campaigned by Islamic populist elites, 
cannot be separated from the development paradox which places 
most people, including Muslims, in a subordinate position. In the 
criticism of experts, development in Indonesia mainly since the 
New Order era, known as the era of modernism-developmental-
is, which was sponsored by the State was limited to providing 
benefits for a small group of political-economic elites. Chinese 
ethnic who are concerned in the economic-business sector, appear 
as a minority that dominates the national economic sector. How-
ever, the strengthening of the economic gap which is dominated 
by ethnic Chinese minorities and oligarchic economic elites over 
the majority (indigenous) community, has become one of the 
variables for the rise of populism in Indonesia. The involvement 
of the urban poor, in the mobilization of Islamists, can not be 
separated at all from their subordinate position in the economic 
field which is a legacy of colonialism and the post-colonial state 
especially the New Order era100.
The action of Islamic populism as in the case of 212, has made 
the issue of the economic marginality of the ummah due to the 
influx of foreign workers, especially from China, the leakage of 
the country’s wealth due to the domination of foreign companies 
such as Freeport, as one of the narratives that contributed sig-
2019. See also Marcus Mietzner & Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mo-
bilisation in Indonesia” 2018.
100  Vedi R. Hadiz, Populisme Islam, 2019; Marcus Mietzner & Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining 
the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation”, 1-19.
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nificantly to mobilizing the masses in large numbers. In this case, 
Vedi R. Hadiz said that the systematic narrative about the mar-
ginalization of the people became one of the main variables that 
contributed to the promotion of anti-Ahok and anti-Jokowi mass 
mobilization. This narrative has long been prominent in the tra-
jectory of modern Indonesian history with the perception that 
ethnic Chinese minorities are social groups that have benefited 
from economic development since the era of colonialism101.
According to Hadiz, the strengthening of Islamic populism 
in various countries including Indonesia in the anti-Ahok and 
anti-Jokowi cases, cannot be separated from the response of Is-
lamists to the paradox of neo-liberal modernization and global-
ization. Almost the same as the actions carried out by Islamism 
groups in various forms, this act of populism also interspersed 
with their ideological and political zeal in criticizing and suing 
the social, economic and political system of the modern world 
which is dominated by the principles of secularism and capitalism. 
Such a political system not only creates a crisis of morality102, but 
also the deterioration of the people and social injustice in various 
fields of life, especially economics. For this reason, these circles 
always wage a counter against the system of secularism-capitalism 
and offer a format of political and economic systems based on 
Islam103.
Other experts see the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia 
with its racist and sectarian style, as in the West, in relation to the 
paradox of democracy. On the one hand, democracy is increas-
101  Vedi R. Hadiz, Behind Indonesia’s Illiberal Turn, this an adapted version of the autohr’s paper 
presented at the 2017 Indonesia Update Conference at the Australian National University, 1-11.
102  The allure of Islamic populism is partly because of claims made about the upholding of a mor-
ally strong society facing mental erosion caused by what is perceived as materialist, consumptive, 
and hedonic values associated with Western culture. Vedi R. Hadiz, Islamic Populism, 49.
103  Vedi R. Hadiz, Populisme Islam, 39-94.
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ingly developing as characterized by freedom of the press, free-
dom of expression and expression of opinions, and the holding 
of elections which takes place relatively free. But on the other 
hand, more and more citizens are trying to openly declare their 
religious identities, make a difference, and open new public 
spaces that are in accordance with religious demands and Is-
lamic lifestyles by consuming Islamic symbols that occur simul-
taneously with increased intolerance and radicalism. In this 
completely open situation, it is also possible for political elites, 
both Muslim and oligarchic, to play all kinds of ways to gain 
constituent support and dominate political power by manipulat-
ing religious symbols104. The presence of popular mobilization as 
the 212 movement can be understood as part of the process and 
even the consequences of democratization where public space is 
very open to various groups, and conservative groups are no ex-
ception105.
Azyumardi Azra also considered that Islamic populism can 
only blossom, grow and develop if the socio-political situation is 
supportive. In other words, Islamic populism can emerge and rise 
to resistance against the ruling regime because of the availability 
of political opportunities. Citing the opinion of Peter Eisinger, 
one of the pioneers of the theory of political opportunity, protest 
actions arise when a political system that under certain conditions 
is exposed and used by challengers to take the fight106. Openness 
104  Noorhaidi Hasan, “Tantangan Islam Politik dan Krisis Legitimasi Ulama (Political Islam’s 
Challenges and Ulema’s Legitimcary Crisis)”, in Noorhaidi Hasan et.al (ed.) Ulama dan Negara-
Bangsa: Membaca Masa Depan Islam Politik di Indonesia, Yogyakarta: PusPIDeP and Pascasar-
jana UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2019, 47-65.
105  Interview with Muhammad Wildan 26 Juli 2019; read also his writing in Muhammad Wildan, 
“Islamism and Democratization in the Post 411 and 212 Rallies of Indonesia”, in Thinking Asean, 
Issue 19/January 2016, pp. 2-5.
106  Peter Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cites”, American Political Re-
view 67, 1973, pp. 11-28.
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of the era of democracy is considered by some experts as an im-
portant political opportunity factor for the emergence of Islamic 
populism that is driven by Islamism groups. On the contrary, 
populism will be difficult and will not even be able to surface in 
a political system that is authoritarianism. Indonesia’s experience 
shows that during the 32 years of authoritarian New Order rule, 
it proved to not provide space for the emergence of socio-politi-
cal activism that was contradictory to the government such as the 
current Islamic populism107. The experience of other countries 
whose political regimes are very authoritarian such as in North 
Korea, it is very unlikely for the growth and development of 
counter-power movements such as right populism.
In addition, the emergence of right populism in various coun-
tries, including Indonesia, is not merely facilitated by the open-
ness and freedom as a consequence of democracy. In general, 
right-sided populism emerged as a response to the crisis of lib-
eral democracy. Vedi R. Hadiz explicitly revealed that the devel-
opment of populism in Islam cannot be separated from the 
people’s disappointment in democracy. Different from conven-
tional populism which aims at curative and constructive demo-
cratic processes to be sensitive to the demands and aspirations of 
the wider community, populism in Islam actually takes a some-
what different path. First, the word ummah is used as a proxy for 
demos (people) who exclusively fight for the interests of Muslims. 
Secondly, instead of supporting democracy as the main way to 
form a government, Islamic populism tends to support a system 
of democratic interfaith governance such as the khilafah or 
shari’ah-based government. Third, Islamic populism emphasizes 
107  Azyumardi Azra, “Populisme, Politik Identitas, dan Demokrasi Indonesia, Pengantar Ahli, dalm 
Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Populisme Politik Identitas & Dinamika Elektoral , xiii-xviii. 
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the aspect of strengthening identity based on the symbol of reli-
giosity108.
For almost 20 years, Indonesia entered the era of democracy, 
public trust in the course of democracy has slackened along with 
institutional and procedural practices which gave birth to a new 
oligarchy. The power of this oligarchy can be read from, for ex-
ample, a number of data that shows that the control of assets by 
the 40 richest people in Indonesia exceeds 580,000 times greater 
than income per capita. This figure clearly shows the large imbal-
ance between a small handful of the rich economic and political 
elites (oligarchs) who are both wealthy and in power at the same 
time with mostly poor people. This kind of socio-economic in-
equality provides a gap for the emergence of identity-based 
populism in identity politics as demonstrated by the 212th move-
ment109.
On the other side, aspirations from the grass roots are often 
choked up and held hostage because regeneration and political 
communication are not going well. These conditions have also 
contributed to the public’s disappointment with democracy which 
has demanded that they look for alternative gaps in building 
representation of power at the elite level. In this context, acts of 
populism in Islam, offer an alternative way with a kind of roman-
ticization back to the meaning of the people as demos, the 
holder of the highest power over the institution of trias politica110.
In European countries, for example, the emergence of right 
populism and its success in fighting for public sympathy and ac-
108  Vedi R. Hadiz, Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2016, 4.
109  Otto Gusti Madung, “Populisme, Krisis Demokrasi dan Antagonisme”, Jurnal Ledalero, Vol. 17, 
No. 7, June 2018, 58-78.
110  Wasito Raharjo Jati, “Trajektori Populisme Islam di Kalangan Kelas Menengah Muslim Indo-
nesia”, Prisma, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2017, 19-27.
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cess to power at the same time, cannot be separated from critical 
liberal democracy which fails to create prosperity and justice for 
all citizens without exception. The anti-immigration syntax men-
tioned by populist politicians as the root of economic injustice 
and inequality also overlaps with the socio-economic situation in 
these countries. Likewise, political narratives campaigned by 
right-wing political elites in criticizing the country’s liberal poli-
cies (such as abortion, prostitution, and LGBT), as well as their 
promises to bring Europe and America back to economic pros-
perity, proved to be successful in attracting public support and in 
the end can deliver them to win the contestation of power.
Likewise, in Indonesia, the clash between Islamists and lib-
eral, pluralist and pro-democracy groups has been going on for a 
long time. In the Monas tragedy, for example, an Islamist group 
driven by FPI clashed with a group in the name of diversity. What 
happened at the 212 action could also be understood as the peak 
of the accumulation of tension between the two groups. Consis-
tently, Islamist groups continue to wage war against liberals who 
often speak out for freedom and protection of human rights for 
all groups including LGBT. In its fight with liberal groups, Is-
lamists often build alliances with other right groups including 
ultra-nationalists. Both of them want economic policies that are 
very protectionist and at the same time are at odds with the lib-
eral group111.
111  According to Timo Duile, between Islamism and ultra-nationalism have almost the same char-
acteristics, first, leadership has absolute authority, Islamists want Islamic government while ul-
tra-nationalists want the absolute obedience of citizens to authoritarian leadership, second, the 
destruction of enemies that are constructed in a conspiracy frameworks such as the PKI and 
LGBTIQ as the influence of the spread of liberalism, third, the importance of militarism, and 
fourth, based on identity politics, ultra-nationalists foster a high sense of patriotism and Is-
lamists rely on scripture verses about sacrifice to God such as the doctrine of jihad. Bima Satria 
Putra, “Fundamentalist and Ultra-Nationalist Global Awakening: Not the End of History”, 
Anarkhis.Org, 22 Feb 2017.
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Representative democratic dislocation is seen as playing an 
important role in encouraging the emergence of conservative 
Islamic populism. In Indonesia, the representation-based political 
crisis was caused by depoliticization, including a floating mass 
policy which was a legacy of the New Order authoritarian regime. 
On the other hand, the dominance of Chinese domestic capital-
ist business class which has limited entry into the political arena 
due to anti-Chinese narratives - along with anti-communism 
narratives - which are continuously reproduced, making political 
parties that do not have a strong capitalist class on ultimately it 
must depend and negotiate with Chinese entrepreneurs to form 
predatory alliances in electoral competition. These two things are 
what marked the occurrence of a representation crisis in Indone-
sia that continues to this day. In this condition, the path taken to 
gain votes in the electoral contestation is none other than money 
politics, political violence, thuggery and the politicization of nar-
row religious and regional sentiments112.
Another view says that the strengthening of Islamic populism 
in the context of democracy in Indonesia is a logical consequence 
of the absence of progressive political movements. Not limited to 
Indonesia, the weakness of progressive politics also occurs in 
various countries, especially Europe113. The weakening of this 
progressive force coincides with the consolidation of the left 
112  Read Vedi R. Hadiz, Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asia Perspec-
tive, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.
113  In Western European and Scandinavian countries, the leftist political project is not consolidated 
as a progressive movement in the era of neo-liberalism, mainly due to post-conflict conditions, 
namely when left political articulation builds consensus by moving to the center which directly 
perpetuates neo-liberal hegemony. This tendency arises in response to the bankruptcy of the 
welfare state due to the swelling of the non-productive middle class demographics and the 
strengthening of individualization and the growing role of the State in providing social security 
to citizens as a product of neo-liberalism. As the left parties move to the center, these parties 
have made neo-liberalism not an antagonism, but rather supported its agenda. Abdil Mughis 
Mudoffir et al., Islamic Populism, 48-59.
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forces in a fairly long period of history. In Europe this condition 
was born as a consequence of the hegemony of neoliberalism and 
the bankruptcy of the welfare state, whereas in post-colonial 
countries such as Indonesia, communist parties (symbols of left 
power) were generally repressed by vicious authoritarian regimes 
during the Cold War era. The mass slaughter of PKI sympathiz-
ers in Indonesia in 1965-1966 and the banning of these political 
parties during the New Order era, was a momentum that marked 
the end of leftist political traditions while providing a way for the 
consolidation of New Order State capitalism. In practice, the 
slaughter of the PKI was not only carried out by the military, but 
also civilians who used Islamic and nationalist-secular identities. 
Propaganda which placed communism as a threat to the state 
ideology (Pancasila) and at the same time a threat to religion, also 
contributed to mobilizing civilian groups in carrying out mas-
sacres of hundreds of thousands of people suspected of being PKI 
sympathizers114.
114  Vedi R. Hadiz, “The Left and Indonesia’s 1960s: The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting”, 
in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Vol. 7 (4), 2006, 554-569.
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4
Does Islamic Populism 
Cause Indonesia’s 
Democracy to Decline?
Experts’ discourses --both of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and Indonesianists-- of the relation between Islamic popu-
lism and democracy are interesting to criticize more thoroughly. 
A small number of experts argue that the rise of Islamic populism 
does not sufficiently implicate in declining democracy in Indo-
nesia. The remainder, which is the experts’ mainstream view, argue 
otherwise, that the strengthening Islamic populism promoted by 
the conservative-radical Islamist groups causes declining quality 
of democracy in Indonesia. Strengthening intolerance, polariza-
tion, delegitimation of democracy institution and regime, and the 
likes are a number of variables taken as the benchmark to assess 
the declining quality of democracy in Indonesia. This chapter will 
present the experts’ discourses in assessing the rise of Islamic 
populism actions related to democracy development in Indonesia 
after the New Order, particularly in Joko Widodo administration 
era. 
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A. Dynamics of Indonesia’s Democracy: 
      From Stagnancy to Regression? 
Twenty years after the reform 1998, the dynamics of Indone-
sia’s democracy development always attract and are highlighted 
by the experts. Generally, they argue that Indonesia’s democracy 
is still on track, particularly in comparison with Countries with 
a majority of Muslim population. When the Countries with a 
majority of Muslim population --such as Egypt, Turkey, Senegal, 
Pakistan and Nigeria-- return to authoritarianism, Indonesia is 
in the democracy corridor. In comparison with its neighboring 
Countries in South East Asia --such as Thailand, Philippines, 
Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia and Burma-- Indonesia’s democ-
racy condition is still better. Although it faces serious challenges 
like corruption, enforcement of rules of law, sectarianism, social 
gap and economic imbalance, Indonesia may still be stated as 
successful in organizing General Election freely and democrati-
cally1.
Although it displays more positive image than Countries with 
a majority of Muslim population in Central Asia or Countries in 
Southeast Asia, but critical valuations are also given by the experts 
related to the depth of Indonesia’s democracy for the 20 years 
after reform. Many analysts assume that in its initial period of 
reform (1999-2004), although Indonesia’s democracy is full of 
governmental instability and social conflicts with ethnicity, reli-
gion, race and inter-group relations resulting from weak State, 
but the quality is deemed relatively good. This is at least marked 
with the birth of various democracy institutions (such as political 
parties), direct General Election as a means of competition in 
struggle for power, etc. Even in the end of 2000s, Indonesia’s 
1 Jeremy Menchik, “Moderate Muslim and Democratic Breakdown in Indonesia”, Asian Studies 
Review, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2019, 1-18.
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democracy is consolidated and becomes the only democratic 
country with a majority of Muslim population and free political 
competition (liberal) in the world. Based on the report of the 
Freedom House (2009), almost all Countries with a majority of 
Muslim population score “Not Free” or “Partly Free”, but Indone-
sia and Mali are two Countries of exception. The two countries 
are classified as Muslim democratic countries with relatively high 
political freedom2.
Entering the next period (2005-2014), the quality of Indone-
sia’s democracy is deemed by the experts to be insufficiently im-
proving. Instead of smoothly landing towards consolidation phase 
in the transitional period, Indonesia’s democracy is at a stagnant 
position and even leads to regression. After developing in 1998, 
1999, and 2005, the Indonesia Democracy Index, particularly in 
terms of civil freedom and people’s political rights, is at stagnant 
position, at about 2 and 3. The Freedom House detects declining 
civil freedom, minority’s rights and accountability of public gov-
ernance, between 2006 and 20103. 
Examined further, the development of the Indonesia Democ-
racy Index (IDI) from 2009 to 2015 is dynamic instead of static. 
In the period, the development of Indonesia’s democracy tends to 
be fluctuating. The report of the Central Statistics Body (BPS), 
for example, shows that in 2009, IDI is 67.30 point, declining to 
63.17 point in 2010. IDI then rise to 65.48 in 2011, and return to 
62.63 point in 2012. In 2013, it slightly rises to 63.72 point and 
2  What makes Indonesia seem different is not only competitive election with regular change of 
power –which classifies Indonesia as democracy in minimalist term—but also competitive ideo-
logical environment which allows political parties in Indonesia to compete by campaigning 
freely, particularly between Islamic and non-Islamic parties. Thomas B. Pepinsky, R. William 
Liddle, Saiful Mujani, Kesalehan dan Pilihan Politik: Memahami Kebangkitan Islam-Politik dari 
Perspektif Indonesia, Prenadamedia Group, 2018, 14. 
3  Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s democratic stagnation: anti-reformis elites and resilient civil so-
ciety”, Democratization, 19 (2), 209-229.
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rises to 73.04 point in 2014, or increasing 9.32 points. We may 
state that the index in 2014 is the best in the next six years after 
20094. 
Increasing religious labeled violence committed by intolerant 
groups against minority groups such as Chinese, Christian, Ah-
madiyah, Shia and others is deemed as a variable which makes 
the quality of democracy not to get better. In addition, the atti-
tudes and behaviors of political elites who are chosen through 
politically democratic electoral mechanism also significantly 
contribute to creating democracy deconsolidation5. For example, 
Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s (SBY), the 6th President, too accom-
modative attitude towards intolerant groups encourages increas-
ing violence against civil rights (particularly minorities’ right). In 
many cases, SBY often makes policies which benefit Islamic 
conservative groups. For example, when MUI issue fatwa on 
groups suspected to be misguided in 2005 –first years of SBY 
administration— assaults on minority groups increase6. 
The experts’ attention to the Indonesia’s democracy develop-
ment is directed to the last five-year period (2014-2019). They 
generally deem that the trend of democracy development is re-
gressive instead of progressive. Instead of getting consolidated 
better, Indonesia’s democracy is even deconsolidated compared 
with that in the previous period. Democracy is at stagnant posi-
tion during Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s (SBY) administration, 
4  https://nasional.okezone.com/read/2015/08/13/337/1195643/indeks-demokrasi-indonesia-
2014-terbaik-sejak-2009
5  Edward Aspinall, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton, “Elite, Masses, 
and Democratic Decline in Indonesia”, Democratization, Routlegde, Taylor & Farncis Group, 
2019, 1-22.
6  More ironically, SBY only condemns that incident and describes it as horizontal clash between 
two antagonistic groups of society, instead of an assault in violation of law by the Islamist group 
on minority. A’an Suryana, “Discrepancy in State Practices”, 2017, 71-103; Marcus Mietzner & 
Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Expalining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia”, 1-19.
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but it is set back or regressive in Joko Widodo’s administration 
era7. In their terminology, Indonesia’s declining democracy is 
labeled as democratic deconsolidation, illiberal democracy, regressive 
democracy, and the likes. In the note of a number of survey insti-
tutions such as Polity IV Index and World Bank, Indonesia’s declin-
ing democracy takes place in some fields, including civil freedom, 
minority rights, public governance accountability, etc.8.
According to the experts, Indonesia’s democracy tradition in 
the last few decades has actually ended and led to democracy 
stagnancy period and even to the democratic initial regression. 
This regression has been listed in the global democracy index, in 
2018, for example, the Economist Intelligence Unit gives Indo-
nesia the highest declining rating in the Democracy Index from 
the 2006 score. With a score of 6.39 out of 10, Indonesia is mov-
ing downwards from the index category “defective democracy,” 
on the verge of crossing into the “hybrid regime” category9.
Sharp criticism of declining quality of Indonesia’s democracy 
is not only made by external experts (Indonesianists), the Indo-
nesian Muslim intellectuals, particularly those liberal-progres-
sive10 also have relatively the same opinion. According to them, 
7  Discourses of stagnancy and regression are the leading issue among the academic analysts writ-
ten in the second term of SBY administration. Read, for example, Edward Aspinall, “The Irony 
of Success”, Journal of Democracy, 2010, 21 (2), 20-34; Greg Fealy, “Indonesian Politics in 2011: 
Democratic Regression and Yudhoyono’s Regal Incumbency”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 47 (3), 2011, 333-53; Dirk Tomsa, “Electoral Democracy in a Devided Society: The 2008 
Gubernatorial Election in Maluku, Indonesia”, South East Asia Research, 17 (2), 2009, 229-259; 
Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner and Dick Tomsa, eds.,  The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s 
Decade of Stability and Stagnation, Singapore: ISEAS, 2015.
8  Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s democratic stagnation: anti-reformist elites and resilient civil so-
ciety”, Democratization, 19 (2), 209-229.
9  Edward Aspinall, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton, “Elite, Masses, 
and Democratic Decline in Indonesia”, Democratization, Routlegde, Taylor & Farncis Group, 
2019, 1-22.
10  In general, ulama or Muslim intellectuals are divided into two groups, namely: liberal intellectu-
als or ulama, that produce variant of liberal Islam and Islamist intellectuals/ulama, that produce 
Islamism. The difference between the two, one of which, may be observed from the two groups’ 
view of the relation between religion (Islam) and the Nation. The first group views Islam and the 
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that Joko Widodo (reformist power representation) wins the 
competition against Prabowo Subianto (oligarchic representa-
tion) in Presidential Election 2014 is expected to give high op-
portunity for democracy consolidation process. The full support 
of most agents of progressive civil society, including human rights 
and democracy activists, in winning the power contestation is, 
partially, based on reformist interest. However, Jokowi is in fact 
unable to completely realize the reform agenda. In the note of 
human rights and democracy activists, Jokowi’s low attention to 
big cases of human rights violation (cases of Munir, victims of 
blooded tragedy of G 30 S PKI, and the likes) is an example of 
Jokowi administration’s failure in guiding and completing reform 
agenda11.
The result of Presidential Election 2019 that once again as-
signs Jokowi as the President (and Ma’ruf Amin as Vice Presi-
dent) does not give much expectation for improvement of de-
mocracy quality. In the experts’ opinion, Jokowi in the second 
period shows populist and authoritarian governmental characters. 
On one hand, Jokowi remains concerned about carrying popular 
programs like Jamkesmas, but on the other hand, he also restric-
tively treats groups which confront his administration. For ex-
ample, Jokowi’s policy in response to his political rivals (on one 
hand, accommodative by embracing some of his political rivals 
such as Prabowo Subianto and, on the other hand, repressive by 
striking some of his political rivals, such as HTI and FPI), ignor-
ing public aspiration that rejects Law which weakens KPK, and 
others, are a number of cases which represent authoritarian lead-
nation not as an integral part, while the second group tends to understand the two groups (Islam 
and the Nation) as an integral part. Baca Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 54-61.
11  Usman Hamid, Moch. Nur Ichwan, July 24, 2019.
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ership12. Marcus Mietzner describes the approach taken by Jokowi 
with a term “fighting illiberalism with illiberalism”13. It is because 
of his illiberal political choice that Thomas Power labels him as 
Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn, which significantly causes Indonesia’s 
democracy regression14.  
In the experts’ opinion, Jokowi’s unsuccessful attempt (also 
previous presidents) in improving the quality of Indonesia’s de-
mocracy after the New Order is caused more by oligarchic elites’ 
dominant influence on his governmental structure. Quoting Vedi 
R. Hadiz’s opinion, democracy institutions infiltration by oligar-
chic elites from the New Order is the main variable and the most 
important to inhibit the transitional process15 towards democ-
racy consolidation16. In his opinion, the state power’s institu-
tional framework after the New Order may have changed, but the 
relation of powers that support it still persist in new institu-
tional context. In this case, the concerned power relation is that 
attached to a kind of predatory capitalism17.   
The trace of declining quality of Indonesia’s democracy is also 
illustrated in BPS report of IDI in the period 2015 onwards. 
Civil rights or freedom remain the aspect to cause declining index 
rating annually. For example, the index rating declines from 73.04 
12  Thomas Power, 8 Sept 2019; Edwards Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner, Sept 12, 2019.
13  Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism”, 261–282.
14  Thomas P. Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline”, 307-338. 
15  At least, the transitional process may be stated as complete if it has produced (1) mutually agreed 
rule and (2) new authoritative government through open, honest and fair election. Juan J. Linz & 
Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Shoutern Europe, South Amer-
ica, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3.
16  Democratic consolidation certainly needs long time and requires the prerequisites: (1) free civil 
society, (2) relatively autonomous political society, (3) law which protects people’s freedom, (4) 
effective government, and (5) economic society. Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Problems of Dem-
ocratic Transition and Consolidation: Shoutern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,. 7-15.
17  Vedi R. Hadiz, Dinamika Kekuasaan Ekonomi Politik Indonesia Pasca Soeharto, Jakarta: LP3ES, 
2005, xxv; 253. Michele Ford and Thomas Pepinsky, eds. Beyond Oligarchy: Wealth, Power, and 
Contemporary Indonesian Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
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point in 2014 to 72.04 point in 2015.18 The development of IDI 
in 2017 is 72.11 point, slightly increasing from previous year 
(70.09 point). In 2018, the index rating is 72.39 (medium = 60-
80), slightly increasing from 2017 (71.11 point). However, the 
freedom of speech variable declines. The index decline (2014-
2015) is influenced by civil freedom aspect, declining 2.32 points 
(from 82.62 to 80.30) and democracy institutions aspect, declin-
ing 8.94 points from 75.81 to 66.87 point. Similarly, the index 
decline from 2017-2018 is influenced by declining civil freedom 
aspect of 0.29 points from 78.75 to 78.46, declining political 
rights aspect of 0.84 points from 66.63 to 65.7919.
In general, the civil freedom aspects often get serious attention 
and used by the experts as the main benchmark in assessment of 
declining quality of democracy. In their opinion, the development 
of Indonesia’s democracy leads to formation of illiberal democ-
racy format. In many cases, the practice of democracy displays its 
contradictive side with liberalism as the basic values to support 
it; political attitude and behavior which highly respect individu-
al freedom. Non-declining violence against minority groups (such 
as Christian, Ahmadiyah, Shia, LGBT) in Jokowi administration 
era is a concrete example of illiberal democracy practice. Once 
again, this problem is deemed to significantly contribute to lead-
ing to current declining quality of Indonesia’s democracy20. 
In addition, the trend of declining democracy index –which 
is the world phenomena, not only the case of Indonesia21— is not 
18  https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/2568262/indeks-demokrasi-indonesia-2015-turun-ini-
penyebabnya
19  Read complete article “BPS: Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia Tahun 2018 Masih di Level Se-
dang”, https://tirto.id/efeU
20  Interview with Greg Fealy, Sept 9, 2019; Thomas Power, 8 Sept 2019; Edwards Aspinall & 
Marcus Mietzner, Sept 12, 2019.
21  The world is experiencing democratic regression. After what is called the “third wave” of democ-
ratization from mid 1970s and its culmination in the beginning of the twenty first century, the 
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only caused by extra-systemic actors (like military and rebels) 
whose political attitudes and behaviors are often contradictory to 
democracy principles. Political elites who are chosen democrati-
cally are the main actors who significantly contribute to democ-
racy violation. Some Countries such as Hungary, Russia, Turkey, 
and, of course, Indonesia are prominent examples, of which lead-
ers are responsible to democracy erosion. In the Countries, poli-
ticians and populist-authoritarian parties gain people’s strong 
moral support22.
Although experts’ opinions differ, but they generally acknowl-
edge that Indonesia’s democracy after the New Order (particu-
larly period 2014-2019) is still relatively competitive, especially 
from the perspective of its direct General Election system. 
Through this system, however, the people my directly participate 
in determining the administrative leader and representatives at 
the parliament. It is also through this system that the political 
parties may freely compete in winning power contestation. As 
acknowledged by Allain Norrin, General Election in Indonesia 
is still relatively competitive as a means to choose leader or regime 
of democracy. However, we should also acknowledge that the 
space of Indonesia’s democracy gets narrower23.
B. Islamic Populism’s Contribution to Democracy
The declining quality of Indonesia’s democracy in the period 
2014-2019 is related to many factors, one of which is the presence 
of Islamic populism. According to the experts, the emergence of 
international index has traced consecutive decline in the amount of democracy, and in aggregate 
value of global democracy. Edward Aspinall, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve 
Warburton, “Elite, Masses, and Democratic Decline in Indonesia”, 1-22.
22  Edward Aspinall, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton, “Elite, Masses, 
and Democratic Decline in Indonesia”, 1-22.
23  Edward Aspinall, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton, “Elite, Masses, 
and Democratic Decline in Indonesia”, 1-22.
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a series of mass mobilization actions promoted by Islamist groups 
significantly contributes to leading not to deepening, but shallow 
democracy instead. There are a number of reasons presented by 
the experts in assessing logical correlation between the emergence 
of Islamic populism and declining democracy.
1. Not legitimatize Democracy
To what extent may democracy in a Country be consolidated? 
Of course, it depends on many things, one of which is whether 
or not the citizens’ behaviors are democratic. People’s acts may be 
stated as democratic when they conform to the values, norms and 
principles of democracy. At the same time, such acts may 
strengthen legitimacy (values, norms and institution) of democ-
racy24. In this case, Adam Przeworski states:
Democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic 
conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in 
town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic 
institutions; when all losers (in general election) want to do is to try 
again (re-participation) within the same institutions under which they 
have lost. Democracy is consolidated when it becomes a system which 
may confirm itself, that when all relevant political strengths find that 
continuously submitting (the future of ) their interest and values to 
uncertain inter-institutions relation remains the best choice25.
The question is whether the Islamic populism actions by the 
Islamist groups are a form of democratic actions and citizen’s 
political participation which lead to strengthening democracy 
legitimacy? Almost all experts argue that the Islamist groups 
involved in the defending Islam action and other various populist 
24 Democracy legitimacy is public acceptance of democracy as a governmental system desired by 
majority of the population in a political community. Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 222.
25 Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 222.
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actions are not of democratic group or –borrowing Hefner’s 
opinion— civil Islam of which political struggle is oriented more 
to Islamization instead of democratization. HTI, for example, is 
an Islamic trans-nationalist group that strongly opposes the 
democratic political system that it considers as toghut and its 
concern to struggle for khilafah agenda26. In this context, strug-
gling for khilafah agenda is clearly contradictory to strengthening 
state-nation, which is a prerequisite of democracy consolidation27.
Similarly, FPI, FUI, Wahdah Islamiyah (WI), and other pro-
ponents of Islamic populism under GNPF-MUI are variants of 
conservative-radical Islamism of which struggle does not conform 
to reform and democratic agenda. Although these groups’ reli-
gious ideologies are not exactly the same with that of HTI, but 
in practice, they also express enforcement of Islamic principles in 
social and political life. The NKRI bersyari’ah expressed by FPI 
for Indonesia’s future development explains how this Islamic 
paramilitary organization legitimatizes (formalize) Islam more 
than democracy. Indeed, FPI accepts the state-nation concept, 
but its acceptance is under sharia interpretation28. In this case, 
FPI is very concerned about making Indonesian nationalism 
more Islamic, or known in Menchik’s term as Godly nationalism29.
In addition, the popular mobilization actions by the propo-
nents of Islamic populism cannot be understood as a form of 
democratic political action or, more exactly, participation30. It is 
26  Interview with Thomas Power, Sept 8, 2019
27  Interview with M. Amin Abdullah, July 26, 2019. Some literatures also explain that the support 
of State-nation is important for governmental consolidation of any kind, particularly democracy. 
Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 27.
28  Interview with Sunarwoto, July 26, 2019
29  Jeremy Menchik, “Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia”, Comporative Stud-
ies in Society and History, Volume 56, Number 3, (2014): 591-621.
30  Political participation is the central concept in democracy. Even public participation becomes –
to borrow Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s term—the heart of democracy. It is unimaginable that 
democracy is without members of society’s capability to participate freely in governmental pro-
cess. Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 25.
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said so, since their mass mobilization does not intend to influence 
decision/polity making or give constructive input and criticism 
to the government. Their insistence on imprisoning Ahok who is 
justified as committing blasphemy is clearly not part of reform 
and democratic agenda. On the contrary, what they struggle for 
(like in Ahok case) reflects an act which is called by the Indone-
sianists as illiberal31.
The populism activism launched by the Islamists cannot be 
understood as a form of critical-democratic attitude towards the 
government. Their criticisms such as blasphemer, infidel, foreign, 
aseng and communist addressed to Ahok, Jokowi and those 
deemed in line with them are clearly not a form of substantive 
criticism of the ruler. However, the governmental practices con-
ducted by leaders like Ahok and Jokowi, however good they are, 
must have weaknesses which need to be criticized. However, when 
criticism is not supported by authentic data, or even based on 
hoaxes, it will not constructively and democratically lead to trans-
parent, credible and accountable governance, or known as good 
governance. Hairus Salim states:   
The 212 people are also insolent, they do not criticize substantially, 
only stating that Jokowi a son of PKI, Chinese, and so on. What I 
meant is, what if he is a descendant of Chinese and PKI? It is not him 
who is PKI. In my opinion, the two (PKI and Chinese) are incorrect, 
he does not speak English and so on, they are not substantial to me32.
Many experts argue that the main agenda behind the popular 
activism is not Islamization. The religious issues are used as a 
political strategy of the Islamic populists in struggle for power. 
31  Greg Fealy, Sept 9, 2019, Thomas Power, Sept 8, 2019; Edwards Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner, 
Sept 12, 2019.
32  Interview, July 23, 2019 
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In other words, this popular activism capitalizes religion for the 
purpose of political practice, contestation for power. As com-
monly known, some of the actors of Islamic populist actions, such 
as FPI, have ever been and are continuously involved in power 
contestation in Head of Region Election of DKI Jakarta. It is 
coincident that the candidates they support are defeated in 
power contestation. When the opportunity comes, these groups 
reappear with new packaging (popular mobilization) to make 
their candidates win.
Similarly, in power constellation at national level (Presidential 
Election 2019), they are practically involved in making their can-
didates win, even with non-constitutional methods. The popular 
mobilization actions they launch are not limited to influencing 
public opinion, but also –if possible— to change the ruler non-
constitutionally. Large-scale demonstration (known as mobocracy) 
is not a constitutional means to convey political aspiration. It is 
correct that they are once hurt for their political defeat in support-
ing their candidates in Presidential Election 2014 and are involved 
once again in power contestation through a democratic mecha-
nism (regular General Election). However, at the same time, they 
also use mass power to suppress and, if possible, overthrow the 
ruler through their extra-parliamentary actions. In this case, the 
Islamic populism actors show ambiguous and even contradictive 
attitudes that, on one hand, they are involved in regular political 
participation (in support of democratic consolidation), but on the 
other hand, they commit political actions beyond the democratic 
rule corridor (democracy deconsolidation)33.     
33  Civic engagement in political engagement such as in regular General Election is one important 
factor for democratic consolidation. Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 27.
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2. Serve Oligarchy’s Interest More
One problem in democracy consolidation is oligarchic domi-
nation in Indonesia’s political system after the New Order. The 
economic-political power which –according to Vedi R. Hadiz-- is 
the legacy of the New Order regime is evidently not only able to 
adapt, but also survive in dominating the new power structure 
after the New Order. Not only at national level, the oligarchic 
elites have also successfully instilled their domination in local 
power domain, especially after decentralization. The success of 
oligarchic elites, both new and old, in various power stages, both 
at regional and central levels, cannot be separated from the long 
established patronage network of economic-political regime. The 
oligarchic elites’ capability to infiltrate the democratic political 
institutions forces other groups involved in political contestation, 
whether willing or not, to negotiate with the dominant regime34.
Differently from the New Order era where oligarchic powers 
are centralized around Cendana family and its cronies, oligarchy 
after the New Order era is decentralized, as marked with forma-
tion of new factions which always compete in fight over natural 
resources and state power. In this intra-oligarchic contestation 
climate, the presence of Islamic populism –social-political actions 
that use conservative morality calls— promoted by (Islamic) re-
ligious elites is clearly not the competitor of oligarchic domina-
tion, both inside and outside power circle. Instead of competing 
with oligarchic domination that has infiltrated democracy, their 
presence is even driven by economic-political regime which is 
ambitious whether to fight over or maintain the power. Many 
assume that the Islamic populism is merely a Trojan horse for 
34  Vedi R. Hadiz, “Indonesian Politics in 2017. Indonesias Year of Democratic Setback: Towards a 
New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 53, No. 3, 
2017, p. 261.
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oligarchic-predatory parties in their political track record which 
is always oriented to fighting over natural resources and State 
power35.
The thorough involvement of oligarchic faction in Islamic 
populism actions may also be observed from the economic-po-
litical regime’s support, both morally and financially, in mass 
mobilization actions. Although it is difficult to prove, but populist 
actions which involve a considerable number of people (150-750 
thousand people) will be difficultly realized without a big funding, 
one of which is believed to come from oligarchic elites36. It is 
undeniable that most of the mass of Muslims enthusiastically and 
voluntarily participate in the defending religion actions. It is also 
undeniable that many non-mainstream religious groups and or-
ganizations support them with drinks, foods, vehicles and various 
supplies for the demonstration. Martin Slama states:
“……….such a mass demonstration of that quantity will be impractical 
without any funder. I don’t know who the funder is. It needs a thorough 
research to reveal it. However, I believe that there will be funder in each 
of such big mass actions ……”37. 
The aligning of Islamic conservative-radical moralist agents 
with ultra-nationalist agents from oligarchic faction outside rul-
ing elites, both in the cases of Head of Region Election of DKI 
Jakarta 2017 and Presidential Election 2019, affirms that Is-
lamic populism actions are not intended to struggle for demo-
cratic agenda. For the Islamists, their involvement in the mass 
mobilization actions is related to pragmatic and ideological 
35  Vedi R. Hadiz, Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2016.
36  Interview with Thomas Power, Sept 8, 2019 and Liam Gammon, Sept 11, 2019.
37  Interview with Martin Slama, July 21, 2019.
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purposes. The pragmatic purpose, the Islamist groups alienated 
in Ahok and Jokowi administrations era will be accommodated 
again in the power just like in SBY era38. The ideological purpose, 
many proponents of the Islamic populism actions desire the ap-
plication of sharia principles and demand to realize public life to 
be more accommodative to Islamic norms and teaching39.
Meanwhile, for the oligarchic ultra-nationalists, their purpose 
to join or, more correctly, get involved in driving the popular 
mobilization is not other than fighting over the access to natural 
resources and State power which since 2014 is under control of 
the status quo. Besides getting involved in Islamic populism ac-
tions, this oligarchic faction also intensely launches similar right 
populism actions. In their populism actions, the ultra-nationalist 
generals frequently narrate NKRI harga mati and cultivation of 
Pancasila ideology. With such narrations, the ultra-nationalists 
oligarchs deem Indonesia as a closed community which must be 
protected from any foreign influences, such as socialism, com-
munism, liberalism, capitalism and others. Prabowo Subianto, for 
example, in his many populist political speeches and campaigns 
emphasize Indonesia’s natural wealth leakage because of looting 
by foreign and aseng (Chine) parties40.
Such sectarianism narrations are not only narrated by ultra-
nationalist factions outside the power circle, but also inside state 
power circle, as may be observed from the statement of Minister 
of Defense, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, of the danger of mate-
rialistic ideologies of liberalism, communism, socialism and reli-
38  Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, “Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in 
Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Group, and the Politics of Accommodation”, Asian 
Studies Review, 2018
39  Greg Fealy, “Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally”, Indonesia At Mel-
bourne, December 12, 2016.
40  Marcus Mietzner, “Reinventing Asian Populism”, 2015.
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gious radicalism. This three, without any clear distinctive explana-
tion, are deemed foreign ideologies which are contradictory to 
Pancasila and, therefore, must be rejected. At the same time, the 
ultra-nationalist faction also continuously narrates fight against 
any kind of fundamentalism, radicalism and extremism in the 
name of religion. On the other hand, however, this faction also 
frequently cooperates with religious conservative-radical agents 
in the name of religious moral purity to discriminate and perse-
cute minority groups such as LGBT, Chinese, Christian, Ah-
madiyah, Shia and others.
However, the two right populism groups (Islamists and ultra-
nationalists) provide exceptional cultural resources taken as the 
basis of ideological legitimacy for oligarchic elites in competition. 
More surprisingly, secular parties such as PDI-P and Golkar also 
frequently play religious narrations and, at local level, politicians 
of the two parties frequently support regional sharia regulations41. 
Marcus Mietzner, in some occasions of PDI-P congress, does not 
deny it. PDI-P which is nota bene not a religious-based party 
often supports enforcement of regional sharia regulations42. In 
this context, it is not surprising that there is a view that the pres-
ence of right populism only serves oligarchs and weakens civil 
society’s opposition and criticism in attempt to realize more in-
clusive Indonesia’s democracy and social justice43.
That the right populism practices conducted by religious 
conservative-radical groups or ultra-nationalist groups are not 
subject to sanction is contra-productive to the substance of 
democratic values. In the concept of liberal democracy, it is im-
41  Michael Buechier, The Politics of Shari’a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing 
Indonesia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
42  Interview with Marcus Mietzner, Sept 12, 2019.
43  Otto Gusti Madung, “Populisme, Krisis Demokrasi dan Antagonisme”, Jurnal Ledalero, Vol. 17, 
No. 7, June 2018, 58-78.
M .  K H U S N A  A M A L  |  DA M A N H U R I  |  I K S A N  K A M I L  S A H R I
1 3 0
possible to build democracy without acknowledging liberalism 
(individual rights). Similarly, in the conception of socialism de-
mocracy, it is difficult to enforce democracy without considering 
public justice. Without these two principles (acknowledgement 
of liberalism and socialism), democracy will only create Tyranny 
of the majority and social gap between the rich and the poor. Even 
in Pancasila democracy, the liberal (humanity) and socialism 
(social justice) principles are upheld44.
3. Intolerant to Minority Groups
Tolerance is not identical to democracy, but tolerance is be-
lieved to be an important factor to make democracy work45. 
However, democracy will work well if the community has certain 
culture, which is citizens and political elites’ acceptance of prin-
ciples on which freedom of speech, association, religion, and the 
likes are based. Such freedoms will be guaranteed if the citizens 
are tolerant to different beliefs followed by other citizens and any 
purposes to be achieved by other citizens. In democracy, every 
citizen must normatively have the same opportunity to achieve 
their respective purpose pursuant to their social, cultural and 
economic-political purpose backgrounds. However, differences 
will be problematic if there is no tolerance46.
Democracy is built on the fact that there is conflict of interest 
between citizens. The fact of the presence of difference is a source 
of conflict in the society. In a democracy system, difference which 
leads to conflict must be eliminated. Peaceful management of 
difference and conflict of interest is a choice deemed to be 
44  Otto Gusti Madung, “Populisme, Krisis Demokrasi dan Antagonisme”, 58-78.
45  John L Sullivan, James Piereson, and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democ-
racy, Chicago: University of Chcago Press, 1982, 5-6.
46  Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 153-154.
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democratic. This arrangement requires every citizen to be tolerant 
to any difference and agreement or disagreement. A citizen may 
dislike or hate others, as long as such attitude does not prevent 
others. For example, it is alright when a Muslim hates a Christian, 
but he will be deemed intolerant when he prevents the Christian 
from performing his religious activities, becoming neighbor, be-
coming governmental official, and others47.
In the context of Islamic populism actions, almost all experts 
agree that the popular mobilization launched by the Islamist 
groups do not reflect tolerant attitudes, behaviors and values. In 
Ahok case, for example, the proponents of the defending Islam 
action that demand Ahok imprisonment on the reason of “blas-
phemy” do not only represent their theological hatred –claiming 
to represent Muslims-- towards an individual deemed to commit 
blasphemy. Moreover, the masses actualize their theological po-
litical hatred in a non-democratic way by suppressing the govern-
ment to sanction Ahok, demanding the government to disqual-
ify Ahok from his candidacy of governor of DKI Jakarta, and 
attempting to prevent Ahok from reassuming the governmental 
position (governor), and others48. 
However, the intolerant actions of the proponents of the de-
fending Islam action have led to violence. Production of hate 
speech and hoaxes (by labeling Ahok as blasphemer, ulama in-
sulter, infidel, Chinese, Christian and others), provoking the so-
ciety not to choose Ahok in Head of Region Election, and dis-
crediting Muslims who support Ahok by not praying for them 
when they die, are real forms of intolerant acts as well as violence. 
Many experts assume that the anti-Ahok campaign which in-
47  Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 153-154.
48  Interview with M. Amin Abdullah, July 26, 2019; Moch. Nur Ichwan, July 24, 2019; and Greg 
Fealy, Sept 9, 2019.
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volves hate speech and act is the most brutal intolerant action in 
the history of Indonesia, particularly after the New Order49.
Similarly, in the case of Presidential Election 2019, various 
popular mobilization actions by the Islamist groups are laden with 
intolerant attitudes and behaviors. Reproduction of sectarianism 
discourse like Jokowi the protector of blasphemer, despot (criminal-
ize ulama), part of foreign and aseng parties, son of communist, and 
the likes, is only a few of the intolerant actions by the Islamist 
groups. Practically, these groups also often commit violent acts in 
demonstrations in rejecting the result of Presidential Election 2019.
In the experts’ opinion, the mass mobilization actions by the 
proponents of Islamic populism, both in anti-Ahok and anti-
Jokowi cases, significantly contribute to weakening Indonesia’s 
democracy50. The argumentation is that such intolerant actions 
are clearly contradictory to the democratic principles, particu-
larly tolerance to differences in citizen’s ethnicity, religion and 
political interest. The absence of tolerance has made minority 
groups like Ahok unable to compete fairly in a democratic po-
litical system. This fact affirms that the development of minority’s 
rights and civil freedom –as the variable of democracy-- in Indo-
nesia after the New Order remains stagnant and is even regress-
ing. Intolerant attitudes and actions are one of its main factors51.
In fact, intolerance itself does not influence declining democ-
racy when the intolerant actors are not active in politics. The elite 
theory of democracy explains that intolerant citizens are not a 
threat to democracy as long as they are apathetic or absent from 
49  Interview with Hairus Salim, July 23, 2019; Edward Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner, Sept 12, 
2019.
50  Jeremy Menchik, “Moderate Muslims and Democratic Breakdown in Indonesia”, Asian Stuides 
Reviw, 2019, 1-18. 
51  Interview with Muhammad Wildan, July 26, 2019; Hairus Salim, July 23, 2019; Greg Fealy, Sept 
9, 2019; and Thomas power, Sept 8, 2019.
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politics. This theory also explains that even if the masses are in-
tolerant and at the same time the political elites are tolerant, the 
stability of democracy may still be maintained, since the elites are 
the ones to determine political policies52. In the case of Islamic 
populism actions in Indonesia, intolerance is not only strengthen-
ing among the masses (people) –or, in van Bruinessen’s term, is 
conservative turn—, but it also occurs to the religious and po-
litical elites. Among the political elites, for example, ultra-nation-
alism is strengthening. Conflicts at the level of political or oligar-
chic elites are suspected to be the main cause of emerging 
intolerant mass mobilization actions, like that in the defending 
Islam action, in support of political elites in fight53.
4. Not Competitor to Regime in Power
Populism emerges in response to weaknesses in the electoral 
or representative democracy held formalistically, legalistically and 
procedurally. In its process, electoral democracy indeed gives the 
people opportunity to get involved in election process, both leg-
islative and executive. However, in practice, public participation 
in the electoral process of representative and governmental 
leader is not entirely held based on their rational aspiration and 
choice. Money political intervention still dominates political 
electoral processes at all levels from Head of Region Election and 
Legislative Election to Presidential Election. Therefore, it is not 
surprising if the people’s representatives and executive leaders 
produced by electoral democracy are not popular. In many criti-
cisms, electoral democracy has produced legislative and executive 
leaders dominated by oligarchic groups54.
52  Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 156.
53  Vedi R. Hadiz, Populisme Islam di Indonesia dan Timur Tengah, Jakarta: LP3ES, 2018.
54  Vedi R. Hadiz, “Indonesian Politics in 2017”, 261.
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Although money politics are still dominant in political process 
in Indonesia, it does not mean that public participation in deter-
mining their leaders is entirely based on it. It does not mean that 
there is no public participation which is based on rational awareness 
and choice in democratic electoral political process at all. In the 
case of Presidential Election 2014, and probably also Head of 
Region Election in many regions, Jokowi’s victory in the power 
contestation is because of, one of its crucial factors is, popular popu-
lism narrations as well as support from reformist civil society ele-
ments for him. Similarly, in the second period, although the pro-
democracy and reform groups start to be divided, but many of these 
groups still consistently support Jokowi in contestation against 
Pra bo wo Subianto, that is fully supported by right populism 
power55.
Substantively, the electoral democracy practice in Indonesia still 
displays paradox dimensions. Besides leadership electoral process 
with intervention of oligarchic elites’ power, the governmental 
practice cannot also be separated from the hand of such elite 
power. Although Jokowi successfully wins the power competition 
with his populism agenda, but when he has occupied the presiden-
tial position, it is not easy for him to realize his reformist-demo-
cratic populism agenda. The existence of non-democratic powers 
which are mostly from oligarchic elites in his power is suspected 
by the experts to be a serious constraint for Jokowi to implement 
his reformist policies. For example, there is no progress of severe 
cases of human rights such as 1965 tragedy, activists kidnapping 
during 1998 reform, Munir murder case, and the likes, since there 
55  Interview with Paul Kenny, Sept 11, 2019 and Edward Aspinall & Marcuz Mietzner, Sept 12, 
2019.
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are expectedly elites involved in the severe cases of human rights 
around Jokowi56. 
The paradox of electoral democracy does not emerge only in 
Jokowi era. The government also faces almost the same problem 
in previous periods. The state or government itself is filled with 
political parties of which democratic spirit is not always above 
the individual or sectoral spirit. The balance between governmen-
tal or state agents that are responsive and irresponsive to public 
interest is always disturbed. This occurs since Abdurrahman 
Wahid (Gus Dur) administration, that is overthrown resulting 
from the bullog gate scandal issue. In SBY administration, the 
government seems to be far more stable and normal, but is con-
trolled by oligarchic parties. The effort to realize the balance is 
also made by Jokowi. In his early administration, Jokowi’s actions 
seem to bring good results. However, over time, the political par-
ties and oligarchic elites’ domination makes the movement to 
seem less progressive57.
According to the experts, such electoral democratic crisis also 
contributes to encouraging emergence of populism. This anti-
establishment movement gets spreading when the relational gap 
between the government (governing society) and the public (non-
governing society) gets wider. In fact, there is substantial demo-
cratic spirit carried by populism as a curative and corrective action 
for electoral democracy, which is mostly dominated by oligarchic 
power. When responded positively, populism may also be deemed 
as a constructive criticism and even become vitamin for the gov-
ernment to correct its governmental system pursuant to the 
democratic corridor. In this context, populism may be deemed as 
56  Moch. Nur Ichwan, July 24, 2019 and Usman Hamid
57  Interview with Muhammad AS Hikam, Sept 31, 2019.
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the mirror of democracy which observes the other side as an 
objection of alienation and discrimination58. 
May Islamic populism actions be deemed to be a civil society 
movement which positively contributes to power check and bal-
ance in order not to be dominated by oligarchic power or status 
quo? Almost all experts argue that the mass mobilization actions 
by the Islamist agents do not represent civil society movement at 
all, of which struggle agenda is oriented to democratic social-
political change. Instead of pursuing change and democratization 
agenda, the Islamic populism actions are more oriented to prag-
matic (power struggle) and ideological (enforcement of sharia) 
interests59. As a political strategy to struggle for power, these Is-
lamic populism actions are clearly contra-productive to the 
democratic values and norms, which emphasize fair methods 
pursuant to rule of law in power contestation.
What is performed by the Islamic populism agents like FPI 
is also far from the civil society spirit in the definition of group, 
association, civic organization, which is known as Non-Govern-
ment/State Organizations (NGOs) which uses civil or civilized 
methods in their social movement. As non-government organiza-
tions, the groups which consolidate into the 212 movement and 
the likes may indeed be categorized as civil society. However, from 
the perspective of the methods they use and their struggle orien-
tation, what is performed by the proponents of Islamic populism 
is far from the civil society category. As commonly known, the 
Islamic populism agents tend to choose non-civilized methods, 
58  Wasisto Raharjo Jati, “Trajektori Populisme Islam di Kalangan Kelas Menengah Muslim Indo-
nesia”, Prisma, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2017. 19-27.
59  In this context, Islamic populism develops towards Islamic revitalization in public space and 
Islamic capitalization in social space. Islamic revitalization based populism carries disappoint-
ment to formal political practice which is dominated more by new elites. Unclear ideology plus 
declining role of Islamic based political parties makes such political sentiment gets stronger, 
bigger and wider. Wasisto Raharjo Jati, “Trajektori Populisme Islam”, 19-27. 
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such as using sectarianism, racism, and hoaxes issues in effort to 
realize their political agenda60.
Meanwhile, from the perspective of struggle agenda, the Is-
lamic populism actions are not oriented to change and democra-
tization at all; an agenda which is struggled for by civil society. 
As an association and organization that does not underbow State, 
civil society plays its function and role as communicator, facilita-
tor and catalyst which is able to mediate public interest and the 
government and also the market. In addition, civil society also 
frequently serves its role as control and even competitor to fight 
tyranny and arbitrariness of regime in power or the government. 
At the same time, civil society also plays an important role in 
strengthening civil norms in the society which emphasize toler-
ance, togetherness and participation in facing mutual problem61.
In democratic principle, the existence of civil society and also 
political society (parliamentary/DPR/MPR and government) 
may be stated as the main component of democracy. It is impor-
tant to note that political society must pay attention to and be 
controlled by civil society. The pattern of power relation between 
the two democratic elements will, in turn, ensure that democracy 
runs healthily and strongly. In this case, Muhammad AS Hikam 
affirms:
“healthy democracy requires balance between political society and civil 
society, thus the government will be able to run responsively to what the 
society or citizens desire. Whether citizen’s rights and obligations are 
fulfilled or get reduced and defeated by political parties, the government 
and parliament or otherwise. This is important to be ascertained”62. 
60  Interview with Muhammad AS Hikam, Sept 31, 2019.
61  Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 20.
62  Interview with Muhammad AS Hikam, Sept 31, 2019.
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From the perspective of character, function and role, we may 
state that the mass mobilization actions by the Islamic populism 
agents may be included into civil society category, but a corrupt 
civil society and even undemocratic civil society. In this case, 
Hikam states: 
FPI is a corrupt civil society, even undemocratic civil society. If a civil 
society serves as the backbone of democracy, then it is a democratic 
civil society. If otherwise, you will handover democracy to the groups of 
HTI, FPI, robbers, no way. You may hand it over to groups of civil 
society like media, professional groups, intellectuals, and others who 
also believe and uses democratic principles, including rule of law63.
More ironically, such corrupt groups of civil society grow 
rapidly in the period after the New Order. They are groups that 
use caliphate (HTI), Wahhabism, Salafism, and Jihadism ( Jema’at 
Islamiyah/JI, Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia/MMI), and Vigilan-
tism (FPI) identities. As undemocratic organizations of civil 
society, of course their populism actions do not constructively 
contribute to strengthening democracy at all. Instead of contrib-
uting to strengthening democracy, particularly in terms of check 
and balance, Islamic populism even reduces the dignity of de-
mocracy64 and emphasizes illiberal characteristics of Indonesia’s 
democracy after the New Order. Muhammas A.S. Hikam states
“……….what have HTI and FPI contributed to democracy? Even 
their words clearly oppose Pancasila, oppose democracy, and even 
63  Interview with Muhammad AS Hikam, Sept 31, 2019.
64  It is said to reduce the dignity of democracy since populism aims at cheating constitutional 
channel by negating various phases and procedures which should be passed through. This may 
become a bad precedence to the indicator of democratic achievement of a State with distrust in 
public institutions. Read Wasisto Raharjo Jati, “Trajektori Populisme Islam”, 19-27.
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manipulate the opportunity given by democracy. In my opinion, they 
are more evil than anything……..”65
5.  Deepening Polarization
In a plural society like Indonesia, the political aspiration of 
every citizen will certainly not be single, but plural and complex. 
In a democracy system, diversity and differences in social, cul-
tural, religious and political aspiration backgrounds may be un-
derstood as a certain reality. Normatively, diversity itself may be 
positioned as a social capital which plays an important role in 
confirming democracy. This diversity will really serve as a social 
capital when there is a mutual understanding (mutually under-
stand and even tolerate differences) among citizens. Mutual 
understanding may be built when citizens trust one another. In 
Putnam’s term, mutual trust between citizens (interpersonal trust) 
may be categorized into a vital social capital66.
One thing to note is that democracy may develop firmly in 
the society of which social interaction is very complex. Coopera-
tion and coordination in such a society will be almost impossible 
when it is based only on rational knowledge and calculation 
among society members individually. Mutual trust and helping 
each other solve any problem they face will be practical in case of 
collective cooperation, even if rational knowledge is insufficient. 
In this case, Inglehart states that mutual trust among citizens is 
a form of political culture and serves as a factor to determine 
democracy stability67. 
65  Interview with Muhammad AS Hikam, Sept 31, 2019.
66  Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy, Princenton: 
Princenton University Press, 1993, 170.
67  Ronald Inglehart, “Trust, Well-Being and Democracy”, Democracy and Trust, edited by Mark. E. 
Warren, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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The populism actions, like the 212 action in the context of 
Head of Region Election of DKI Jakarta, may be understood as 
a group’s distrust in and even hatred towards individual or other 
social group of different ethnic and religion. All this time, Ahok 
is known as the governor of DKI Jakarta who is firm about rule 
of law, transparent, accountable, and does not compromise with 
corruption, collusion and nepotism. Ahok’s weaknesses are that 
he speaks harshly (red: ceplas ceplos), non-Muslim (Christian) and 
Chinese. According to the experts, these make some people to 
dislike (instead of distrust) him. Moreover, Ahok is also exclu-
sionary towards intolerant groups such as the drivers of the de-
fending Islam action.  
The same occurs to the Islamic populism actions in the context 
of Presidential Election 2019. Many assume that the opposition 
of the Islamist groups in their alliance with the ultra-nationalist 
groups is caused more by dislike (instead of distrust) of some 
elements of the society (particularly among Islamists) to Jokowi 
administration. Almost similarly to Ahok, Jokowi is also known 
to be exclusionary towards radical Islamist groups which are suf-
ficiently accommodated by the power in the previous period. 
Actually, the distrust in the government may also be the char-
acteristic of citizen’s criticism for the state administrators. Citi-
zen’s constructive criticisms of the government may even serve to 
strengthen democracy consolidation. However, when the distrust 
is not based on critical thinking, but emotion instead, it may 
change to hatred which will, in turn, cause collective reactionary 
actions to each of government’s policies. The experts deem what 
the proponents of the Islamic populism actions express in the 
anti-Ahok and anti-Jokowi cases as a reactive, instead of critical, 
expression of “disappointment”, which will not implicate in gov-
ernance improvement.
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In practice, primordial disappointment expression of the Is-
lamists to both Ahok and Jokowi will, in turn, cause polarization 
which will eventually lead to sectarianism conflict. Many experts 
assume that the power contestations 2014-2019 are marked with 
extraordinary polarization among citizens resulting from differ-
ence in political choice. The emergence of religion or ulama de-
fender groups versus blasphemer or ulama insulter supporting 
groups, Pancasila groups versus anti-Pancasila/NKRI groups, 
pluralist groups versus anti-pluralist groups, pro-democracy 
groups versus anti-democracy groups, and kampret versus kecebong 
marks political polarization in the power contestation in contem-
porary Indonesia. Moreover, as the result of polarization, conflict 
between the two groups involved in the power contestation un-
avoidably becomes reality. Conflict which involves physical clash 
or violence occurs in the protest action of the Islamic populism 
faction in rejection of General Election result and in guiding the 
siding of General Election dispute in the Constitution Court.  
In many facts, harsh conflict enlivens the dynamic of power 
contestation in Indonesia, as between the Islamists versus plural-
ists, which may be understood as part of ethnical and religious 
diversity instilled so early and in-depth into everyone. In this 
conflict, the enemies often transform to “they, who grow and 
justify their violence and barbarity, are not human”68. In Indone-
sia, religionism has occurred everywhere and for a long time. 
Everyone’s religious passion is pumped up every day through 
various channels, televisions, mass media, social media, schools, 
and others. Consequently, conflicts which use religious label are 
unavoidable69.  
68  Saiful Mujani, Muslim Demokrat, 23.
69  Interview with Hairus salim, July 23, 2019.
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C. Paradox of Contra-Islamic Populism
It has been stated above that Indonesia’s current declining 
democracy (and also in the world) is not only correlated with the 
populism actions promoted by the conservative-radical groups. 
The political elites which control the state power also signifi-
cantly contributes to reducing the quality of democracy. In the 
experts’ opinion, the political elites’ actions are categorized into 
illiberal70 and deemed to be the main factor to cause democracy 
deconsolidation. In Indonesia case, these illiberal actions are often 
displayed by the political elites, including Jokowi administration. 
Jokowi’s policy in issuing Perpu ormas (Government Regulation 
in Lieu of Law of mass organization), his intervention in political 
parties, “criminalization” of opposition actors, and others later 
cause what is known as Jokowi’s authoritarian turn. Differently 
from Suharto’s authoritarianism, Jokowi displays varieties of 
populist authoritarianism71.
Meanwhile, the experts’ discourses of Jokowi’s choice of re-
sponse to the Islamic populism actions cause interesting debate. 
Some of them argue that the government’s firm attitude in pre-
venting as well as countering the populism sponsored by the Is-
lamist groups is deemed appropriate. Among the government’s 
firm policies are dissolution of HTI, restriction of licensing for 
mass mobilization activism in the name of religion such as joint 
prayer, prosecuting legally religious elites who spread hate speech, 
and the likes, that what is conducted by the government is none 
other than maintaining unity of NKRI as well as the dignity of 
70  Liberalism (as an anti-thesis of illiberalism) here is not in economic and social contexts, but in 
political context, which is whether there is freedom of expression, freedom of association. This is 
needed so that voters have maximum opportunity to contribute in democracy, instead of only 
minimum. Interview with Thomas Power, Sept 8, 2019.
71  Thomas P. Power, “Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline”, 2018.
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democracy itself. They assume that such government’s firm atti-
tude is even too late, as stated by M. Amin Abdullah:
In such a case, the government must be present, if otherwise, it will be 
over, and it is too late for about 20 or 30 years. In the past, this is part 
of their weapon, like Pamswakarsa. When TNI is weak because of 
NGOs, the state is weak, it will be over, we must cooperate to create a 
group of Pamswakarsa. It is from such Pamswakarsa that HTI, FPI, 
and the likes are formed72.
According to M. Amin Abdullah, the government’s firm at-
titude to dissolve radical groups that are anti-Pancasila and NKRI 
is deemed to be ideal. However, he acknowledges that such gov-
ernment’s measure is harshly criticized by human rights and 
democracy activists. He states:
These must be corrected. They are wrong. Even if people don’t like 
cancellation or banning of HTI, but when it has actually challenged the 
existence of the nation, then the nation must act, otherwise, it will be 
over. Even if many parties say there is no evidence that HTI rebel? Well, 
if we are waiting for rebellion, it will be over. We will be the next Syria. 
In Konbes in Jogja in ’70s or ‘80s, they clearly stated against nation-state, 
against democracy. It was their proclamation, their manifesto. Will we 
wait for a Syria-like incident to happen for evidence?73
Still according to M. Amin Abdullah, not only the activists, 
the government’s policies are also harshly criticized by Western 
experts and scholars. In his opinion, it is alright, but he says that 
the policies taken by the government is correct, since it priori-
tizes security (preventive measure) instead of waiting for the 
nation to be destroyed to act. He states:
72  Interview July 26, 2019.
73  Interview July 26, 2019.
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It is alright. If the government did not do it, Indonesia will really be the 
next Syria. In my opinion, it is not the government’s fear or phobia of 
radical groups like FPI. They are really a threat. But the 212 is real. 
When the nation gets threatened, then stop human rights, stop 
democracy, al-aman qabla iman (security takes precedence over faith), 
instead of al-iman taking precedence over al-aman, but the otherwise, 
this is a must, the nation must dare to say it. When the existence of the 
nation is threatened, in the sense of harsh statements, not only during 
212, during general election, it was them, even if they use others’ hand, 
the 02. They have done so even in the early stage, then what if they win? 
I mean the radical groups, instead of Prabowo, the groups that benefit 
from him. If they are so violent, if they win, it is possible that Indonesia 
will be like Middle East. The point is we must be careful, Islamic civil 
societies like NU and Muhammadiyah should re-think of their cultural 
strategy74.
Similar view is presented by Muhammad AS Hikam. In his 
opinion, the government’s or nation’s policy to dissolve HTI in 
response to Islamic populism is deemed correct and may be 
stated as democratic. He says, there is nothing wrong in dissolv-
ing HTI through government regulation (Perpu), since what is 
conducted by the government –as the state’s representation— 
aims at protecting itself and maintain the unity of NKRI, ad its 
right to protect the state’s sovereignty is not contradictory to the 
international law. Moreover, he states:
………moreover, the people assume that what is conducted by the 
government in dissolving demonstration as anti-democracy. On the 
contrary, I see it strange. What is undemocratic from the dissolution of 
HTI? What they commonly say is not stated through the court, and 
the argumentation is just like that. But the government also has 
argumentation that, as the representation of the nation, it has the right 
to protect itself and maintain the Indonesian territory. That right is 
acknowledged by the international law and HTI clearly is not only 
74  Interview July 26, 2019.
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contradictory to, but also aims at destroying NKRI. Therefore, the law 
or processes like criminal law cannot be used like those in the Law. 
Therefore, rendering Government Regulation valid does not only take 
legal formal perspective75.
  
On the other hand, many experts of Indonesian Muslim intel-
lectuals and Indonesianists see the response of the government 
and civil society of moderate Muslims to the Islamic populism 
actions, in some cases, as something paradoxical to the demo-
cratic principles. HTI dissolution is one policy mostly criticized. 
According to Moch. Nur Ichwan, the government’s policy to 
dissolve HTI is clearly contradictory to democracy (in the sense 
of liberal democracy). He says in his complete statement:
The government’s policy to dissolve HTI is contradictory to democracy. 
However, in some democratic countries, such banning is made. The 
United States, as the biggest country of human rights, make a list of 
banned movements, and how many are those in our country? They are 
incomparable76. 
A relatively harsh view is presented by Sunarwoto, that the 
contra-populism actions made by the government and Islamic 
moderate organizations are reactive response. Even what they 
have done to the intolerant and anti-democratic groups, in his 
opinion, is also something undemocratic. He states:
In my opinion, it is their response when (as if ) they are struck by wave. 
Our way shouldn’t be this brutal. Just divert them, Islamize them by 
instilling democratic elements, I think it will be better. Give them just 
a little opportunity, but following democracy is a must. Making them 
quit from their ideology will be better than dissolving them. Ideology 
will never change, it is fact. The current HTI is under young generation, 
75  Interview, Sept 31, 2019
76  Interview, July 24, 2019
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that is not as ideological as previous generation. Their ideology is 
market ideology, they are unfamiliar with Nabbani reading and others, 
their readings are from third source77.
Similar view is expressed by Hairus Salim, that the action of 
the government or Islamic moderate organization in dissolving 
HTI is contradictory to the democratic freedom principle. In 
(liberal) democracy, freedom of speech, association, and religion 
is fundamental. When the principle is abandoned, the quality of 
democracy of a nation will, certainly, decline. Salim states:
Referring to the liberal view, it is unacceptable, I mean freedom. 
Therefore, it is not the organization that should be removed, if you 
violate something agreed upon, if it (HTI) violates violence, it must 
clearly be removed by law. Or, if HTI control an office, that is the actual 
problem, our citizenship is incomplete, thus an individual’s ideology 
may influence an office. For example, you are an HTI and become the 
head of BKKN office, then obligate all subordinates to do shalat 
jama’ah, that’s it. Or, you hold a Maulid event, weekly teaching by 
Basalamah, it cannot be resisted, since friends from NU also do so, it is 
incomplete citizenship. I think we were wrong from the start, giving 
religion too big space which should be national. At the end, we cannot 
control it, then we cut it at the end, ban the organization78.
Further, he adds:
………therefore, our view of democracy is limited (limited democracy), 
HTI members may say that our Pancasila is substantial Pancasila, we 
will always enforce divinity, humanity, unified Indonesia and so on. It 
is alright that they says so, and when they tries to replace Pancasila, 
they will be responded legally, not the organization. Organization is 
the core, part of freedom of speech. The dilemma of democracy is that 
77  Interview, July 26, 2019
78  Interview July 23, 2019
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people take advantage of it to fight democracy. Let us see, when they 
are treated inappropriately, they call for human rights, but they treat 
others to their heart content. How can our citizenship education be 
good, while (in fact) religion takes priority79?
Similarly harsh criticisms are given by the Indonesianists. The 
government’s contra-populism action in its alliance with Islamic 
moderate groups, particularly NU, is deemed as reactive response; 
a response which does not only effectively stop radicalism from 
growing, but also often contradicts to democratic principles. Even 
many states that what is conducted by the government in elimi-
nating the Islamic populism power as “arbitrariness”80. However, 
contra-radicalism or populism activism with undemocratic meth-
ods will eventually lead to revenge by the deradicalized group. In 
this case, Greg Fealy states: 
If the government systematically, thoroughly thinks of the consequence 
of its policy, to me, anti-radical is just reactive. There is no comparative 
study with other nation to observe whether this reactive-discriminative 
program is effective or not. In UI, for example, since BNPT conducts a 
research on renowned state universities exposed to radicalism, the rector 
gets depressed. He then starts a program to harshly fight against 
Islamism, until he himself visits Imam of UI mosque to filter all potential 
takmir (administrators). In UI Salemba, Imam in mosque Salemba that 
is indicated as an Islamist is replaced with a professor from NU, and so 
are the takmir, all speakers are from NU. The number of students that 
come there then decreases about 60-70 percent, making the mosque 
empty. Thus, even if the rector informs Jokowi that “I have successfully 
79  Interview July 23, 2019
80  In contemporary period, most of the decline in democracy is not encouraged by ideological 
motivated authoritarianism. In previous periods, fascist, militarist, corporatist, organicist, com-
munist, and other ideological varieties explicitly confront the core principles of representative 
democracy and democratic liberalism; today, erosion of democracy is often driven by populist 
leaders such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turki, who rule and 
promise to represent democratic principles, but actually undermine them to maintain their 
power. Edward Aspinalls, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Eve Warbuton, “Elites, 
Masses and Democratic Decline in Indonesia”, 2019.
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cleared up the campus from groups which may endanger the nation and 
so on” but it is in fact only ‘cosmetic’ (camouflage). There is no polar 
change, and I believe that it is only to conceal the existence of Islamist 
movement or it has more underlying impacts. For example, when a staff 
or student knows that his career will be blocked because of his movement 
or political affiliation, he may remain active in that organization, or he 
may conceal their attitudes and behaviors or PKS/HTI identity. Maybe, 
5-10 years ahead, he will reemerge and be more persistent in his 
Islamization and revenge on those who prevent his struggle81.
An interesting note is also addressed to NU and Muham-
madiyah, to Islamic moderate organizations that are actively in-
volved in deradicalization movement. Greg states:
Both NU and Muhammadiyah are involved, but the impact is only small. 
For Muhammadiyah, there is resistance to get involved in the 
deradicalization program. Deradicalization means de-Islamization or 
de-Islamism, de-PKS-ization, etc. Only few Muhammadiyah figures are 
involved in that program. PP Muhammadiyah are clearly reluctant to get 
involved together with NU that drives that government to ban HTI. A 
very trusted source says that NU is the one that strictly encourages 
Jokowi to ban HTI. Therefore, according to Jokowi, the source of idea to 
ban HTI it not the police, military, but the strongest pressure is from NU. 
Thus, I think NU has very high anti-Islamism spirit, but not so is 
Muhammadiyah. I met the secretary of Muhammadiyah, Abdul Mu’ti, 
at that time, Helmi Faesal, Secretary General of NU tried to persuade 
Muhammadiyah figures to participate in the press conference to state 
that they support HTI banning and Muhammadiyah rejected it. They 
said that if HTI really commit treason, then bring the case to the court. 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no single case committed by a HTI 
member, no one has ever been detained by the police for a treason case. 
And I think Muhammadiyah members say that the government should 
not auto-criticize such groups. Muhammadiyah’s willingness in the anti-
radicalization campaign is very limited82.
81  Interview, 9 Sept 2019.
82  Interview, 9 Sept 2019.
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In contra-radicalism (including populism) activism, moderate 
groups such as NU fights back with no less militancy. They state 
HTI, often HTI-PKS, as enemy which may endanger pluralism, 
democracy and NKRI. They also try to sterilize governmental 
bureaucracy from those supporting, affiliated with and members 
of HTI-PKS. There is a concern that this condition will cause 
never-ending revenge, particularly from the opponent (HTI-
PKS), since they know how to feel as the opposition. What is 
conducted by NU is clearly contra-productive to its identity as 
an Islamic moderate organization83. In this case, Thomas Power, 
for example, states:
even though NU is involved in advocacy of minority groups (ethnic, 
religion, sex, etc.). But the Islamist groups like PKS and others are 
quantitatively minorities. If, as legal organizations (acknowledge by the 
government) that follow the governmental system and participate in 
general election, they are repressed, including, by state apparatus, what 
will happen next? Will they still use formal way or informal methods 
which are far more extreme, anti-system, anti-democracy, etc.? We do 
not know it. If these groups are not given with democratic space, they 
will then find undemocratic way which may endanger democracy 
itself84. 
A different view is presented by Muhammad AS Hikam, who 
understands the measures made by NU and Muhammadiyah in 
countering radicalism, including encouraging the government to 
issue the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law of mass orga-
nization to ban HTI. What is performed by the two Islamic 
moderate organizations –that have completed their statehood--, 
particularly NU, is in their capacity to protect the diverse ways of 
83  Interview with Greg Fealy, Sept 9, 2019; Thomas Power, Sept 8, 2019; and Sunarwoto, July 23, 
2019.
84  Interview, Sept 8, 2019.
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life violated by the Islamic radical groups like HTI, Wahabi and 
Salafi. In addition, what is performed by NU also conforms to 
the purpose of protecting the unity of NKRI. In his opinion, the 
state is off guard for a long time, as proven that HTI has success-
fully taken control over campuses and BUMN, and State Civil 
Apparatus (ASN) as well as TNI personnel are exposed to it. In 
this context, what NU has performed is clearly reactive attitude 
or action. He states:
It cannot be reactive, since HTI has grown for 20 years in Indonesia 
and gets reacted just now. In my opinion, it is the government’s 
weakness that it cannot control how extensive the influence of HTI 
and the hardliners is. NU has been aware since long ago but is limited 
since it is not the state, the government or the authority. NU has 
complained so many times, announced its view and made fatwa that 
this is a threat, certainly a threat to its life world. But after it is exposed 
that the radicalism desires to destroy Indonesia, it is a threat to the 
nation. Thus, the argument that it is reactive is incorrect, except snap 
short, like the event that FPI made a parade and was dissolved by 
Banser in Semarang. Such snap sort must be placed in the context of 
democracy85. 
Meanwhile, the delegitimation by the government is no less 
strict. HTI dissolution, imprisonment of a number of opposition 
individuals accused for violation of IT Law or hate speech, restric-
tion of permit for the opposition groups to implement their social 
activities like the 2019 ganti presiden case, and the likes, are the 
government’s restrictive policy in its effort to deligitimate the 
opposition power. This policy is taken since the government does 
not wish to take risk (not merely potential social vulnerability to 
be caused by the Islamic populism actions that often spread hate 
85  Interview with Muhammad AS Hikam, Sept 31, 2019.
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narrations) of the opposition group’s strengthening potential, 
which may politically lead to the defeat of status quo, like the case 
of Head of Region Election of DKI Jakarta. It seems that the 
regime in power (and so is the opposition group) tends to pri-
oritize how to win the 2019 power contestation without consid-
ering further the health of democracy. In this case, Thomas 
Power states:
“Ideally, we should make preference, like we win and democracy 
remains operating. We are defeated, and democracy also remains 
operating. The essence is healthy democracy is to be prioritized more than 
whether we win or lose. What we see as good of the government or opposition 
is that the two want to win, regardless of whether democracy is healthy or 
not. The point is we win it first, whether democracy will operate or not, be 
healthy or not, just let it be. It is how each party behaves in contestation”86.
In addition, the contra-populism actions launched by the 
government also cause deligitimation issue which involves state 
power instrument. In this case, the government often utilizes the 
state power or instrument as a means to repress the opposition. 
The issuance of Regulation of Law in Lieu of Law of mass orga-
nization, for example, cannot be separated from the role of At-
torney General. This legislative institution’s role may also be ob-
served from its intervention over the opposition parties. Many of 
the regional incumbents, for example, are forced to join the 
Nasdem Party and support Jokowi. In the experts’ criticism, the 
government’s act to utilize the Attorney General is clearly con-
tradictory to the democratic spirit. In this case, Thomas Power 
states:
86  Interview with Thomas Power, Sept 8, 2019
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It is certain that, in a state, there is opposing group, and it is also certain 
that there is anti-democratic group. In developed countries like Europe, 
there are right group, left group and center group. But the problem is 
how the state responds anti-democratic groups? What method is to 
take to dissolve them, whether by transparent method, legal-judicial 
method or executive order, all of which are important to consider. If it 
is only the executive without any check and balance like the issuance of 
Presidential Regulation in Lieu of Law of mass organization, it will be 
deemed undemocratic87. 
87  Interview with Thomas Power, Sept 8, 2019





The dynamics of emergence of Islamic populism and its con-
sequence for democracy in Indonesia after the New Order have 
become a discourse intensively discussed, debated about and re-
viewed by experts. Indonesian Muslim scholars (intellectual, aca-
demics and activists) and Western scholars who are concerned 
about the study of Indonesian social, political and Islamic issues 
(Indonesianists) are recorded as the intelligent group –to borrow 
Yudi Latif ’s term— who actively and productively discuss and 
review such matters. However, reviews of this issue continue and 
various academic works they produce continuously contribute to 
the dynamics of thinking and Indonesia social, political and Is-
lamic studies.
This research is one part of the academic studies which discuss 
the rise of Islamic populism or –to borrow Marcus Mietzner’s 
term—Islamist populism as well as any consequences it causes in 
the development of democracy in Indonesia after the New Order. 
Although many literatures have described Islamic populism and 
how such social-political phenomena which use religious label 
emerge, but there are matters which are not completely described 
yet. Is it appropriate to state the popular mobilization in the name 
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of defending Islam action, defending ulama action, reunion 212, 
people power, and the likes, which are strengthening in the pe-
riod 2016-2019, as Indonesia’s typical Islamic populism, as such 
populism phenomena is rising in some parts of the world? 
With regard to the matter, the result of this research confirms 
that the experts’ discourses, both from Indonesian Muslim schol-
ars and Indonesianists, vary. Generally, they understand the mass 
mobilization phenomena initiated by Islamist groups as Islamic 
populism. The argumentation is that the popular actions involve 
ideology and political narrations which places the mass (particu-
larly the people) in a position vis a vis the regime in power which 
is described as corrupt, dzalim (authoritarian) against the people, 
and part of foreign and aseng (Western and Chinese) powers and 
great mass mobilizations as a strategy to struggle for their po-
litical agenda. This experts’ perspective confirms populism experts’ 
opinion like Cas Mudded an Margaret Cannovan who define 
populism as an ideology or more precisely a thin ideology. Like 
ideational perspective in general, populist ideas (which positions 
the people vis a vis the power structure and dominant value) take 
an important position in constructing reality (political interpreta-
tion) and simultaneously encourage social practice (mass mobi-
lization) to realize their political agenda. However, because of its 
thin character, it cannot stand alone as a political-practical ideol-
ogy: it has no capacity to promote any extensive and coherent 
program for solution to important political questions.
Some experts deem that the popular mobilization actions 
promoted by the conservative-radical Islamist groups represent 
identity politics more. The mass actions do not carry or struggle 
for populous agenda which are directly related to their life im-
provement in the social, economic, educational and political as-
pects at all. The agenda carried by the Islamist groups are prag-
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matic (struggle for power resources) and some are undeniably 
ideological (enforcement of Islamic principles or Islamization of 
public space). The agents of Islamic populism capitalize religious 
and populous symbols as their political strategy to gather mass 
support. The driving actors and the masses who participate in the 
Islamic populism actions are mostly of Muslim mid-class, in 
which they desire (not only economic improvement) improve-
ment of public space pursuant to religious (Islamic) norms. 
Therefore, these groups are concerned more about secularized 
public spaces than poverty issue which burdens the people and 
Muslims.
Meanwhile, some other experts see the popular mobilization 
phenomena which use religious and popular issues as a represen-
tation of Islamic identity political populism in Indonesia, since 
in the action, the Islamist groups, the main actors of the popular 
mobilization, uses religious symbols, sentiment and ideology to 
mobilize the masses to participate in their struggle for political 
agenda. The populism dimension may be viewed in the narrations 
which perceive or place the people, including Muslims, in an 
antagonistic position against the regime in power which is imaged 
as corrupt, authoritarian and pro-blasphemer. In addition, the 
narration of adversity experienced by Muslims, especially in 
economic-political aspect, as caused by domination of foreign and 
aseng parties also marks populism driven by poverty issue. In this 
perspective, the experts view Islamic populism as a mixture of 
identity and social class issues; the latter is typically economic-
political perspective.
With regard to factors which play important role in driving 
the rise of Islamic populism in Indonesia, the experts have differ-
ent views. There are at least four variants of experts’ view, first, 
Islamic populism emerges and rises in the context of political 
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elites’ confrontation, particularly oligarchy, in struggle for and 
preservation of power. In the context of Presidential Elections 
2014 and 2019, the power contestation is full of confrontation 
between two groups of oligarchic political elites which carry ultra-
nationalist populism figure, Prabowo Subianto, against moderate 
populism, Joko Widodo. The confrontation and conflict among 
the oligarchic political elites later drag civil groups (particularly 
conservative-radical) into the fight for power. Many view that the 
mass mobilization launched by the Islamist groups as political 
elites’ means in their struggle for and/or preservation of power.
Second, a view that the rise of Islamic populism di Indonesia 
emerges in line with strengthening religious resurgence with its 
conservative and radical characters. In Martin van Bruinessen’s 
terminology, the Indonesian era after the New Order is in the 
religious conservative turn or illiberal turn in other Indonesianists’ 
term, such as Marcus Mietzner, Edwards Aspinall, Vedi R. Ha-
diz, Paul Kenny and Greg Fealy. The strengthening conservatism 
and various illiberal actions marked with many intolerant and 
violent attitudes and actions with religious labels by both political 
elites and religious elites drive Islamist groups to rise and perform 
mass mobilization to struggle for their political agenda. At the 
same time, strengthening conservatism and illiberalism also in-
tersect with the absence of progressive powers (including among 
Muslims) in public space. Besides fragmentation resulting from 
difference in organization and political agenda, the weakening 
progressive powers in Indonesia cannot be separated from the 
New Order regime’s legacy, which greatly contributes to destroy-
ing these groups. 
Third, the view that the rise of Islamic populism is caused more 
by exclusion of Islamist groups from power domain. All this time, 
the Islamist groups like FPI get privilege from regime in power 
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even since the early reformation in 1998. As commonly known, 
the emergence of Islamic paramilitary organizations like FPI are 
facilitated and utilized by certain political elites. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that when the patron holds power, these para-
military organizations also get free access to power. Until Susilo 
Bambang Yudoyono era, the Islamist groups receive promising 
space and access to power. The condition changes during the 
change in power after SBY. Instead of accommodation in power, 
the Islamist groups are even alienated and marginalized. The 
exclusion of Islamist groups in Jokowi era drives them to rise and 
show their strength by mobilizing the masses. The Ahok case is 
deemed only to be an access door for these groups to draw the 
attention of and negotiate with the ruler for accommodation.
Fourth, a view that the emergence of Islamic populism in 
Indonesia is the consequence of democracy. Generally, right 
populism emerges in response to liberal democracy crisis. Vedi R. 
Hadiz explicitly states that the development of Islamic populism 
cannot be separated from the people’s disappointment at the 
democracy. Differently from conventional populism with curative 
and constructive purpose for democracy process to be more sen-
sitive to people’s demands and aspirations, Islamic populism takes 
different path. People’s words are used as proxy demos (people) to 
exclusively struggle for Muslims’ interest. Instead of supporting 
democracy as the main path to shape governance, Islamic popu-
lism tends to support other than democratic governmental system 
like khilafah or sharia based government.
This research also finds evidences that the popular mobiliza-
tion actions, in almost all of experts’ opinion, significantly con-
tribute to declining quality of democracy in Indonesia. Among 
the Islamic populism’s contributions are, first, Islamic populism 
does not significantly contribute to strengthening democratic 
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legitimation. Instead of deepening democratic legitimation using 
democracy institution and rule of law as a means to struggle for 
their political agenda, the Islamic populism actions even dele-
gitimize them. The street actions which involve a great number 
of people (mobocracy) to influence the government’s decision 
making, as in Ahok case, and influence regular power contestation 
in an uncivilized way are a small part of the form of democratic 
delegitimation.
Second, Islamic populism does not represent reformist or pro-
gressive civil society movement, which is oriented to social change 
and democratization in its struggle. Instead of democratizing 
power and facilitating the people’s interest with the State, Is-
lamic populism is oriented to Islamization and service of oligar-
chy. In experts’ opinion, the Islamist groups are inappropriately 
included into part of civil society organization, since their actions 
are far from being civilized, which are the most important char-
acteristic of civil society. Even if they are included into civil soci-
ety, the Islamist organizations such as HTI and FPI are to be 
included into bad civil society or anti-democratic civil society 
category. Not only non-democratic method, their agenda is (like 
establishment of caliphate) also far from democratic category. 
Third, Islamic populism is evidently intolerant to social, po-
litical and religious diversity and differences. The mass mobiliza-
tion action that demands Ahok to be disqualified from his can-
didacy of governor of DKI Jakarta and imprisoned proves that 
Islamic populism is greatly intolerant to minority like Ahok. The 
other intolerant attitudes and actions are reflected in response to 
Muslims’ different choices, both in Head of Region Election and 
Presidential Election. In the context of power contestation, the 
proponents of Islamic populism often spread propaganda of not 
to pray for late Muslims who are pro and choose the blasphemer 
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(Ahok), to label Ahok and his supporters as infidel, Chinese, 
Christian and any other discriminative labels. Similarly, during 
the Presidential Election, the Islamic populism group frequently 
spreads hoaxes related to Jokowi’s status justified as pro-blas-
phemer, a regime which criminalize ulama, communist descen-
dant, and a regime which is pro-foreign and aseng parties. 
Not limited only popular mobilization by non-state actors of 
the Islamists, the declining quality of democracy in Indonesia is 
also contributed to by State and non-State actors of the moderate 
Muslims. Many experts criticize Jokowi’s policy in handling the 
Islamic populism movement. On one hand, Jokowi attempts to 
reconcile with religious and political elites who are the supporters 
and even important actors of the Islamic populism movement 
like K.H. Ma’ruf Amin and Prabowo Subianto by making them 
part of his administration. This strategy is deemed effective in 
deconsolidating the Islamic populism movement. At the same 
time, Jokowi takes an exclusionary attitude towards Islamic 
populism elements such as FPI (along with Habib Rizieq), HTI, 
and others. Jokowi’s policies to “criminalize” of Islamic populism 
and opposition elites and the issuance of Government Regulation 
in Lieu of Law of Prohibition of HTI are deemed as a form of 
Jokowi’s populist authoritarianism, which are against to the val-
ues, norms and principles of democracy.
B. Suggestion
Although many experts have had many discussions in various 
perspectives, the topic of Islamic populism and its consequences 
for the development of democracy in Indonesia will remain in-
teresting and actual to explore. Many predict that Islamic popu-
lism has ended along with the end of Presidential Election 2019 
and defeat of these anti-democracy groups in power contestation. 
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Contra-populism movements are still launched by the State and 
non-state actors of the moderate Muslims. However, the contra-
populism movement will seriously implicate in the development 
of Islamist groups in religious political activism. The implication 
which is not less interesting than contra-populism is democracy 
development in Indonesia. When the State in its alliance with 
moderate Islamic groups gets more powerful in control and man-
agement of public (including political) space, will democracy in 
Indonesia be more consolidated?  
Some studies have discussed this topic and explained that the 
contra-populism actions in fact contribute to declining quality of 
democracy in Indonesia. This argumentation is based on tempo-
rary finding related to the character of illiberal or democratic 
militant but anti-pluralism contra-populism movements. In the 
past few years, the trend of contra-populism movement are 
likely to have interesting developments, which will also have in-
teresting implications for the process of democracy in Indonesia. 
Many predict that if the militancy of moderate Muslims gets 
stronger, it is possible that liberal-progressive moderate Muslims 
will remain marginalized, which will lead to worsening quality of 
democracy in Indonesia.
This research restricts its scope of study on discourses and 
interpretations of experts of Indonesian Muslim scholars (aca-
demics and intellectual cum activists) and Indonesianists in un-
derstanding the rise of Islamic populism phenomena and its 
implications for the development of democracy in Indonesia 
after the New Order. Although the sources are domestic and 
foreign scholars, but this research cannot compare the two views 
of the experts. Therefore, we suggest the next researchers to ex-
plore these experts’ discourses with a comparative approach or 
study. Although they have rational and liberal scientific traditions, 
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but the further social, cultural and scientific traditions of the 
scholars who live in different part of the world will make it chal-
lenging to explore their thinking construction comparatively.
In addition, there is still high opportunity to continuously 
explore Islamic populism in Indonesia both in macro (national) 
and micro (local) scopes. However, many things related to the 
populism phenomena have not been explored, deepened and 
revealed by the reviewers. Intersections of information from the 
groups that are so far involved in Islamic populism actions, for 
example, have not been successfully touched. As commonly 
known, the proponents of Islamic populism are not only from the 
mainstream Islamists such as HTI, FPI, FUI, Wahdah Islamiyah 
(WI), and others, but also conservative elements of NU, pesantren, 
Muslim traditionalist elites and also Muhammadiyah. It is cer-
tainly interesting to explore and deepen information of these 
Islamist groups, as well as their connection with mainstream Is-
lamist groups. 
In the context of competition for Islamic religious authority 
and public space in Indonesia, plurality, polarization and internal 
contestation of conservative-radical Islamist groups and between 
moderate Islamic groups are also interesting issues. In the context 
of deradicalization and depopulism, the moderate Muslims have 
no similar religious attitudes and actions. Some of them under-
stand the contra-populism movement as the representation of 
Islamic ultra-nationalism, which is not less dangerous than trans-
nationalism. Similarly with the Islamist internal groups, their 
power gets more consolidated and polarized, both because of 
internal conflict and intervention of external power.
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